Judgment

DUA, J.: - These eight appeals with certificate (Crl. Appeals Nos. 151 to 158 of 1966), raise a common question of law and would, therefore, be disposed of by a common judgment. Indeed, all the appeals in the Punjab High Court were also disposed of by a learned single Judge of that Court sitting on circuit at Delhi by a common judgment and another learned single Judge of the same Court similarly certified the cases to be fit for appeal to this Court by a common order.

2. The only question canvassed at the bar requiring determination by us is whether the respondent is liable to be prosecuted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 37 of 1954 (hereafter called the Adulteration Act) for selling adulterated vinegar when the vinegar is being sold under a licence granted under the Fruit Products Order, 1955 (hereafter called the Fruit Order) made by the Central Government under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. The High Court has, relying on an unreported Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in State v. Raj Kumar, (Crl. A. 996 of 1961, D/- 29-10-1962 (Punj)), held that they cannot be prosecuted. It was argued in the High Court that the rules made under the Adulteration Act had come into force after the enforcement of the Fruit Order and vinegar being mentioned as an article of food in those Rules, prosecution under both the provisions of law was permissible. Reliance in support of this argument was also placed on Section 26 of the General Clauses Act. This argument was not accepted and it was observed that the special provisions of the Fruit Order had overriding effect and, therefore, a manufacturer of Fruit Products could only be prosecuted under the provisions of the Fruit Order. Prayer for reference to a larger Bench for reconsideration of Raj Kumar s case Cri. A. 996 of 1961 D/- 29-10-1962 (Punj) (supra) did not find favour with the learned single Judge.

3. In this Court the view taken in Raj Kumar s case, Cri. A. 996 of 1961, D/- 29-10-1962 (Punj) (supra) was sought to be supported by the learned counsel for the respondent. The provisions of the Fruit Order and of the Adulteration Act, it was contended, could not harmoniously co-exist on the statute book as compliance with one would, in certain contingencies, result in violation of the other in some respects. With respect to the particular charges tried in the cases in appeal, however, no attempt was made on behalf of the respondents to show that there was any fatal conflict or inconsistency between the two provisions. The question before us accordingly lies within a very narrow compass. The appellant urged that there is no implied repeal of the Adulteration Act by the Fruit Order in so far as the sale of vinegar is concerned, whereas the case of the respondent is that there is an implied repeal and the respondents are not liable to be prosecuted under the Adulteration Act for violating its provisions. Shri Bishan Narain sought support for his submission from Om Prakash Gupta v. State of U. P., 1957 SCR 423 and T. S. Baliah v. T. S. Rengachari, (1969) 3 SCR 65. In the former case Section 5 (1) (c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was held not to repeal Section 409, I. P. C. The decision of the Punjab High Court (Khosla and Falshaw, JJ.) in State v. Gurcharan Singh, AIR 1952 Punj 89, holding to the contrary was overruled. In the latter case Section 52 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 was held not to repeal Section 177, I. P. C.

4. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the facts of all the eight cases separately as no such reference was made by either side at the bar. Shri Bishan Narain for the appellant, by way of illustration made a passing reference to the facts of Crl. Appeal No. 155 of 1966. From the record of that appeal we find that samples of (i) sugar cane juice vinegar, (ii) vine (pure) vinegar and (iii) pure jaman vinegar, were taken by a Food Inspector from the shop of the respondent on October 17, 1960 and on the same having been found highl