SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.N. RAY, C.J.I. AND K.K. MATHEW, J
Shanti Kumar R. Chanji, Appellant
Versus
The House Insurance Co. of New York, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 1991 of 1971, D/-24-7-1974.
Civil Appeal - Pension scheme for foreign employees - Lieu of notice and gratuity - In year 1965 appellant asked for discovery by respondent of documents relating to pension scheme for foreign employees - Application for discovery was dismissed appellant took out a Chamber Summons for amendment of plaint - Proposed amendments were two-fold - First set of amendments related to averments in support of claim for gratuity which had already been alleged in plaint - Second set of amendments related to averments in support of a claim for Rs. 850 per month by way of pension as and from 1 February, 1964 during life time of appellant - Held, In finding out whether order is a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of Letters it has to be found out that order affects merits of action between the parties by determining some right or liability - Even with regard to discretionary orders appellate Court can interefere where, order is insupportable in law or is unjust - High Court considered second application for amendment to be a new claim based on new set of facts which became barred on date of application for amendment - In exceptional cases on amendment has been allowed where effect is to take away from a defendant a legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of time, because Court found that consideration of lapse of time is outweighed by special circumstances of the case - Appeal dismissed.
Judgment
RAY, C. J. :- This is an appeal by certificate from the judgement dated 29 March, 1971 of the High Court of Bombay.
2. The appellant filed this suit on 2 September, 1964 in the High Court of Bombay and claimed six months salary in lieu of notice and gratuity for 16 years of service.
3. In the year 1965 the appellant asked for discovery by the respondent of documents relating to pension scheme for foreign employees. The application for discovery was dismissed in the month of November, 1965.
4. On 16 December, 1969 the appellant took out a Chamber Summons for amendment of the plaint. The proposed amendments were two-fold. The first set of amendments related to averments in support of the claim for gratuity which had already been alleged in the plaint. The second set of amendments related to averments in support of a claim for Rs. 850 per month by way of pension as and from 1 February, 1964 during the life time of the appellant.
5. By an order dated 19 January, 1970 the appellant was allowed to amend the plaint in respect of the claim for gratuity. The appellant s proposed amendment in support of the claim for pension was refused.
6. By summons dated 27 April, 1970 the appellant sought an amendment of the plaint claiming Rupees 68,000 as damages in relation to his right to pension. By an order dated 6 July, 1970 the appellant was allowed to amend the plaint as prayed for.
7. The respondent preferred an appeal against the order dated 6 July, 1970. The High Court by judgment dated 29 March, 1971 allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated 6 July, 1970 allowing the amendment.
8. The appellant repeated the contentions which had been advanced before the High Court. First, it was said that no appeal could lie against an order of amendment because it was not a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent : Secondly, it was said that an order allowing the amendment was a discretionary order. Therefore, the appellate court should not have interfered with the discretion.
9. Counsel for the appellant submitted that `judgement means a decision finally adjudicating the rights between the parties. It was emphasised that a judgment would be a decision on substantive rights of parties Amendment was submitted to be a procedural right. Counsel for the appellant relied on the decision in Dayabhai v. Murugappa Chettiar, ILR 13 Rang 457 (FB) and Manohar Baliram ILR (1952) Nag 471 in support of the proposition that judgement means and is a decree in a suit by which the rights of the parties in the suit are determined.
10. The locus classious is the decision of the High Court of Calcutta in Justice of the peace for Calcutta v. Oriental Gas Co. (1872) 8 Bengal LR 433 where Sir Richard Couch, C. J. said.
"We think that judgment means a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability. It may be either final or preliminary, or interlocutory, the difference between them being that a final judgment determines the whole cause or suit, and a preliminary or interlocutory judgment determines only a part of it, leaving other matters to be determined."
11. This Court in Asrumari Debi v Rupendra Deb, 1953 SCR 1159 dealt with the question as to whether an order of transfer of a suit filed in the Jalpaiguri Court to the High Court to be tried in its Extraordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction was a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. It was held that an order for transfer of a suit is not a judgment within the meaning of Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent as it neither affects the merits of the controversy between the parties in the suit itself nor terminates or disposes of the suit on any ground.
12. This Court in Asrumati Debi s case, 1953 SCR 1159 said that a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent would have to satisfy two tests. First, the judgment must be final pronouncement which puts an end to the proceeding so far as the Court
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