Judgment

MATHEW, J.: -This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment passed in Criminal Appeal No. 58/1966 whereby the High Court of Patna set aside the acquittal of the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judges of Chapra and convicted him under Section 82 (d) of the Indian Registration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and sentenced him to six months rigorous imprisonment.

2. One Ramnagina Rai filed a complaint before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Chapra, against Bishundeo Rai, Sheo Deo Prasad Rai, Mohan Rai, Jangli Rai and the appellant stating that they entered into a conspiracy and forged a Zerpeshgi deed on 25-1-1964 purporting to be executed by Bishundeo Rai and Nageshwar Rai in favour of Jangli Rai in which Sheo Deo Prasad Rai falsely personated Nageshwar Rai. The Sessions Court, to which the case was committed, after trial came to the conclusion that Sheo Deo Prasad Rai, posing as Nageshwar son of Bujhawan, executed the Zerpeshgi deed and that Sheo Deo Prasad Rai falsely personated as Nageshwar before the sub-Registrar, that no such person as Nageshwar existed and that Bishundeo Rai, the father of Sheo Deo Prasad Rai and co-executing of the document was a party to the forgery. The Court, therefore, convicted Bishundeo Rai and Sheo Deo Prasad Rai of offences under Section 467 and Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. Bishundeo and Sheo Deo Prasad were also convicted under Sections 82 (d) and 82 (c) respectively of the Act. The remaining three accused were given the benefit of doubt and acquitted. Two appeals were filed from this judgment to the High Court, namely Cri. A. No 205/1966 and Criminal Appeal No. 58/1966 We are only concerned with the appeal filed by the complainant against the acquittal of the appellant, namely, Criminal Appeal No. 58/1966. In that appeal, the High Court came to the conclusion that the Sessions Judge was wrong in acquitting the appellant as there was clear evidence that it was he who identified Sheo Deo Prasad Rai Nageshwar, son of Bujhawan, before the Sub-Registrar. The Court therefore, convicted him under Section 82 (d) of the Act for abetment of an offence under Section 82 after overruling his contention that the complaint was not maintainable without the permission as required by Section 83 of the Act.

3. In this Court, the only point argued on behalf of the appellant was that the complaint was incompetent as it was filed by a person without obtaining the necessary permission under Section 83 of the Act and, therefore, the conviction was bad and must be set aside. Section 83 of the Act provides:

"83 (1) A prosecution for any offence under this Act coming to the knowledge of a registering officer in his official capacity may be commenced by or with the permission of the Inspector General, the Registrar or the Sub-Registrar, in whose territories, district or sub-district, as the case may be, the offence has been committed.

"(2) Offences punishable under this Act shall be triable by any Court or officer exercising powers not less than those of a Magistrate of the second class."

On a reading of the section, it would be clear that it deals only with prosecution for an offence under the Act coming to the knowledge of the Registering Officer in his official capacity. It, in effect, provides that where an offence comes to the knowledge of the Registering Officer in his official capacity, a prosecution may be commenced by or with the permission of any of the officers mentioned in the section. The section can possibly have no application to cases in which offences are committed under the Act but the offences do not come to the knowledge of the Registering Officer in his official capacity. If the Registering officer does not know in his official capacity that the document produced before him is a false document or that the person appearing before him is personating some other person, the section has no application. The section is not prohibitory in that it does not preclu