Judgment

SHELAT, J.:- On September 24, 1971, the District Magistrate, Hooghly, in exercise of the power conferred on him under sub-s. (1) read with sub-section (2) of S. 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) passed the order impugned in this petition directing the petitioner s detention, being satisfied that it was necessary to do so "with a view to preventing him acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order or security of the State". Pursuant to the order the petitioner was arrested on that very day and detained in Hooghly Jail.

2. The grounds of detention served on the petitioner on that occasion were as follows:

"(1) On 8-7-71 at about 21.00 hours you alone with your associates held a meeting in a house at village Jagannathpur, P. S. Khanakul, District Hooghly and decided to kill Jotedars and richmen of the locality.

(2) On 10-7-71 at about 21.30 hours you along with your associates attacked one Sk. Ismail s/o L. Sk Lakhe of Sathpaitha, P. S. Khanakul, District Hooghly and tried to assault him by Tange and a dagger with intent to kill him.

(3) On 25-8-71 at about 16.30 hours you along with your associates addressed a meeting at Chhabbishpur Bazar in front of Lal Baba Temple and impressed upon the gathering to use arms to establish common people Raj in the country and for the same purpose you urged killing policemen and gun licencees and collection of arms and ammunitions from them. You also disregarded the Indian National Flag by trampling (it)under foot and shouted slogans saying, "We don t recognise the National Flag. Down with this Government. Let us form a peasant s Raj" etc."

3. In regard to the language used in the impugned order and the grounds of detention, counsel appearing amicus curiae for the petitioner raised two contentions. One was that the recital in the impugned order that the District Magistrate was satisfied of the necessity of the petitioner s detention to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to "the maintenance of public order or the security of the State" indicated that he had not applied his mind with any seriousness either to the acts alleged in the grounds of detention against the petitioner or to the question whether they fell within the purview of the expression "the security of the State or the maintenance of public order" or both. The other contention was that ground No. 2 in any case was not germane to the concept of either the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, in respect of which alone S. 3 authorised him to direct detention. The impugned order, urged counsel, becomes unsustainable on either of his two contentions.

4. The Act confers extraordinary power on the executive to detain a person without recourse to the ordinary laws of the land and to trial by courts. Obviously, such a power places the personal liberty of such a person in extreme peril against which he is provided with limited right of challenge only. There can, therefore, be no doubt that such a law has to be strictly construed. Equally also, the power conferred by such a law has to be exercised with extreme care and scrupulously within the bounds laid down in such a law.

5. Section 3 of the Act empowers the authorities specified therein to detain a person on the specific grounds laid down therein, namely, preventing the person concerned from acting in a manner prejudicial to (i) the Defence of India, relations of India with foreign powers or the security of India, or (ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or (iii) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. We are not concerned with a foreigner, to whom cl. (b) of the section also would apply, and therefore, that clause need not detain us. Section 3 thus clearly lays down that the power of detention conferred thereunder can be exercised on any one or more of the said grounds. Obviously, therefore, if the power is exercised on