SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1972 Supreme(SC) 329

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
J.M. SHELAT, I.D. DUA AND H.R. KHANNA, JJ.
Joydeb Gorai, Petitioner
Versus
State of W.B., Respondent.
Writ Petn. No. 39 of 1972,
D/- 24-7-1972.
Advocates Appeared
Mr. S. Lakshminarasu, Advocate, amicus curiae, for Petitioner; Mr. G. I. Mukhoty, Advocate, Mr. Sukumar Basu, Advocate of M/s. Sukumar Basu and Co., Advocates, for Respondent.

Headnote:

West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act – Section 3(3) r/w(1) – Detention - Legality of a detention order - District Magistrate, passed order impugned in this petition directing the petitioner s detention under sub-sec. (1) read with sub-section (3) of Sec.3 of West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, being President s Act XIX of 1970, on ground that such detention was necessary "with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order - There is no dispute that consequent upon the passing of said order that Government of West Bengal and other relevant authorities under Act duly took all consequential steps such as reporting to and obtaining Government order of approval reporting to the Central Government, disposal of petitioner representation referring petitioner case to Advisory Board and obtaining its opinion etc within respective times prescribed by Act - Whether detention was to be terminated or continued – Held, Counsel, however, argued that though decisions of this Court have laid down that such an order of confirmation has to be passed within three months from date of arrest, the appropriate Government has to pass such an order as soon as possible and cannot delay in doing so until expiry of three months - This decision, thus, makes it clear that legality of a detention order or the detention thereunder would not be affected if an order of confirmation is passed before expiry of three months from date of detention - When the State Government receives that opinion, it has still the option to exercise power and to continue detention beyond the period of three months or not - Confirmation is the exercise of power to continue detention after the expiry of three months - Unless that power is exercised within the period of three months from date of detention, detention after expiry of that period would be without the authority of the law - Therefore, if the order of confirmation has been passed, as it has been done in the present case, within three month time from date of arrest, neither legality of the detention order nor the continued detention thereunder is affected - Both the contentions raised by counsel thus having failed, petition also must fail and is consequently dismissed - Petition dismissed.

Judgement

SHELAT, J.:- The District Magistrate, Burdwan passed the order impugned in this petition on July 14, 1971 directing the petitioner s detention under sub-sec. (1) read wth sub-section (3) of Sec.3 of the West Bengal (Prevention of Violent Activities) Act, being President s Act XIX of 1970, on the ground that such detention was necessary "with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order". In pursuance of the order the petitioner was arrested on August 6, 1971 when he was furnished, as required by the Act, the grounds of detention.

2. There is no dispute that consequent upon the passing of the said order that Government of West Bengal and the other relevant authorities under the Act duly took all consequential steps such as the reporting to and obtaining the Government s order of approval reporting to the Central Government, disposal of the petitioner s representation referring the petitioner s case to the Advisory Board and obtaining its opinion etc. within the respective times prescribed by the Act.

3. Two grounds questioning the validity of the said order and the detention thereunder were, however, urged by Mr. Lakshminarasu, appearing for the petitioner amicus curiae. The first was that the first ground in the grounds of detention was irrelevant and therefore vitiated the entire order. The second was that there was undue delay in the confirmation by the State Government of the detention order and the continuance of detention thereunder after the expiry of three months of detention.

The first ground in the grounds of detention runs as follows:

"That on 7-2-71 at 13.30 hours you and your associates had been to the house of Shri Bibhuti Bhusan Ghosh of Ranchi Dhowrah, Police Station Kulti, and asked him to rub (out) the anti-naxalite slogans written on the wall of his house. Being refused you threatened to kill him. Your such act terrorised the common public and as such they could not pursue the normal avocations of life. Moreover, it disturbed public order".

The question is whether threat to kill the said Bibhuti Bhusan Ghosh amounted to "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" as defined in Sec. 3 (2) (d) of the Act. Cl. (d) amongst other things provides that committing any offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term extending to seven years or more, where the commission of such offence disturbs or is likely to disturb public order, would fall within the said definition of the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order". Section 506 of the Penal Code provides that a threat to cause death or grievous hurt or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years or with fine or both. That being so, the offence said to have been committed by the petitioner clearly was one of the offences enumerated in cl. (d) of Sec. 3 (2) of the Act. Ground No.(1) further alleges that the threat to kill the said Ghosh administered to him on account of his refusal to rub out the anti-naxalite slogans written on the wall of his house "terrorised the common public and as such they could not pursue the normal avocations of life" and furthermore, disturbed public order. This assertion coupled with the satisfaction of the other requirement of cl. (d) of Sec.3 (2), namely, the committal of the offence of threatening to kill, would bring the act in question within the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" as defined in Sec. 3 (2). It cannot, therefore, be argued that ground No.(1) was extraneous or irrelevant to the objects set out in Section 3 of the Act and in respect of which a valid order of detention could be made under the Act.

4. The second contention also is not such as can be sustained. There is no dispute that the petitioner was





Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top