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1972 Supreme(SC) 149

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
C.A. VAIDIALINGAM, I.D. DUA AND G.K. MITTER, JJ.
M/s. Chhotabhai Jethabhai Patel and Co., Appellant
Versus
The Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur and others Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 12 of 1968, D/- 9-3-1972.
Advocates appeared
Mr. M. N. Phadke, Sr. Advocate Mr. Mohinder Narain Advocate for M/s. Rajinder Narain and Co., with him, for Appellant.

Advocates:
M.N.Phadke, MOHINDER NARAIN, RAJENDER NARAIN

Headnote:

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 227 - Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 - Sections 78, 2, 3, 9, 10, 11 to 22, 42 to 47, 31, 41, 77, 71, 72 - Appellant Had Framed A Charge Sheet - In Respect Of Certain Acts Of Misconduct - Gross Negligence Of Duty - He had been forced to append his signature to a certain paper without same having been read over to him - Labour Court after holding an enquiry took view that findings of enquiry officer were perverse that order of dismissal was passed by a person not authorised to exercise power and consequently Labour Court directed reinstatement of third respondent with all back wages - Appellant preferred an appeal to State Industrial Court contending inter alia that third respondent had failed to comply with provisions of law in that he did not make an application which was a condition precedent to approaching Labour Court and prayed that order of Labour Court should be set aside on that ground alone – Held, It must be held that a person who is dismissed would be an employee within meaning and we can see no valid reason for differentiating case of a dismissed employee from one who complains of some other change - As scheme of Act is that disputes should be settled as far as possible and primarily through conciliation and agreement it does not stand to reasons that an employee should be able to side-step all this by a direct reference to Labour Court - A Labour Court is a creature of statute and it can only exercise such jurisdiction as statute confers on it - If there are certain pre-conditions to exercise of its jurisdiction it must refuse to entertain any such application unless such pre-conditions are first complied with - Appeal allowed.

Judgement

MITTER, J.:- In this appeal by certificate the question involved is, whether the Labour Court at Nagpur could exercise jurisdiction under Section 78 (1) (D) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Actin a case where the employee of an industry governed by the Act had not complied with the provisions of Section 42 (4)_ of the said statute read with the proviso to the said sub-section. The Bombay High Court has held that it was not necessary for an employee first to approach the employer or to follow the procedure laid down in Section 42 (4) including the proviso before the could apply to the Labour Court for relief under Section 78 (1) (D).

2. The facts are as follows. One Nathu, respondent No. 3 herein was employed as a munshi in the appellant s Bidi factory at Bhandara. The appellant had framed a charge sheet against him in respect of certain acts of misconduct, gross negligence of duty, insubordination etc. on May 13, 1965. As enquiry in respect thereof was held on May 15th after receipt of written statement from Nathu. Holding that the charges levelled against him were proved, the employer dismissed the third respondent with effect from August 1, 1965. The said respondent filed an application challenging the order of dismissal before the Labour Court under Section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, hereinafter referred to as the Act , on the 5th August. His complaint was that the charge sheet was not proper, that the Head Office of the appellant had no authority to deal with his case under the Standing Orders, that no evidence was allowed or filed on behalf of the employer and that the finding was based only on his statement and in particular his cross-examination. He had been forced to append his signature to a certain paper without the same having been read over to him. The Labour Court after holding an enquiry took the view that the findings of the enquiry officer were perverse, that the order of dismissal was passed by a person not authorised to exercise the power and consequently the Labour Court directed the reinstatement of the third respondent with all back wages. The appellant preferred an appeal to the State Industrial Court contending, inter alia, that the third respondent had failed to comply with the provisions of law in that he did not make an application under Section 42 (4) of the Act which was a condition precedent to approaching the Labour Court and prayed that the order of the Labour Court should be set aside on that ground alone. The Industrial Court confirmed the order of the Labour Court. The appellant then filed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before the Bombay High Court. The High Court held against the appellant. Unfortunately, there is no appearance for the respondent before us.

3. In order to appreciate the scope of the Labour Court s jurisdiction under the Act and in particular the attractability of Section 78 (1) (D) it is necessary to examine the scheme of the Act as a whole including the provisions relevant for this appeal. The Act when first passed in 1946 known as the Bombay Industrial Relations Act was applicable to a limited area with the State. In the Vidarbha region of the State, there was another similar Act in operation. The Act suffered numerous amendments from time to time until 1965 when Maharashtra Act 22 of 1965 was passed. The new Act was described as an Act "to extend the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 throughout the State of Maharashtra and for that and for certain other purposes further to amend that Act, and to repeal corresponding laws in force in any part of the State."

Under Section 2 of that Act the Bombay Industrial Relations Act of 1946 as in force immediately before the commencement of the 1965 Act in the Bombay area of the State of Maharashtra was extended to the rest of the State. The C. P. and Berar Act was repealed. As a result, the Act now extends to the whole of the State. Chapter I contains only three sections: Section 2 d






























































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