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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
M.H. BEG, Y.V. CHANDRACHUD AND A.C. GUPTA, JJ.
Pratap Singh, Appellant
Versus
Rajinder Singh and another, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 808 of 1973,
D/- 20-2-1975.
Advocates appeared
M/s. R. K. Garg, B. C Agarwala, V. J. Francis and R. C. Kaushik. Advocates for Appellant: M/s. T. S. Krishnarmurthi Iyer, (Sr.) Advocate, (M/s. K. C. Agarwala, M. M. L. Srivastava and E. C. Agarwala, Advocates, with him (for No. 1) and Mr. A. T. M. Sampath (for No. 2) for Respondents.
– see the decision in Pratap Singh v. Rajinder Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1045. As held in Nizamuddin Ahmed v. Barbada Narbada Prasad, AIR 1975 SC 1909, the allegations of corrupt practice have to be proved by evidence which leave little room for doubt even though it may not be necessary to prove the allegation beyond all reasonable doubt is in as in a criminal prosecution. See also decision in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299. As held in the case of Bir Chandra Barman v. Anil Sarkar, AIR 1976 SC 603, it is well established that a charge of corrupt practice is quasi-criminal in nature and must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. As held in D. Ventaka Reddy v. R. Sultan, AIR 1976 SC 1599, the allegations of corrupt practice being in the nature of quasi-criminal charge the same must be proved beyond any shadow of doubt. The election petitioner in order to succeed must plead all material particulars and prove them by clear and cogent evidence. Also held in Ghasi Ram v. Dal Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1191= 1968(3) SCR 102, the proof required to establish a corrupt practice must be almost of the character required to establish a criminal charge. See also decision in Ramji Prasad Singh v. Ram Bilas Jha, AIR 1976 SC 2573. As held in the case of Amolak Chand v. Bhagwandas Arya, AIR 1977 SC 813, election petitions alleging corrupt practices are proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature and the onus is on the person who challenges the election to prove the allegations beyond reasonable doubt.
– as held in the case of Narendra Madivalapa Kheni v. Manikrao Patil, AIR 1977 SC 2171, a Court must as usual ask for proof beyond reasonable doubt from the party setting up corrupt practice even where there is a veneer of power politics stopping to conquer and officers thereby becoming vulnerable to ”higher” displeasure. As held in Manmohan Kalia v. Shri Yash, AIR 1984 SC 1161, the allegation of corrupt practice must be proved as strictly as a criminal charge and the principle of preponderance of probabilities would not apply to corrupt practices envisaged by the Act because if this test is not applied a very serious prejudice would be caused to the elected candidate who may be disqualified for a period of six years from fighting any election, which will adversely affect the electoral process. See also decisions in Harasingh Charan Mohanty v. Surendra Mohanty, AIR 1974 SC 47. As held in Manphul Singh v. Surinder Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2158, the charge of corrupt practice is quasi-criminal and should be proved satisfactorily.
– As held in the case of Ram Awadesh Singh v. Sumitra Devi, AIR 1972 SC 580, each instance of corrupt practice had to be established separately. If every one of those instances are not proved, all of them put together cannot be accepted as true because of the volume of evidence. As held in the case of D.P. Mishra v. Kamal Narayan Sharma, AIR 1970 SC 1477, the proof of evidence should be beyond reasonable doubt. As held in the case of Jagjit Singh v. Kartar Singh, AIR 1966 SC 773, the proof of the charge has a double consequence, the election of the returned candidate is set aside, and he incurs subsequent disqualification as well. Therefore, when a charge this kind is framed against a returned candidate, it has to be proved satisfactorily. It was held in Ram Dial v. Sant Lal, AIR 1959 SC 855, that what is material under the Indian Law is not the actual effect produced, but the doing of such acts as are calculated to interfere with the free exercise of any electoral right. As held in Razik Ram v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1975 SC 667, the trial of an election petition being in the nature of an accusation, bearing the indelible stamp of quasi-criminal action, the standard of proof is the same as in a criminal case. Also held in Sultan Salatuddin Owasi v. Mohd. Osman Shaheed, AIR 1980 SC 1347, it is now well settled that a charge of corrupt practice must be proved to the hilt, the standard of proof of such allegation is the same as a charge of fraud in a criminal case. As held in the case of Ram Sharan Yadav v. Thakur Muneshwar Nath Singh, AIR 1985 SC 24, a charge of corrupt practice has to be proved by convincing evidence and not merely by preponderance of probabilities. As the charge of corrupt practice is in the nature of criminal charge, it is for the party who sets up the plea of ”undue influence” to prove it to the hilt beyond reasonable doubt and the manner of proof should be the same as for an offence in a criminal case. Also held in Ram Singh v. Col Ram Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3, that the proof required in an election matter where the allegations of corrupt practice have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt almost just like a criminal case.
– see decision in Pratap Singh v. Rajinder Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1045; Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Khan, AIR 1975 SC 290. The evidence of every witness in an election case cannot be dubbed as intrinsically suspect or defective. It cannot be equated with that of an accomplice in a criminal case whose testimony has according to a rule of practice though not of law, to be corroborated in material particulars before it is relied upon. See decision in S. Venkata Reddy v. R. Sultan, AIR 1976 SC 1599.
– see decisions in Pratap Singh v. Rajinder Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1045 = N. Vimla Devi v. K.M. Reddy, AIR 1975 SC 1135; Lakshmi Raman v. Chandan Singh, AIR 1977 SC 587 = Rahim Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed, AIR 1975 SC 290.
Judgment
BEG, J.:- Pratap Singh, the appellant before us under Sec. 116A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ), was elected- at an election held on 11-3-1972 for the Haryana State Legislative Assembly, the result of which was declared on 12-3-1972. The Respondent Balbir Singh questioned this election by means of an election Petition alleging that the election was void as the appellant had committed corrupt practices hit by Sec. 123, sub-s. (4), (5) and (6) of the Act. The petition was allowed by a . learned Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. solely on the ground that the corrupt practice, provided far as follows, in Section 123 (5) of- the Act. was committed by the appellant:
"123 (5) The hiring or procuring, whether on payment or otherwise, of any vehicle or vessel by a candidate or his agent or by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent, or the use of such vehicle or vessel for the free conveyance of any elector (other than the candidate himself, the members of his family or his agent) to or from any polling station provided under Section 25 or a place fixed under subsection (1) of Section 29 for the poll:
Provided that the hiring of a vehicle or vessel by an elector or by several electors at their joint costs for the purposes of conveying him or them to and from any such polling station or place fixed for the poll shall not be deemed to be a corrupt practice under this clause if the vehicle or vessel so hired is a vehicle or vessel not propelled by mechanical power.
Provided further that the use of any public transport vehicle or vessel or any tramcar or railway carriage by any elector at his own cost for the purpose of going to or coming from any such polling station or place fixed for the poll shall not be deemed to be a corrupt practice under this clause".
2. The appellant assails the judgment of the High Court on the following main grounds with which, we will deal seriatim:
1. That, the High Court erred in relying upon legally unproved entries in what is called a Pukar book or register showing both the hiring out and then payments for the use of certain trucks on 11-3-1972, the date of election for purposes of election.
2. That, the Register itself is in admissible in evidence under any provision of the Evidence Act.
3. That, the entries in the Pukar Register are suspicious indicating that the Register itself, or, at least, the entries involved were not contemporaneous but fabricated after the election was over.
4. That, the High Court erred in relying upon the evidence of challans by the police on 11-3-1972 of drivers of trucks said to have been used by the appellant when the best evidence in the possession of the police relating to these challans was not forthcoming so that the challans .appeared d to have been manoeuvred for the purpose of supporting a false case.
5. That, the High Court erred in relying upon merely uncorroborated oral testimony of Motor truck drivers in accepting the respondent s case which was not really corroborated as the alleged corroborative evidence was not evidence at all in the eye of law.
6. That the High Court overlooked the well established principle that the charge of a corrupt practice in the course of an election must be treated as quasi-criminal in character which has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
3. We will deal with these objections in the reverse order, starting with the last mentioned ground of attack on the High Court s judgment. The judgment rests largely on appreciation of oral evidence. It could not, therefore, be easily disturbed by us as has been repeatedly pointed out by this Court even in first appeals on facts in election cases. If the High Court overlooks serious infirmities in the evidence adduced to support the case accepted by it or misreads evidence or ignores the principle that a charge of corrupt practice, in the course of an election, is a grave one which, if established, caste
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