Judgment

R. S. SARKARIA, J.: - This appeal by special leave directed against a judgment of the Allahabad High Court raises a question in regard to the interpretation of Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act 1908. It arises out of these circumstances:

Roshan La1 and two others filed a suit in the Court of Munsif Havali, Lucknow against Balmukund and another for dissolution of partnership, rendition of accounts and recovery. The suit was finally heard and decided by the Munsif as per his judgment, dated 30-10-1956, in these terms:

"Defendant No. I Lala Bal Mukand shall pay a total sum of Rs. 15,927/2/- to the plaintiffs in which they have equal shares. Plaintiffs shall also get their costs from defendant No 1. Let a final decree be prepared accordingly provided necessary court-fee is paid by the plaintiffs within one month."

The plaintiffs did not pay the court-fee within the time originally fixed in the judgment. They asked for extension of time which was granted without notice to the other side. The plaintiffs then deposited the necessary court-fee within this extended time, on 18-1-1957. About 12 days thereafter, on 30-1-1957, the final decree was drawn up and signed.

3. The appellant (Defendant No. I made an application for obtaining a copy of the judgment on 14-11-1956. The copy was prepared and delivered to the appellant on 16-11-1956. On 26-11-1956 i.e. about two months before the decree was actually drawn up and signed, the appellant made an application for a copy of the decree. The copy was prepared and delivered to Counsel for the appellant on 1-2-1957. Information about the supply of this copy was received by the appellant at Delhi on 3-2-1957.

4. Against the judgment and decree of the Munsif, the defendant filed an appeal on 12-2-1957 before the Additional Civil fudges Lucknow. Along with the Memorandum of Appeal, he submitted an application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in respect of the period from 6-2- 1957 to 12-2- 1957. By his - judgment dated 14-2-1957, the Judge dismissed the appeal as time-barred.

5. Aggrieved, the defendant preferred a second appeal to the High Court.

6. Before the learned single Judge of the High Court the appellant urged: (1) That, the first appellate Court did not properly exercise its discretion when it held that there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay; (2) (a) That as the decree passed was conditional on payment of court-fee the date when the decree was actually signed should be the date of the decree; (b) That as the decree was prepared late, it should be held that the "time requisite" for obtaining a copy of the decree" was not the only time while the application for a copy of the decree remained pending but also the time prior to it.

7. The learned Judge rejected both these contentions. Following the rule in Keshar Sugar Works, Bombay v. R. C. Sharma, AIR 1951 All 122 (FB) he held that the period between the date of the judgment (30-10-1956) and the date (26-11-1956) of making the application for copy could not be excluded as "time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree" under Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act. In the result he dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation. Hence this appeal.

8. The contentions which were canvassed on behalf of the appellant in the High Court, have been re-agitated before us by Shri R. K. Garg.

9. Firstly, it is urged that the Additional Civil Judge had exercised his discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in a grossly unjust and unreasonable manner in not condoning the delay. It is submitted that apart from the sworn statement of the appellant that he was ill, there were patent circumstances in this case which by themselves constituted a sufficient cause for condoning the delay of six days in filing the appeal. It is stressed that the law on the point was anything but clear, and the delay in applying for a copy of the decree was due to the delay in preparation of the decree, which in turn, was attribut