SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1972 Supreme(SC) 509

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
H.R. KHANNA AND K.K. MATHEW, JJ.
P. D. Jambhekar, Appellant
Versus
State of Gujarat, Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 91 of 1970, D/- 25-10-1972.
Advocates appeared
Mr. S. T. Desai, Sr. Advocate, (Mr. N. N. Keswani, Advocate, with him), for Appellant; M/s. S. K. Dholakia and B. D. Sharma, Advocates, for Respondents.

Headnote:

Factories Act, 1948 – Section 92 and 106 - Mining Act, 1952 – Section 21(1)(iv)(c),23(2) and 79 – Accident – Factory accident - One was a worker in factory in question of which appellant was Manager - Worker while cleaning the clip steering machine with a rag near delivery side slipped when machine was in motion, and while trying to save himself, his right hand was trapped into bevel gears of stentering machine - Bevel gears were at a height of three feet from ground floor and are dangerous parts of stentering machine and were not safe by position and construction - As a result of the injury his fingers had to be amputated - In respect of this accident, Inspector of factories received a report from concerned authority - Inspector visited the factory and made an enquiry into accident - Thereafter he filed the complaint for an offence punishable under S. 92 of the Factories Act, 1948 - Whether facts mentioned in report were sufficient to convey the knowledge of commission of an offence under the Act – Held, in the circumstances, therefore, delay in making the inquiry however irregular or deplorable cannot affect the question of limitation - As Section 106 makes date of knowledge of commission of offence starting point of the period of limitation, court find it difficult to read section so as to make date on which Inspector would or ought to have acquired knowledge of commission of offence had he been diligent, starting point of limitation, especially where, as here statute does not provide for an inquiry into accident much less period with which inquiry has to be made - It is only in the jurisprudence of Humpty Dumpty that court can equate "date on which alleged offence came to knowledge of an Inspector" with date on which alleged offence ought to have come to his knowledge. Court think that High Court was right in its conclusion - Appeal dismissed.

Judgment

MATHEW, J. :- This is an appeal by Special Leave from the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Revision Application No. 244 of 1969. By the judgment the High Court set aside the order of the Chief City Magistrate, Ahmedabad, dismissing the complaint filed by the Inspector of Factories against the Manager of Arun Mills Ltd., the appellant here, on the ground that the prosecution was barred by time.

2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. One Chandrakant Jethalal was a worker in the factory in question of which the appellant was the Manager. On February 27, 1968, the worker while cleaning the clip stentering machine with a rag near the delivery side slipped when the machine was in motion, and while trying to save himself, his right hand was trapped into the bevel gears of the stentering machine. The bevel gears were at a height of three feet from the ground floor and are dangerous parts of the stentering machine and were not safe by position and construction. As a result of the injury his fingers had to be amputated. In respect of this accident, the Inspector of factories received a report from the concerned authority on February 28, 1968. The Inspector visited the factory on 30-7-68 and made an enquiry into the accident. Thereafter he filed the complaint on 20-9-68 for an offence punishable under S. 92 of the Factories Act, 1948 (hereinafter called the Act). On behalf of the accused a preliminary objection was taken that the prosecution was barred by time in view of the provisions of S. 106 of the Act which provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months of the date on which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of an Inspector. The Magistrate found that the report conveyed knowledge of the commission of an offence and that the Inspector came to know about the commission of the offence on the date the report was received by him and therefore the complaint was barred by time. It was against this order that the revision application was filed before the High Court. The High Court came to the conclusion that the Inspector did not get any knowledge of the commission of an offence under the Act from the report, and as he got the knowledge of the commission of the offence only on the date of the enquiry, the complaint was filed within time.

3. So, the main question in this case is whether the facts mentioned in the report were sufficient to convey the knowledge of the commission of an offence under the Act. There is no controversy here that the offence committed, if any, is one under clause (iv) (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act. Section 21 (1) (iv) (c) reads as follows :

"Unless they are in such position or of such construction as to be safe to every person employed in the factory as they would be if they were securely fenced, the following, namely,

(a) every part of an electric generator, a motor or rotary convertor;

(b) every part of transmission machinery; and

(c) every dangerous part of any other machinery,

shall be securely fenced by safeguards of substantial construction which shall be kept in position while the parts of machinery they are fencing are in motion or in use:"

A plaim reading of Section 21 (1) (iv) (c) would indicate that every dangerous part of any other machinery shall be securely fenced by safeguard of substantial construction which shall be kept in position while the parts of machinery they are fencing are in motion or in use and that is to be done unless they are in such position or of such construction as to be safe to every person employed in the factory as they would be if they were securely fenced. In other words, if those dangerous parts are in suchs position or are of such construction as to be safe to every person employed, the question of securely fencing by safeguard of substantial construction and of keeping them in position while the parts














Click Here to Read the rest of this document
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top