Judgment

Hegde, J.-The only question that arises for decision in this Appeal by certificate is whether "the suit is barred under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act" (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act). That question is concluded against the respondents in view of the decision of this Court in Shivashankar Prasad Sah and Another v. Baikunth Nath Singh.{1969 (1) SCC 718 :

2. The facts necessary for deciding this appeal, briefly stared, are as follows:

3. The suit from which this appeal arises is based on two simple mortgage deeds executed by one Hardeo Singh, the father of defendant No. 1 (the appellant in this appeal) on his own behalf and as guardian of his minor sons. The first of these two mortgages was executed on September 14, 1943. That was for a sum of Rs. 11. 500/-. The second mortgages. was for a sum of Rs. 4,000/- executed on May 3, 1946. Both of them are simple mortgages. The rate of interest prescribed under those mortgages is 12 per cent, per annum. On the foot of those mortgages, the respondents who are mortegagees brought the suit from which this appeal arises claiming therein a sum of Rs. 30,600./- with future interest. The Trial Court dismissed the suit as being not maintainable in view of the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. But in appeal the High Court of Patna reversed the decree of the Trial Court and granted a preliminary decree for the amount due under those deeds. It granted four months time to the defendants to pay up the decretal amount with interest to the plaintiffs. It father ordered that in default the preliminary decree shall be made final and the properties mentioned in Schedule 3 of the plaint shall be sold to satisfy the decretal dues.

4. Under the two mortgages meationed above, the mortgagor had mortgaged his proprietory right in the properties mentioned in the Schedule annexed to those mortgages. We were were told at the bar that the second mortgage was in respect of the very properties That had been mortgaged under the first mortgage. According to the deferdants all the properties mortgaged under the two deeds mentioned earlier had vested in the Government in view of the provisions of the Act and therefore the mortgagor could have proceeded only under Section 14 of that Act. the defendants contended that the present suit was barred by the provisions of the Act. It was claimed on behalf of the plaintiffs that properties mentioned in Schedule 3 of the plaint are Zirat, Bakasht and Giarmazrua lands. The contention of the plaintiffs was that the properties that fall within the scope of Section 6 of the Act have not vested in the Government under Section 4.

In support of that proposition, the plaintiffs relied on the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Sidheshwar Prasad Singh v. Ram Saroop Singh {AIR 1963 Pat 412: 1963 BLJR802.}The High Court accepted that contention and decreed the suit as mentioned earlier.

5. As mentioned earlier the very question that we are now called upon to decide had been considered and decided by this Court in Shivashankar Prasad s case (supra). Therein this Court ruled that the properties mentioned in Section 6 of the Act have also vested in the Government under Section 4. Dealing with that question this Court observed:

"The consequences of the vesting of an Estate is set out in Section 4. Section 4 (a) provides that once an Estate vests in the State the various rights in respect of that Estate enumerated therein shall also vest in the State, absolutely, free from all encumbrances. Among the rights enumerated therein undoubtedly includes the right of possession. In view of Section 4 (a) there is hardly any doubt that the proprietor loses all his rights in the Estate in question. After setting out the various interests lost by the proprietor that section proceeds to say "such proprietor or tenure-holder shall cease to have any interests in such Estate or tenure other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of th