SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K.S. HEGDE AND A.N. GROVER, JJ.
Devi Singh, Appellant
Versus
Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 743 (N) of 1967, D/- 20-7-1972.
Advocates appeared
Mr. S. T. Desai, Sr. Advocate (M/s. R. V. Pillai, Manik Lal Waghray and R.K.P. Shankardass, Advocates, with him), for Appellant; Mr. B. V. Subramaniam, Sr. Advocate, (M/s. A. Subbarao, K. R. Nagaraja, Qamaruddin and K. L. Mehta for Mr. K. R. Sharma, Advocates with him), for Respondent.
Hyderabad Municipal Corporations Act 1950 – Section 59 and 447 - Permanent injunction - Municipal taxes - Appellant instituted a suit against respondent for a permanent injunction restraining respondent from obstructing appellant possession and enjoyment of his property and from collecting any amount therefrom except prescribed municipal taxes - Suit was decreed by trial court - On appeal by the respondent the decree of trial court was reversed by High Court - According to allegations in the plaint disputed property which hereinafter referred to as the "Bazaar" and bounded on the east by canal and police station, on west by Bakar Mandi , on north by cement road, graveyard and huts belonging to plaintiff and on the south by land, huts and graveyards belonging to plaintiff was the ancestral property of plaintiff and was owned by him having been purchased by his ancestors - Whether Bazaar was property of plaintiff and was in his possession at time of institution of suit - Held, It has been maintained before court on behalf of the plaintiff that the orders made by one were admissible and relevant under S. 13 of the Evidence Act - These points were not gone into by courts below and have still not been decided and court do not wish to express any opinion on them - In court judgment this is a fit case in which a remand is necessary to the trial court - Trial court shall decide the matter afresh only on issues relating to title and possession of parties with the exception of such legal points which have already been disposed of by court - Both sides have expressed willingness to produce before trial court all such documents which are relevant and which are in existence to enable court to dispose of the question of title and possession of both the parties in a satisfactory manner - Appeal is consequently allowed and the case is remanded to the trial court for disposal in accordance with law in light of the direction given - Case remanded.
Judgment
GROVER, J. :- This is an appeal by certificate from a judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.
2. In the year 1953 the appellant instituted a suit against the respondent for a permanent injunction restraining the respondent from obstructing the appellant s possession and enjoyment of his property known as Jumerate Bazaarat and from collecting any amount therefrom except the prescribed municipal taxes. The suit was decreed by the trial court. On appeal by the respondent the decree of the trial court was reversed by the High Court and the suit was dismissed.
3. According to the allegations in the plaint the disputed property which was called "Maidan Bazaar Jamerath", hereinafter referred to as the "Bazaar" situated at Karvan Aspan and bounded on the east by canal and police station, on the west by Bakar Mandi , on the north by cement road, graveyard and huts belonging to the plaintiff and on the south by land, huts and graveyards belonging to the plaintiff was the ancestral property of the plaintiff and was owned by him having been purchased by his ancestors. In the 1346 Fasli i.e. 1936 A.D. the Sarfe-Khas Murbarak which was the Department-in-charge of the personal estate of the Nizam of Hyderabad made efforts to acquire the possession of the Bazaar claiming title over it and actually took possession of the same. Under the terms of certain agreements between the Sarfe-Khas and the Municipal Corporation all the Bazaars in the possession of Sarfe-Khas were entrusted to the Corporation on the condition that it should manage them and pay a specified amount to the Sarfe-Khas. The right to recover the tax was transferred from the Bazaarath Department of Sarfe-Khas to the Municipal Corporation but the property remained in the possession of the said Department of the Sarfe-Khas. The plaintiff laid claim with the Sarfe-Khas to the Bazaar and after full inquiry the title was admitted by the Sarfe-Khas Department over the Bazaar and other adjacent property which had been taken possession by the Sarfe-Khas. The latter relinquished its claim to the title of the entire property including the Bazaar and decided to restore the entire property to the plaintiff and pay him the mesne profits in compliance with the order dated May 22, 1950 passed by the Minister concerned. The possession of the entire property to which Sarfe-Khas was claiming title but which actually belonged to the plaintiff including the Bazaar was delivered to him. The defendant was informed by means of a letter dated May 17, 1952 by the Sarfe-Khas about such delivery of possession to the plaintiff which belonged to him. According to the plaintiff the defendant had been obstructing his possession for some time before the institution of the suit and proceedings under S. 107 of the Criminal Procedure Code were also taken against the plaintiff; but the case of the defendant was not accepted in those proceedings. The plaintiff, therefore, claimed a permanent injunction in the terms stated before.
4. The defendant in its written statement denied that the Bazaar was ancestral property of the plaintiff and was owned and possessed by him. It was claimed that the suit land was owned and possessed by the defendant namely, the Municipal Corporation. As regards the judgments passed by the Sarfe-Khas and the order of the Minister it was stated that those were not binding on the defendant as the defendant was not made a party to those proceedings. Reliance was placed, in particular, on a Firman dated the 20th April, 1939 issued by the Nizam. It was asserted that the plaintiff had never been given possession of the suit land nor did that land have any concern with the proceeding mentioned in the plaint. In para 6 of the written statement it was averred that the true facts were that in compliance with the Firman mentioned above the City Improvement Board had given the land to the defendant extending from the Muslim Jang Bridge to the old Bridge. It was further stated that the Municipa
Login now and unlock free premium legal research
Login to SupremeToday AI and access free legal analysis, AI highlights, and smart tools.
Login
now!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
Copyright © 2023 Vikas Info Solution Pvt Ltd. All Rights Reserved.