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1973 Supreme(SC) 106

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
S.N. DWIVEDI AND Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.
Parkash Chand Khurana etc. Appellants
Versus
Harnam Singh and others. Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 1866 of 1967. D/- 28-3-1973.

Headnote:

Constitution of India,1950 – Article 133(1)(a) and (c) – Civil Procedure Code,1908 – Rule 3 - Arbitration Act, 1940 – Section 30 - Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 – Possession of property - Series of execution applications - Plot, Industrial area was allotted to the respondents by Development Board - Respondents erected buildings on plot, installed machinery therein and started a factory in name and style of "Bharat Rubber Mills" - By an agreement of respondents sold their rights in plot and factory to the appellants - Disputes arose between parties on certain matters relating to agreement, which parties referred to an arbitrator - Arbitrator gave his award and the award became a rule of the court - Appellants not having paid amount, respondents filed a series of execution applications - Appellants opposed that application on various grounds which were rejected by executing court and execution was directed to proceed - Whether respondents, after getting back possession from appellants, would be free to deal with property in ordinary course of business – Held, last contention of appellants is that particular term of clause 7 of award providing for right of respondents to obtain possession of property on appellants committing default is in nature of a penalty, against which appellants are entitled to be relieved - One answer to this contention is that it is impossible to treat particular term as in nature of a penalty – Court see no warrant for view that award decree should be treated as a consent decree - Award of arbitrator did not get its efficacy by reason of fact that parties agreed to it - Award was valid on its own, independently of decision of parties not to object - In instant case, parties agreed to refer their disputes to arbitration when no suit was pending and award subsequently became a rule of the Court - For these reasons court confirm judgment of High Court and dismiss appeal - Appeal dismissed.

Judgment

CHANDRACHUD, J.:- Plot No. 29-B, Industrial area. Faridabad, was allotted in the year 1952 to the respondents by the Faridabad Development Board. Respondents erected buildings on the plot, installed machinery therein and started a factory in the name and style of "Bharat Rubber Mills". By an agreement of May, 1955 respondents sold their rights in the plot and the factory to the appellants. Disputes arose between the parties on certain matters relating to the agreement, which the parties referred to an arbitrator. The arbitrator gave his award on August 4, 1955 and the award became a rule of the court on August 23, 1956.

2. One of the principal terms of the award, broadly, was that the appellants were to pay a certain sum of money to the Board in discharge of the liability of the respondents and on their failure to make the payment, they were to give back the possession of the plot and the factory to the respondents. The appellants not having paid the amount, respondents filed a series of execution applications the last of which is dated January 16, 1964. Appellants opposed that application on various grounds which were rejected by the executing court and the execution was directed to proceed. Appellants filed an appeal against the judgment of the executing court, which was allowed by a learned single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. Respondents challenged that judgment in Letters Patent Appeal No. 139 of 1965. That appeal was allowed by a Division Bench on September 15, 1967 and the judgment of the executing court was restored. The High Court has granted to the appellants leave to appeal to this court from its judgment under Art. 133 (1) (a) and (c) of the Constitution.

3. Under clause 2 of the award, the appellants were liable to discharge the liability of the respondents to the Faridabad Development Board in the sum of Rs. 23,686-6-0. Under cl. 7, the appellants were to pay this amount within 11/2 years or alternatively, to obtain from the Board within that period a complete discharge for the respondents. It is common ground that within the stated period the appellants had paid a sum of Rs. 8,000/- only to the Board. In addition, they had forwarded to the Board for its acceptance verified claims in the sum of Rupees 10,000/- which they held under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. The Board was evidently disinclined to accept the verified claims in discharge of the liability of the respondents. Assuming, however, in favour of the appellants that the verified claims constituted a valid payment, they had still not paid to the Board the full amount which they were liable to pay under cl. 2 of the award, within the period mentioned in clause 7.

4. As the appellants committed default in the payment of the aforesaid amount, the consequence prescribed by clause 7 of the award would follow, namely, that the respondents would be entitled to take back possession of the property from the appellants. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants, however, argues that the respondents refused to co-operate with the appellants and in the absence of such co-operation the appellants, though ready and willing to pay the amount, were unable to do so. They cannot, therefore, be visited with the penal consequences provided for by clause 7 of the award.

5. Our attention has been drawn to the bulk of the correspondence that transpired between the appellants and the Board on the one hand and the appellants and the respondents on the other but we see therein no support for the contention that the default on the part of the appellants occurred by reason of the non-co-operation of the respondents. Appellants created impediments in their own way by asking the Board to accept verified claims in discharge of the liability of the respondents. The Board was under no legal obligation to accept the verified claims, not at any rate without proper scrutiny, and such scrutiny could notoriously take longer than t




















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