Gulam Abbas vs Haji Kayyum Ali - 1972 Supreme(SC) 444

Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

1972 Supreme(SC) 444

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.N. GROVER, M.H. BEG AND A.K. MUKHERJEA, JJ.
Gulam Abbas, Appellant
Versus
Haji Kayyam Ali and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 2134 of 1970, D/- 18-9-1972.
Advocates appeared
Mr. K. Rajendra Chowdhry, Advocate, for Appellant; M/s. P. C. Bhartari, D. N. Mishra, Advocates of M/s. J. B. Dadachanji and Co., Advocates, for Respondent No. 1.

Headnote:(1) Contract Act, 1872-S. 23-renunciation of spes successionis by a Mahommadan heir-is not hit by the section.
       A renunciation of an expectancy, as a purported but legally in affective transfer, is not struck by section 23 of the Contract Act. AIR 1959 Mad. 131 overruled. [Para 5
       (2) Mahommadan Law-succession-expectant heir-renunciation of rights to inherit after receiving consideration-is not prohibited-operates as estoppel.
       (3) Evidence Act, 1872-S. 115-estoppel by conduct-heir relinquishing right to inheritance after taking consideration-is estopped from claiming share in inheritance.
       A renunciation by an expectant Mohammadan heir in the life-time of his ancestor is not valid, or enforceable against him after the vesting of the inheritance. But if the expectant heir goes further and receives consideration and so conducts himself as to mislead an owner into not making dispositions of his property inter vivos the expectant heir could be debarred from set ting up his right when it does unquestionably vest in him. The principle of estoppel operates in such a case. [Para 7
       The renunciation of a supposed right, based upon an expectancy, could not by any test found there, be considered "prohibited". The binding force in future of such a renunciation would even according to strict Muslim Jurisprudence, depend upon the attendant circumstances and the whole course of conduct of which it forms a part. In other words, the principle of an equitable estoppel, far from being opposed to any principle of Muslim Law will be found, on investigation to be completely in consonance with it. AIR 1959 Mad. 131 & AIR 1964 Kerala 200 overruled. AIR 1956 All. 573 & AIR 1956 Tra. 217 approved. [Para 8
       Where the plaintiff executes deeds of relinquishment during the life time of their father and obtained consideration for the same, and never objected during the life time of their father, then estopped by their conduct, on an application of section 115. Evidence Act, for claiming any right to inheritance which accrued to them on their father's death covered by the deeds of relinquishment for consideration, irrespective of the question whether the deeds could operate as legally valid and effective surrenders of their spes successionis. [Para 17
       (4) Family arrangement-law as to -what is a family arrangement.
       Our law relating to family arrangement is based on English Law.
       A family arrangement is an agreement between members of the same family intended to be generally and reasonably for the benefit of the family either by compromising doubtful or disputed rights or by preserving the family property or the peace and security of the family by avoiding litigation or by saving its honour.
       The arrangement may be implied from a long course of dealing but it is more usual to embody or to effectuate the agreement in a deed to which the term "family arrangement" is applied. "Matters which would be fatal to the validity of similar transactions between strangers are not objections to the binding effect of family arrangements. [Para 6

Judgement Key Points

The ratio of this case primarily revolves around the principle that a renunciation of a right based on an expectancy, such as an inheritance, is not prohibited by law and can be valid if supported by consideration and conduct. Furthermore, the case establishes that such a renunciation, when coupled with conduct that misleads others into believing the right has been relinquished, can operate as an estoppel against the claimant when the inheritance rights vest. The court emphasizes that the principle of estoppel can be applied to prevent a person from asserting a right to inheritance if their conduct has led others to believe that they have relinquished such rights, especially when supported by consideration. Additionally, the case clarifies that under Muslim law, a mere expectancy cannot be transferred or renounced, but conduct and consideration can create an equitable estoppel that binds the parties. The decision underscores that the law recognizes family arrangements and conduct as valid indicators of intent and can operate to bar claims to inheritance when such conduct has led to a change in the position of other parties, even if the formal legal validity of the renunciation is questionable.

Judgment

BEG, J. :- This is a Defendant s appeal by Special Leave against the Judgment and decree of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh allowing a second appeal in a partition suit between members of a family governed by Muslim law. The Defendant-Appellant and the Plaintiff-Respondent are both sons of Kadir Ali Bohra who died on 5-4-1952 leaving 555 behind five sons and a daughter and his widow as his heirs. It appears that Kadir Ali had incurred debts so heavily that all his property would have been swallowed up to liquidate these. Three of his sons, namely, Ghulam Abbas, Defendant No. 1, Abdullah, Defendant No. 2, and Imdad, Defendant No. 3, who had prospered, came to his rescue so that the property may be saved. But, apparently, they paid up the debts only in order to get the properties for themselves to the exclusion of the other two sons, namely Kayyumali, Plaintiff-Respondent, and Nazarali, Defendant No. 4, who executed, on 10-10-1942, deeds acknowledging receipt of some cash and moveable properties as consideration for not claiming any rights in future in the properties mentioned in the deeds in which they gave up their possible rights in future. The executant of each deed said :

"I have accordingly taken the things mentioned above as the equivalent of my share and I have out of free will written this. I have no claim in the properties hereafter and if I put up a claim in future to any of the properties I shall be proved false by this document. I shall have no objection to my father giving any of the properties to my other brothers. . . . . . . . . . . .".

During the father s lifetime, when all chance or expectation of inheritance by either Kayyumbi or Nazarali could be destroyed by disposition of property, neither of these two raised his little finger to object. The only question before us now is whether the plaintiff and Defendant No. 4 are estopped by their declarations and conduct and silence from claiming their shares in the properties covered by these deeds.

2. The first appellate Court, the final Court on questions of fact, recorded the following findings, after examining the whole set of facts before it, to conclude that the plaintiff and defendant No. 4 were estopped from claiming their shares in the inheritence :

"In the instant case, it is evident that the release deeds Ex. D/2 and Ex. D/3 were executed by the plaintiff and defendant No. 4, Nazarali, when the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 had with their labour and money straightened the status of their father Kadarali and had cleared up the debts which would have devoured the whole property of Kadar Ali and the plaintiff was doing nothing and was in a way a burden to his father. In such state of things when the plaintiff and defendant No. 4 executed the release deeds in question, it can be said that it was a family settlement to prevent the future disputes that may arises and to secure the peace and happiness in the family of the parties and thereby induced the defendants Nos. 1, 2 and 3 to believe that the plaintiff would not claim a share in the suit properties and led them to discharge the debts due to Kadar Ali and to be in affluent circumstances themselves as they are at present and the plaintiff now seeks benefit of it against his own past undertakings."

3. The High Court reproduced the passage, quoted above, from the judgment of the First Appellate Court, with out any dissent from any of the findings of fact contained there. It specifically held that the Court below was correct in finding that consideration had passed to the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 4 for the relinquishment of their future possible rights of inheritance. It proceeded on the assumption that, if the law had not prohibited the transfer of his right of inheritance by a Muslim heir, an estoppel would have operated against the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 4 on the findings given. It held that the rule of Muslim Personal law on the subject has the same effect as Section 6 (1) of the Transfer of Proper

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