Judgment

SARKARIA, J. :- This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court, dismissing appellant s petition made under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The material facts are these :

On June 15, 1969, a report was lodged in Police Station, Tilak Marg, New Delhi, by one Munshi Ram alleging that he was employed as a Driver of bus, DLP 3867, belonging to Indraj Singh and Sukh Lal of Chirag Delhi. On June 13, 1969 at 6 p.m., he stopped the bus at Mathura Road to talk to one Devi Singh son of Ganesh Lal. Devi Singh invited the informant and his companions, Mahinder Singh Conductor and Sher Singh helper, to soft-drinks at a nearby shop. Leaving the bus unattended, they proceed to that shop. In the meantime, Jehan Singh appellant, Sharma, R.K. Pathak and another man of stout-build got into the vehicle. The stout man took the steering wheel, and all the four drove away in the bus despite the protests of the informant and his companions. Munshi Ram then went to Chirag Delhi to inform his employer Indraj Singh, but found the latter absent. It was also mentioned in the report that Pathak and Sharma were employed in Scindia House.

2. The police started investigation and arrested Jehan Singh appellant, and R. K. Pathak, Assistant manager of the Industrial Credit Co. Ltd., Scindia House (hereinafter called the Company). They wee later released on bail. The bus was also seized by the police from the possession of the Company.

3. Pathak and the appellant filed two separate petitions under Sec. 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code challenging the police proceedings in pursuance of the First Information Report made by Munshi Ram.

4. The learned Judge by a common judgment allowed Pathak s petition and quashed the proceedings against him, but dismissed the appellant s petition with this observation :

"If Jehan Singh had transferred all his rights in the bus, though against the stipulations in the hire-purchase agreement, it would be a matter for consideration of the trial court whether he could be regarded guilty of the offence of theft if the version contained in the first information report is proved."

5. At the outset, we inquired from Shri. Anand, learned Counsel for the appellant, whether the proceedings sought to be quashed were pending in any court or before the police. We are told that at the date of the filing of the petitions under Section 561-A, Cr. Procedure Code, no charge-sheet or complaint had been laid in court. The matter was still at the stage of investigation by the police.

6. Shri. Prasad, learned Counsel for the State contends that the petitions under Section 561-A to quash the proceedings which were being conducted in the course of police investigation, were not competent. He has referred to King Emperor v. Nazir Ahmad, 71 Ind App 203 at p. 213 and State of West Bengal v. S. N. Basak, (1963) 2 SCR 52 at p. 54 . It is maintained that in these circumstances, the petitions of both Pathak and the appellant Jehan Singh ought to have been dismissed as premature.

7. On the other hand Shri. Anand maintains that his case falls within one of the exceptions to the general rule enunciated in the cases cited by Shri. Prasad. Reliance has been placed on R. P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, (1960) 3 SCR 388

8. It appears to us that the preliminary objection raised by Shri. Prasad must prevail.

9. In King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, 71 Ind APP 208 their Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out that the functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping" and that the "court s functions begin when a charge is preferred before it, and not until then." It was added that "it has sometimes been thought that Section 561-A has given increased powers to the Court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so, the section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the court already inherently possesses shall be preserved".