SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P. JAGANMOHAN REDDY, S.N. DWIVEDI AND P.K. GOSWAMI, JJ.
State of Rajasthan and others, Appellants
Versus
Sajjanlal Panjawat and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeals Nos. 1083, 1092 1087, 1119 and 1647 of 1967, D/- 14-12-1973.
Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 133 (1) (a), (c), 14, l9, 25, 26, 31, 26 (b), (d) and 25 (1) - Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959 - Section 17 (3), 52 (1) (d) and (e), 52 (i) (a) or (c) , 53 , 2 (11) , 52 , 30, 31, 38 to 4, 32 to 36 , 37 to 46 , 53 (5) - Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 - Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 - Section 76 (1) - Private Temples - Public Religious Trusts - Ownership and Management of Jain Shasan - Whether temples were private temples or public religious trusts does not seem to have been urged - Whether petitioners/ respondents who claim to represent Swetamber Jain sect can challenge right of State - Whether provisions of Act in any way infringe their fundamental rights to manage their own affairs in matters of religion - Whether any of provisions of Act offend their fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts. 25, 26 and 27 of Constitution - Whether it is a Swetamber Jain temple or a Digamber Jain temple - Whether temple is a Swetamber Jain temple or a Digamber Jain temple as contended by interveners does not arise for decision - Whether Keshariyanathji temple is a Swetamber Jain temple - Whether temple is a Jain temple, or as alleged by State a Hindu temple - Whether management of temple had been taken over prior to Constitution by erstwhile Udaipur State - Whether that management continued to be vested even after Constitution in its successor - Whether respondents fundamental rights guaranteed under Arts.25 and-26 are affected – Whether Swetamber or Digamber, had lost right before Constitution - Whether this is a valid claim or not, and whether impugned provisions of Act contravene any of tenets of Jain religion - Whether any of them in fringe right of respondents guaranteed under Art. 26 of Constitution - Whether this is so or not cannot be determined merely on allegations in petition - Whether provisions of subs-sec. (5) of S. 53 empower Government to take away from a religious denomination - Whether such vesting would contravene fundamental rights guaranteed under cls. (b) and (d) of Art. 26 - Whether provisions of sub-e. (1) read with sub-ss. (4) and (5) of S. 53 authorise vesting of administration of a public religious trust - Whether that levy was a tax or a fee one of material facts taken into consideration - Whether it was fee or tax did not matter - Whether it was a compulsory levy - Whether State was making a profit out of administration of civil justice - Whether amounts so collected from those fees were spent on administration of civil justice - Whether impugned fees were court-fees or taxes on litigants or litigation - Whether Section 17 (3) can be declared to be invalid on account of Rule 18 requiring fee to be deposited in State Consolidated Fund - Whether two temples which State contended were public trusts - Whether two temples were his private property – Held, All collections went to Consolidated Fund of State and all expenses had to be met not out of those collections but out of general revenues by a proper method of appropriation as was done in case of other Government expenses - Though this was so it was nonetheless observed That in itself might not be conclusive - But as there was total absence of any correlation between expenses incurred by Government and amount railed by contribution under provision of S. 76, it was observed that theory of a return or counter- payment or quid pro quo could not have any possible application to that case - Fee is a sort of contribution levied on public trusts towards meeting expenses incurred by State Government in rendering services to public trusts through agency of Devasthan Department and that according to budget provisions for year expenditure on Devasthan Department was Rs. 2,76,715/- as against income of only Rupees 3,000/for same year from registration fee - This averment in reply of Commissioner. Devasthan Department was not controverted by petitioners either by a reply thereto or by any other material produced by them - In these circumstances, mere fact that She amount was paid under R. 18 into Consolidation Fund is by itself not sufficient to hold that levy under Section 17 (3) of Act is tax the income by way of fees is far below expenditure incurred on Devasthan Department, levy would be a fee - In this view, Section 17 (3) cannot be held to be invalid and ultra vires powers of State Legislature – Court express no opinion on question whether Section 17 (3) can be declared to be invalid on account of Rule 18 requiring fee to be deposited in State Consolidated Fund - Act has been challenged on grounds similar to these in the other appeals and no separate arguments were addressed, except those advanced by respondents Advocate in other appears this appeal also will be decided accordingly - Appropriate authority under Act will however decide this question before applying Act to these temples - In this appeal as also in appeals decision of High Court that S. 17 (3) and S. 52 (1) (d) and (e) are void and unconstitutional is also set aside - Appeals dismissed.
Judgment
JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J.:- These five appeals are by certificate under Art. 133 (1) (a) & (c) of the Constitution and have been heard together as common questions of law were raised in all these appeals.
2. Civil Appeal No. 1083 of 1967 is an appeal by the State of Rajasthan against the respondents, while Civil Appeal No. 1092 of 1967 is the appeal by the respondents against the State of Rajasthan. These two appeals, which we may also refer as the first set of appeals, arise out of a writ petition filed by the respondents against the State of Rajasthan alleging that the temple of Shri Rikhebdevji, also known as Keshariyanathji temple, situated about 40 miles from Udaipur, is a Swetamber Jain temple which is under the ownership and management of Jain Shasan and has been recognized as such in official documents as well as in the firmans issued by the erstwhile State of Mewar. Notwithstanding, the position it was averred that the management of the said temple has been illegally usurped by the State of Rajasthan through the Devasthan Department for some years, and that the State of Rajasthan had applied certain provisions of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959 - hereinafter called the Act - to the said temple which contravened the fundamental rights of the respondents guaranteed under Arts. 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. The respondents, therefore, prayed that the Court should refrain the State from enforcing provisions of the Act specified in the petition and declare them void being in contravention of the fundamental rights of the respondents guaranteed under Arts. 14, l9. 25, 26 and 31 of the Constitution of India. They also challenged Section 17 (3) of the Act on the ground that the fee levied along with the application for registration of the public trust is a tax, and therefore beyond the competence of the State Legislature. The case of the State of Rajasthan, however, was that the temple in question was not a Jain temple, but is a Hindu temple where Jains of all sects as well as Hindus of all beliefs and sects including the Bhils worship. It denied that the provisions of the Act which had been enacted to regulate and to make better provisions for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts in the State of Rajasthan were in any way violative of Arts. 25 and 26 or any other article of the Constitution. It asserted that the management of the temple was with the State of Rajasthan which had a valid and legal right to manage it, and that S. 17 (3) of the Act was valid. The High Court held that Rikhabdevji temple is a Swetamber Jain temple and is at present managed by the State of Rajasthan, that S. 17 (3) of the Act is invalid because under the Rules that have been framed under the Act an amount of Rs.5/-charged as registration fee goes to the Consolidated Fund, and is thus not a fee but a tax which the State Legislature was not competent to revs. Following the decision in another writ petition, which is the subject matter of the second set of appeals to which we shall refer presently, the High Court struck down S. 52 (1) (d) and (e) of the Act, but as the management of the temple had vested in the State prior to the Constitution, the case of Rikhabdevji was held to have been covered by S. 52 (i) (a) or (c) of the Act. In the petition relating to the second set of appeals the High Court had held that in cases of trust as are mentioned in sub-ss. (1) (a), (b) and (c) a secular State may not like to keep the management of public trusts belonging to various denominations with it and may like to transfer it to those who might be better equipped for managing it in accordance with the wishes of the founder or of the religious denomination to which the trust belongs. But that would not be violative of Art. 26 (b) and (d) of the Constitution in any way. It was of the view that S. 52 (1) (d) and (e) of the Act was invalid as S. 53 had not provided for proper safeguards for the administration of the proper
relied on : Director of Endowments, Govt. of Hyderabad v. Akram All, AIR 1956 SC 60
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