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1972 Supreme(SC) 499

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.N. RAY, D.G. PALEKAR, M.H. BEG AND S.N. DWIVEDI, JJ.
Madan Lal, Appellant
Versus
Bhai Anand Singh and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 57 of 1972, D/- 12-10-1972.

Headnote:

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 3 of 1949 – Section 13(2) - Indian Arbitration Act – Section 34 – Land on lease - Termination of tenancy - Respondents, landlord lessors, had executed a lease - Under its terms, lessor had given some land to lessees for building and renting out of a Cinema house for a period of twenty years on a rent per month for first year, and increased per month - Period within which Cinema had to be constructed was also specified - Clause 6 of the lease laid down - On the expiry of tenancy or the extended period of tenancy, as aforesaid, entire structure, built by lessees at their own cost becomes property of lessor, and shall exercise all the rights of ownership and shall be entitled to sell entire property, subject to this condition that lessor shall have to pay 50% of market value of structure built by lessees at their expenses - Whether there was any such undertaking before Controller which, quite apart from contract embodied in deed, should affect discretion of Controller in passing an eviction order – Held, court have not been shown any undertaking given to Rent Controller, apart from assertion quoted above from the application under Section 13 of Act - And, no order of Controller on any such supposed undertaking has been placed before court - Parties had hotly contested before Controller as well as High Court what exact meaning of clause under consideration was - It could not be either expected or assumed that application under Section 13 would contain an acceptance of very interpretation put forward on behalf of lessees and denied by the lessors - Court therefore, refrain from deciding question whether there was any such undertaking before Controller which, quite apart from contract embodied in deed, should affect discretion of Controller in passing an eviction order - All court need say here is that meaning of terms of lease, interpreted by us also, is not affected by the alleged undertaking - Appeal dismissed.

Judgment

BEG, J. :- This appeal by Special Leave has arisen in the following circumstances :

The respondents, landlord lessors, had executed a lease on 9-11-1949. Under its terms, the lessor had given some land to the lessees for the building and renting out of a Cinema house for a period of twenty years on a rent of Rs. 300/- per month for the first year, and, thereafter, at Rs. 600/- per month. The period within which the Cinema had to be constructed was also specified. Clause 6 of the lease laid down :

"On the expiry of tenancy or the extended period of tenancy, as aforesaid, the entire structure, built by the lessees at their own cost becomes the property of lessor, and shall exercise all the rights of ownership and shall be entitled to sell the entire property, subject to this condition that lessor shall have to pay 50% of the market value of the structure built by the lessees at their expenses. If the lessor and the lessees fail to assess the value of the aforesaid structure by mutual consent, two arbitrators will be appointed, nominated by the lessor and the lessees. In case of their difference of opinion an umpire shall be appointed by parties whose award shall be final. In case the lessor fails to pay 50% of the value of the structure so assessed within period of six months of award of the umpire or arbitrators the whole structure shall be sold and out of the sale proceed 50% of the price of the structure so assessed by the umpire or arbitrators shall be paid to the lessees. The lessees shall have the first charge on the sale proceeds". The lease had expired. Therefore, the lessor applied under Section 13 (2) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 3 of 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ), to the Rent Controller, appointed under the Act, for the eviction of the former tenant and the appellant sub-tenant. During the pendency of this application, the lessees applied to the Rent Controller, under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act, for the stay of eviction proceedings pending the decision of a dispute between the parties as to who was entitled to possession while the market value was being determined by Arbitrators under Clause 6 set out above. The Rent Controller held, inter alia, that the powers of ejectment under Section 13 of the Act, on specified grounds, could not be curtailed even by some agreement between the parties and had dismissed the stay application. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissed the lessees appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, after interpreting the lease deed and holding that clause 6 of the deed "negatives any right in the lessees to retain possession after the expiry of the lease".

It went on to observe :

"It is specifically provided therein that as soon as the lease expired the lessor would become full owner of the super-structure which she would have the right to sell. The rest of the clause provides the method in which the sum paid to the lessees was to be ascertained or recovered and that method does not include a right in them to continue to possess either the land or the super-structure. What has been made subject to the payment of the said sum is the exercise by the lessor of her right to sell the property the delivery of possession of which on the expiry of the lease, however, is not stipulated to be postponed till such payment."

2. The first submission made by Mr. Chagla, learned Counsel for the appellant, is that the High Court had put an erroneous and inequitable interpretation on the deed inasmuch as the Court did not take into account the fact that the Cinema had necessarily to be run by somebody while the market value of the property was being ascertained by resort to arbitration. Hence, it was argued that the lessees right to continue in possession during what was described as an "interregnum" was implicit. The reply is that no such gap is warranted by the terms of the lease. The respondents also contended that no specific provision for recovery











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