JUDGMENT

KHANNA, J. (for himself and on behalf of Gupta J.):—The detailed facts of this case have been given in the judgment of our learned brother Beg J. and need not be repeated. The question of law which was referred to the High Court and which has been answered in the negative against the assessee-appellant is as follows:

"Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income 12 of the Lok Shikshana Trust was entitled to exemption under Section of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Section 2(15) of the same Act, for the assessment year 1962-63"

"Charitable purpose was defined in Section 4 (3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 asunder:

"In this sub-section charitable purpose includes relief of the poor, education, medical relief, and the advancement of any other object of general public utility."

The definition of "charitable purpose" as given in Sec. 2(15) of the Income tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) with which we are concerned reads as under:

"(15) Charitable purpose includes relief of the poor, education, medical relief, and the advancement of any other object of general public utility not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit.

2. It would appear from the above that in the definition of "charitable purpose" as given in the Act the words "not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit" have been added at the end of the definition as given in the Act of 1922. We shall see as to what is the effect of the above addition.

3. In order to see as to whether the appellant-trust is for a charitable purpose, we may first go into the question as to what is the object of the appellant-trust. According to Mr. Palkhiwala, learned counsel for the appellant, the object of the appellant-trust is education, while the stand of Mr. Sharma on behalf of the revenue is that not education but the last mentioned category in S. 2(15), viz., the advancement of any other object of general public utility, is the object of the appellant-trust. The reason for the above divergence in the stands of Mr. Palkhiwala and Mr. Sharma is that according to Mr. Palkhiwala, the concluding words of the definition in Section 2 (15) of the Act "not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit" do not qualify the first three categories of relief of the poor, education, or medical relief but qualify only the fourth category of "advancement of any other object of general public utility"- Once the object of the appellant trust is held to be education, the trust would, according to Mr Palkhiwala. be held to be for a public purpose as defined in Sec. 2 (15) of the Act. In such an event, it would be immaterial whether the object of the trust involves or does not involve the carrying on of any activity for profit. As against that, Mr. Sharma has controverted the submission that the concluding words of the definition, viz., "not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit qualify only the fourth category of advancement of any other object of general public utility". According to Mr. Sharma, the concluding words qualify the first three categories of relief of the poor, education and medical relief also. In any case, submits Mr Sharma, the object of the appellant-trust falls in the fourth category of the definition, namely, any other object of general public utility." It is in our opinion, not necessary to express opinion in this case on the question as to whether the words not involving the carrying on of any activity for profit" qualify the fourth object, viz, the advancement of any other object of general public utility, or whether they also qualify the other three objects of relief of the poor, education and medical relief, because we are of the view that the object of the appellant-trust was not education but any other object of general public utility. Clauses 2, 6. 10, 14, 16 and 18 of the trust deed of the appellant read as under:

2. The object of the Trust shall be to educate the peo