Judgment

ALAGIRISWAMI J.:- By two notifications dated 22-6-1965 and 28-8l965 the Government of Bihar sent to the Labour Court, Chota Nagpur Division, Ranchi applications in respect of 73 workers of the appellant for decision under Section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act for retrenchment compensation. The employer contended that it was a case of closure for reasons beyond its control and that therefore the workmen were entitled to compensation under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Sec. 25-FFF of the Act and not to retrenchment compensation. The workers contended, however, that they were entitled to retrenchment compensation under Section 25-F. The Labour Court held that it was a case of retrenchment. Two writ petitions filed by the employer before the High Court of Patna failed and these appeals have been filed in pursuance of a certificate of fitness granted by the High Court.

2. The argument on behalf of the appellant is that where there is a dispute before the Labour Court considering an application under Section 33-C (2) as to whether the workmen had been retrenched or the factory had been closed for reasons beyond the control of the employer, it was not a matter which the Labour Court was competent to decide and that it was a matter which only an Industrial Tribunal considering a reference under Section 10 is competent to decide. In particular Item 10 of the Third Schedule to the Act is relied upon to show that the matter relating to retrenchment and closure is one which only an Industrial Tribunal is competent to decide. Reliance is placed upon a decision of this Court in U. P. Elect. Co. v. R. K. Shukla (1970) 1 SCR 507 where it was held that the power of the Labour Court is to compute the compensation claimed to be payable to the workmen on the footing that there has been retrenchment of the workmen, that where retrenchment is conceded and the only matter in dispute is that by virtue of Section 25-FF no liability to pay compensation has arisen the Labour Court will be competent to decide the question, that in such a case the question is one of computation and not of determination, of the conditions precedent to the accrual of liability and that where the dispute is whether workmen have been retrenched and computation of the amount is subsidiary or incidental, the Labour Court will have no authority to trespass upon the powers of the Tribunal with which it is statutorily invested.

3. In the U. P. Electric Company s case (1970) 1 SCR 507 the facts were somewhat different. The Court in that case noticed at page 513 (of SCR) of the report that -

"The Company had expressly raised a contention that they had not retrenched the workmen and that the workmen had voluntarily abandoned the Company s service by seeking employment with the Board even before the company closed its undertaking."

This Court emphasised at page 517 (of SCR) of the report that -

"If the liability arises from an award, settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A or by virtue of a statute or a scheme made thereunder, mere denial by the employer may not be sufficient to negative the claim under Section 33-C (2) before the Labour Court".

We, therefore, do not see how the decision in the U. P. Electric Company s case (supra) can come to the aid of the appellant in this case. The said case is clearly distinguishable on the peculiar facts as noticed above.

4. In Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P. S. Rajagopalan, (1964) 3 SCR 140 this Court considered the scope of Section 33-C (2) elaborately and it would be necessary to quote at some length from that decision. In that case it was urged by the empolyer that Sec. 33-C (2) can be invoked by a workman who is entitled to receive from the employer the benefit there specified, but the right of the workman to receive the benefit has to be admitted and could not be a matter of dispute between the parties and that the only point which the Labour Court can determine is one in relation to the computation of the benefi