Judgment

ALAGIRISWAMI, J.:- These five appeals arise out of five writ petitions filed before the High Court of Mysore questioning three notifications issued under the Mysore Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1958. The notifications were (1) a declaration under Section 3 of the Act, dated 17-11-1960, (2) a declaration under Section 9 of the Act, dated 20-4-1961, and (3) a notification by the Government dated 20-12-1962 under Section 12 by which certain lands were to be acquired under the Act. The provisions of Sections 3, 9, 12 and 15 were also impugned as unconstitutional. The High Court struck down Sections 3 and 9 as violating Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution and Section 12 (1) (b) as violating Article 14. It did not consider it necessary to consider the constitutional validity of Section 15. It, however, held that the three notifications above referred to were not unconstitutional because in exercising their functions under Sections 3, 9 and 12 the authorities concerned were not exercising a quasi-judicial power. But the result of striking down the sections of the Act above referred to was that the notifications also fell along with them. The State of Mysore has {fled these appeals under certificate granted by the High Court.

2. There are two possible approaches to this question. One is to hold that the provisions of the statute are them selves unconstitutional because they do not provide a reasonable opportunity for the affected parties to be heard, the other is to hold that as there is nothing in the statutory provisions which debar the application of the principles of natural justification while the authorities exercise the statutory powers under the Act, and as the principles of natural justice would apply unless the statutory provisions point to the contrary the statutory provisions themselves are not unconstitutional though the notifications issued under them may be struck down if the authorities concerned do not observe the principles of natural justice while exercising their statutory powers. As there is a presumption of constitutionality of statutes unless contrary is established it is the latter course that appears to us to be the proper approach.

3. This Court has made considerable advances in recent years in its attitude towards the question of the application of the principles of natural justice. The High Court referred to the decisions in Cooper v. Board of Works for the Wands worth District, ((1863) 14 CB (NS) 180)) King v. Electricity Commissioners, (1924-1 KB 171) as well as Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayaratne, (1951 AC 66), as also to the decision of this Court in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani, (AIR 1950 SC 222). It referred to the decision in Ridge v. Baldwin, (1963(2) All ER 66) and considered that it had considerably shaken the foundations of King v. Electricity Commrs., 1924 1 KB 171 (supra). It noticed the decision of this Court in Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U. P. Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta, (AIR 1962 SC 1110/. It did not however refer to the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei, (1967-2 SCR 625) nor the decision in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, 1970-1 SCR 457 as they were subsequent decisions of this Court.

4. In Binapani Dei s case (l967) 2 SCR 625 this Court held:

"The rule that a party to whose prejudice an order is intended to be Passed is entitled to a hearing applies alike to judicial tribunals and bodies of persons invested with authority to adjudicate upon matters involving civil consequences. It is one of the fundamental rules of our constitutional set up that every citizen is protected against exercise of arbitrary authority by the State or its officers. Duty to act judicially would therefore arise from the very nature of the function intended to be performed, it need not be super-added. If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exer