SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
26-9-1973.
M.H. BEG AND K.K. MATHEW, JJ.
State of U.P. and another, Appellants
Versus
K. N. Misra and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeals Nos. 614-617 of 1971:
Civil Appeal No. 695 of 1971:
Civil Appeals Nos. 695 and 614-617 of 1971, D/- 26-9-1973.
Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 133 (1) (c), 226 , 311 , 14 and 16 - Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955 - Regulation 4, 4 to 7 , (3) and (4), 5 (4), (2),(3), (5), 7 (2), (4) and 9 - Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 - Rule 9 (2) - Police Service - Select List for Promotion - Eligible for Promotion - Whether function of Selection Committee in preparing list, which could involve proposals for supersession - Whether they were eligible, and, thereafter, whether they should be brought on select list for particular year - Whether performance of function terminates in an order which has a conclusive effect or force of law - Whether there are prescribed procedural attributes of proceeding, such as its initiation by a party opposed to another - Whether decision imposes obligations by defining, conferring, varying, extinguishing, or recognising rights and liabilities - Whether function involves application of objective criteria defined by law to impartially ascertained facts - Whether Regulation 5 (4) had been properly understood and applied by Selection Committee and Union Public Service Commission - Whether they be purely administrative in every situation which may arise or involve any elements of quasi-judicial at least where proposal for supersession is sent to Union Public Service Commission - Whether Selection Committee and Union Public Service Commission performed their functions on a correct interpretation of relevant regulations and not whether they acted honestly about which entertain no doubt whatsoever - Whether such an extension of rules of natural justice to a case of "selection" is warranted by authorities as they stand - Whether, on authorities as they stand today, such an expansion of scope of natural justice is justified - Whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial - Whether orders of State Government reverting officers concerned to their State service posts - Whether High Court was right in its interpretation of Regulation 5 (2) of Indian Administrative Service/Indian Police Service Regulations, 1955 - Whether State Government was competent to terminate officiating appointments of respondents – Held, It was contended on behalf of respondents that before they were superseded, notice should have been given to them and their explanation asked for - It was argued that rules of natural justice required that before name of a member is removed from select list, he should be given notice to show cause why his name should not be removed and unless that is done, decision to remove his name from select list would be bad - When that period is over, he has no right to be included in select list for the next year - He has only a right to be considered for inclusion in it - In other words, inclusion of a persons name in select list in a year does not give that person a vested right to have his name included in select list for succeeding year - As already stated, a fresh list will have to be prepared for succeeding year after considering merit and suitability of all eligible candidates - Regulation 5 (5) of Promotion Regulations makes it clear that there can be supersession when making selection, or in reviewing or revising select list - Expression "supersession" does not mean removal of name of a person whose name appeared in previous list from subsequent list or his demotion in rank in subsequent list - As there is to be a fresh assessment of merit and suitability when a fresh list has to be drawn up, and that, as far as possible has to be done every year, word "supersession" can only mean overlooking seniority in State service for inclusion in list – Court should have thought that expression "supersession" in context is quite inapt, as it has overtones that seniority per se has some claim for preferential treatment – Court do not think that in making selection or in reviewing or revising select list, as a fresh list has to be prepared on basis of merit and suitability of all eligible candidates including those whose names remain in previous list, with due regard to seniority, there is no question of notice being given to a senior when he is proposed to be passed over - No vested right is involved; no interest recognized and protected by law is in jeopardy – Court is not prepared to lay down as a general proposition that whenever a selection is made on basis of merit and suitability with due regard to seniority, notice to a senior will be required if he is proposed to be passed over in favour of a junior on ground of his greater merit and suitability - No precedent has been cited in support of proposition - On a balance of all relevant factors, Court do not think it expedient to extend horizon of natural justice involved in audi alteram partem rule to twilight zone of mere expectations, however great they might be - Appeals dismissed.
28. In the context of the effect upon the rights of aggrieved persons, as members of a public service who are entitled to just and reasonable 98 treatment, by reason of protections conferred upon them by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, which are available to them throughout their service, it was incumbent on the Selection Committee to have stated reasons in a manner which would disclose how the record of each officer superseded stood in relation to records of others who were to be preferred, particularly as this is practically the only remaining visible safeguard against possible injustice and arbitrariness, in making selections. If that had been done, facts on service records of officers considered by the Selection Committee would have been correlated to the conclusions reached. Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable. We think that it is not enough to say that preference should be given because a certain kind of process was gone through by the Selection Committee. This is all that the supposed statement of reasons amounts to. We, therefore, think that the mandatory provisions of Regulation 5 (5) were not complied with. We think that reliance was rightly placed by respondents on two decisions of this Court relating to the effect of non-compliance with such mandatory provisions. These were: Associated Electrical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd., Calcutta v. Its Workmen, AIR 1967 SC 284 and Collector of Morighyr v. Keshav Prasad Goenka, (1963) 1 SCR 98
29. Lastly, I may refer to another question mooted before us. It was whether the orders of the State Government reverting the officers concerned to their State service posts simply because their names had not been included in the select list of 1968 were illegal for contravening the provisions of Regulation 9 set out above. The Division Bench had not only held that no directions were given by the Central Government under Rule 9 (3) of the Cadre Rules, but that the State Government which had itself not considered the question of the fitness of the aggrieved officers, had acted on the wrong assumption that it was bound to pass reversion orders simply because the names of the officers concerned had ceased to find a place on the select list.
30. The powers of the State Government to act under Regulations 8 and 9 are limited. It has to report under Regulation 9 (2), set out above, which corresponds with Rule 9 (2), of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954, to the Central Government with reasons for making an appointment to a cadre post of an All India Service in a State. The cadre post is defined as a post specified in a schedule to the Indian Administrative Service (Fixation of Cadre Strength) Regulations, 1955. It is true that it is the Central Government alone which can direct the termination of service under Regulation 9, as the Central Government is ordinarily the appointing authority. The State Government has powers, conferred by Rule 8, of making appointments only in certain contingencies. If it exceeds these powers of making appointment, the appointments may be vitiated. I am, however, not satisfied, on the materials placed before us, that the State Government either exceeded its powers or that an order of the Central Government to terminate a service was needed. However, as we agree with the conclusion of the Division Bench, for other reasons already given, that the impugned select lists of 1968 and reversion orders passed by the State Government should be quashed, I prefer not to decide this question in these cases.
31. The result is that, for the reasons given above thes
Shivaji Nathubhai v. Union of India
not extended : A K Kraipak v. Union of India
Board of Hghh School and Intermediate Education v. Ghansyam Das Gupta
followed : Associated Electrical Industries India Pvt Ltd v. Workmen
Divisional Personnel Officer v. S Raghavendrachar
P L Lakhanpal v. Union of India
relied on : Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan
Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan
Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan
Unikani Sankunni Menon v. State of Rajasthan
Madan Gopal Agarwal v. District Magistrate
referred : State of Punjab v. K R Erry and Sobhag Rai Mehta
Mir Ghulam Hussan v. Union of India
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