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1974 Supreme(SC) 213

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.N. RAY, C.J.I. AND K.K. MATHEW, J.
Murlidhar Agarwal and another, Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 2370 of 1969.
Civil Appeal No. 583 of 1971.
Civil Appeal No. 2370 of 1969 and Civil Appeal No. 583 of 1971,
D/- 29-7-1974

Headnote:

Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226 - U. P. (Temporary) Control of the Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 - Section 7-A – Tenant - Suits for recovery of rent as well as for ejectment - Whether suit filed by appellants for recovery of possession of premises - Original owner of premises was one Ram Swaroop Gupta - He leased the premises to M/s. Pioneer Exhibitors and Distributors Limited - They used premises for exhibiting cinema - That lease terminated by efflux of time Gupta, leased premises by a deed for a period of 10 years to respondent No. 2 - But there was no order allotting the accommodation to him under Section 7 (2) of Act - Respondent No. 2 also used premises for exhibiting cinematograph films - Disputes having arisen between parties, Gupta filed suits for recovery of rent as well as for ejectment against respondent No. 2 - Appellants purchased premises in question from Ram Swaroop Gupta by a sale deed - Held, No doubt, there is no assurance that judges will interpret the mores of their day more wisely and truly than other men - But this is beside point - Point is rather that this power must be lodged somewhere and under our Constitution and laws, it has been lodged in the judges and if they have to fulfil their function as judges, it could hardly be lodged elsewhere - See Cardozo - We think that Section 3 is based on public policy - As we said, it is intended to protect a weaker section of community with a view to ultimately protecting interest of community in general by creating equtiality of bargaining power - Although section is primarily intended for protection of tenants only, that protection is based on public policy - Language of section, as already stated, is prohibitive in character - It precludes a court from entertaining suit - We think the High Court was right in its conclusion - Appeal dismissed.

Judgement

MATHEW, J.:- The appellants filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Allahabad praying that the order passed by the State Government on October 20, 1967, allowing a revision filed by the respondent be quashed and possession of the premises in question be given to them under Section 7-A of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of the Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act).

2. The original owner of the premises was one Ram Swaroop Gupta. He leased the premises to M/s. Pioneer Exhibitors and Distributors Limited. They used the premises for exhibiting cinema. That lease terminated by efflux of time of June 30, 1952. Gupta, thereafter, leased the premises by a deed dated October 13, 1952 for a period of 10 years to Ram Agyan Singh, respondent No. 2. But there was no order allotting the accommodation to him under Section 7 (2) of the Act. Respondent No. 2 also used the premises for exhibiting cinematograph films. Disputes having arisen between the parties, Gupta filed suits for recovery of rent as well as for ejectment against respondent No. 2. The appellants purchased the premises in question from Ram Swaroop Gupta by a sale deed dated March 26, 1962. Thereafter they filed an application under Section 7 of the Act read with Rule 6 made under the Act for release of the accommodation in their favour. On December 3, 1965, the Additional District Magistrate allowed the application and permitted the appellants to take possession of the premises. That was on the basis that the premises were in illegal occupation of respondent No. 2. The representation against this order filed by respondent No. 2 to the State Government was rejected on January 10, 1966 on the ground that there was no provision for any interference by Government with the order. On December 4, 1965, the appellants filed an application for eviction of respondent No. 2 under Section 7-A of the Act. On June 18, 1966, the Additional District Magistrate directed issue of notice under clause (2) of Section 7-A, why respondent No. 2 should not be evicted. Thereafter, the Additional District Magistrate passed the order for eviction. Respondent No. 2 went up in revision against the order to the Additional Commissioner. He confirmed the order of the Additional District Magistrate. Respondent No. 2, thereafter, filed an application for revision under Section 7-F of the act before the State Government against the order. The State Government allowed that application on October 20, 1967 holding that respondent No. 2 was not liable to be evicted from the premises. On January 20, 1968, the State Government communicated to the parties a summary of the reasons on the basis of which the order had been passed. That in effect said that the respondent was running a cinema under a licence in the premises from 1953, that the District Magistrate, when he granted the licence, was satisfied that respondent No. 2 was in lawful occupation and that, in these circumstances, he was entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Section 7-A (1) of the Act and was not liable to be evicted from the premises.

3. It was to quash this order that the appellants filed the writ petition before the High Court.

4. A learned Single Judge of the Court quashed the order. Respondent No. 2 filed an appeal against the order The Division Bench reversed the order of the learned Single Judge. It is against this order that this appeal has been filed on the basis of a certificate granted under Article 133 (1) (b) of the Constitution.

5. The Division Bench was of the view that the learned Single Judge was not justified in interfering with the order passed by the State Government under Section 7-F of the act inasmuch as the order of the State Government did not suffer from any infirmity either on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to pass the order or for the reason that there was an error of law apparent on the face of the record.

6. The material provision in Section 7-A of th
















































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