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1974 Supreme(SC) 259

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.N. RAY, C.J.I., K.K. MATHEW, A. ALAGIRISWAMI, P.K. GOSWAMI AND R.S. SARKARIA, JJ.
Aflatoon and others, Petitioners
Versus
Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, Respondents.
W.P. No. 363 of 1972:
Bahadur, Petitioner
Versus
Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, Respondents.
Nuruddin, Appellant
Versus
Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, Respondents.
W.P. No. 362 of 1972:
Abdul Rashid etc., etc., Appellants
Versus
Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, Respondents.
Bahadur, Appellant
Versus
Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, Respondents.
Writ Petn. Nos. 362 and 363 of 1972; Civil Appeals Nos. 107, 969, 970, 971 (N), 968 (N), 1168 (N) and 1185 (N) of 1972,
D/- 23-8-1974.
Civil Appeals Nos. 107, 969, 970 and 971 (N) of 1972:
Civil Appeal No. 968 (N) of 1972:
Civil Appeal No.1168 (N) of 1972:
Civil Appeal No. 1185 (N) of 1972:

Headnote:

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 4, 5A, 6, 9(1), 9 – Constitution Of India, 1950 - Article 19(1)(f), 31(5)(a), 31(2),(5), 19(5) - Delhi Development Act, 1957 – Section 15, 12, 12 (3) - Land Acquisition Amendment and Validation Act, 1957 - Section 4 (3) - Land - Assessment of Compensation - Challenged Validity of Proceedings for Acquisition - A notification was issued stating that an area of 34,070 acres of land was needed for a public purpose, viz., planned development - About six thousand objections were filed - Objections were overruled - Declaration was published in respect of a portion of area - Thereafter, notices were issued requiring appellants to state their objctions, if any, to assessment of compensation - Appellants thereupon challenged validity of proceedings for acquisition before High Court on following grounds: (1) that acquisition was not for public purpose but for companies and so provisions of Part VII of Act ought to have been complied with, (2) since no part of compensation payable came from public exchequer, acquisition was not for a public purpose and (3) that proceedings for acquisition violated fundamental right – Held, It was contended that acquisition was really for co-operative housing societies which are companies within definition of word company in S.3 (e) of Act, and, therefore, provisions of Part VII of Act should have been complied with - Both learned Single Judge and Division Bench of High Court were of view that acquisition was not for company – Court see no reason to differ from their view - Mere fact that after acquisition Government proposed to hand over, or, in fact, handed over a portion of property acquired for development to co-operative housing societies would not make acquisition one for company Nor is Court satisfied that there is any merit in contention that compensation to be part for acquisition came from consideration paid by co-operative societies - In light of averments in counter affidavit filed in writ petitions here, it is difficult to hold that it was co-operative which provided fund for acquisition - It may be noted that validity of notification under Section 4 and declaration under S.6 was in issue in Udai Ram v. Union of India and this Court upheld their validity - Appeals and writ petitions dismissed.

Judgement

MATHEW, J.:- These writ petitions and civil appeals raise common questions and they are, therefore, disposed of by a common judgment. The Civil Appeals arise out of the decision of High Court of Delhi dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants challenging the validity of the proceedings for acquisition of the land in question for "planned development of Delhi". In the writ petitions, the validity of the same proceedings is being challenged on certain additional grounds also.

2. A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) was issued on November 13, 1959, stating that an area of 34,070 acres of land was needed for a public purpose, viz., the planned development of Delhi, Between 1959 and 1961, about six thousand objections were filed under Section 5A of the Act. The objections were overruled. On March 18, 1966, the declaration under S.6 of the Act was published in respect of a portion of the area. Thereafter, in 1970, notices were issued under S.9(1) of the Act requiring the appellants to state their objctions, if any, to the assessment of compensation. The appellants thereupon challenged the validity of proceedings for acquisition before the High Court of Delhi on the following grounds: (1) that the acquisition was not for public purpose but for companies and so the provisions of Part VII of the Act ought to have been complied with, (2) since no part of the compensation payable came from the public exchequer, the acquisition was not for a public purpose and (3) that the proceedings for acquisition violated the fundamental right of the appellants under Article 19(1)(f) as there was unreasonable delay between the publication of the notification under S.4 and the issue of the notices under Section 9 of the Act with the result that the appellants were deprived of the benefits of the appreciation in value of the property after the date of the notification under S.4. The High Court negatived the contentions and dismissed the writ petitions.

3. The main arguments addressed before us on behalf of the appellants and the writ petitioners were that the public purpose specified in the notification issued under S.4, namely, the planned development of Delhi was vague as neither a Master Plan and a Zonal Plan was in existence on the date of the notification and as the purpose specified in the notification was vague, the appellants were unable to exercise effectively their right under S.5A of the Act and that as the notification under S.4 was published in 1959, the compensation awarded was wholly inadequate with reference to the market value of the property on the date when the appellants are to be deprived of their possession of the property. In other words the contention was that as there was inordinate delay in finalising the acquisiton proceedings, the appellants were deprived of the beneift of the appreciation in the value of the property between the date of the notification under Section 4 and the date of taking possession of the property. Linked with this contention was the submission that the provisions of S.23 of the Act which lay down that compensation should be determined with reference to the market value of the land as on the date of the notification under Section 4 was an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the appellants to hold and dispose of property under Article 19(1)(f). It was further contended that as the acquisition of the property was for the purpose of planned development of Delhi, the only authority competent to issue the notification under S.4 was the Central Government under S.15 of the Delhi Development Act and since the proceedings were initiated by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, the proceedings were ab initio invalid. The argument was that, as the acquisition was made for the planned development of Delhi, it could be carried out only in accordance with the provisions of the Delhi Development Act, and that, under S.15 of th










































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