Judgment

CHANDRACHUD, J.:- The plaintiff, who in a Rent Act application against his tenant sought possession of certain premises on the ground of personal requirement, died pending the application. The question for decision is whether the cause of action would survive to his legal representatives or whether, as contended by the tenant, the application must abate.

2. On June 28, 1962 a flat at Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi, was leased by the plaintiff to the defendant. On failure of the defendant to comply with two notices to quit, plaintiff filed an ejectment application under Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ("the Act") Possession was sought from the tenant on the ground that the premises were required by the plaintiff "for occupation as a residence for himself and members of his family".

3. The Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, dismissed the application on the preliminary ground that the notices to quit were not valid. Plaintiff filed an appeal against that decision but during its pendency he died on August 22, 1968. Appellants 1 to 4 who are the widow, son and two married daughters of the plaintiff applied for being brought on the record of the appeal as his legal representatives. The tenant opposed that application on the narrow ground that the son and daughter of a deceased daughter of the plaintiff ought also to have been impleaded to the application and since that was not done, the appeal had abated. By its order dated December 13, 1968 the Rent Control Tribunal, which was seized of the appeal allowed these two persons also to be impleaded as appellants. By a further order dated January 2, 1969 the Tribunal set aside the decision recorded by the Additional Rent Controller on the preliminary issue and remanded the ejectment application for a decision on merits. These two "heirs" are now appellants 5 and 6. Second appeal 107 of 1969 filed by the tenant against the order of remand, was dismissed by the High Court of Delhi on 20-2-1970.

4. As the order of remand passed by the Rent Control Tribunal was not stayed during the pendency of the Second Appeal, the Additional Rent Controller proceeded with the ejectment application and had in the meanwhile passed an order of eviction against the tenant. By his judgment of February 14, l969 he held that the plaintiff s widow (appellant 1), his son (appellant 2), the son s wife and three minor daughters of that couple required the premises bona fide for their occupation.

5. The tenant appealed against that decision and contended for the first time in appeal that the right to sue did not survive to the heirs of the plaintiff. The Rent Control Tribunal rejected that contention and confirmed the order of eviction on merits.

6. In an appeal filed by the tenant (S. A. O. No. 178 of 1970 (Delhi) ) the High Court of Delhi- took the view that the right to sue did not survive to the heirs of the plaintiff and on that ground it dismissed the ejectment application, leaving it open to the heirs to bring a fresh proceeding founded on their own requirements. The correctness of that decision is challenged by the plaintiff s heirs in this appeal by special leave.

7. The survival of the right to sue on the death of a plaintiff is a problem that has often to be solved on a permutation of several facts and circumstances. But it would be out of place in this judgment to embark upon an abstract disquisition of the question as to in what classes of cases, the right to sue survives in favour of the legal representatives. In some cases under the Rent Acts, the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona has been attempted to be applied on the death of a necessary party to a suit or proceeding but that oft-quoted maxim is oft misunderstood. The plain meaning of that common law maxim is that a Personal action dies with the parties to the cause of action. Its purport, until sweeping changes were made in the previous law by the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934 was that no executor or a