JUDGMENT

SHINGHAL, J.:—This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka dated November 20, 1974, upholding the judgment of the Sessions Judge of South Kanara dated July 16, 1974, setting aside the conviction of respondent Krishnaiah for an offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and the sentence 666 thereunder. The respondent was a grower of paddy, and it was alleged against him that while he grew paddy in 7.12 acres of land, and was liable to sell 3.12 quintals by way of levy, he ignored the demand notice which was served on him on October 28, 1971 and thereby contravened the provisions of Clause 3 of the Karnataka Paddy Procurement (Levy) Order.

2. The Sessions Judge took the view that it was only the "Purchase Officer" to whom the paddy was required to be sold, and that as the demand for the levy was made by the Enforcement Officer it was unauthorised. It is however not in dispute before us that the Sessions Judge lost sight of the newly promulgated Karnataka Paddy Procurement (Levy) Order, 1966, hereinafter referred to as the Levy Order, clause 3 of which provided for the sale of paddy to the Enforcement Officer by way of levy. But it has been argued on behalf of the respondent that, even so there was no evidence to show that the demand notice was signed by an Enforcement Officer. Our attention has been invited in this connection to that part of the judgment of the Sessions Judge where it has been stated that as the accused had challenged the appointment of the person who had issued the demand notice as the Enforcement Officer, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove the appointment and that, in absence of any such proof, there is no occasion for taking a different view of the matter.

3. Clause 2 (c) of the Levy Order defines "Enforcement Officer" to mean

"any person appointed by order of the Deputy Commissioner of the District as Enforcement Officer in respect of such area as may be specified in such order, and where no such person is appointed for the area, the Revenue Inspector of the Circle having jurisdiction."

It has been argued by Mr. Netar, for the appellant State, that as the order for the levy of paddy had been signed and issued by the Revenue Inspector concerned, the Sessions Judge committed an apparent error in taking the view that it was not issued and signed by a duly appointed Enforcement Officer.

4. As would appear from the definition mentioned above, Enforcement Officer was the person appointed by an order of the Deputy Commissioner as such for a specified area. It was therefore permissible for the Deputy Commissioner to appoint a person other than the Revenue Inspector to be the Enforcement Officer, and it was only when he did not think it proper to do so that the Revenue Inspector of the Circle could function as the Enforcement Officer. So when the accused had raised a controversy regarding the authority of the Revenue Inspector to issue the order of levy, it was necessary for the prosecution to prove that no one else had been appointed to be the Enforcement Officer and the Revenue Inspector of the Circle had the authority to function in that capacity. The prosecution did not, however, produce any such evidence. In fact Mr. Netar has not been able to refer us to any averment of the prosecution or the appellant on the record that no one else had been appointed as the Enforcement Officer and the Revenue Inspector had the authority to function as such. It cannot therefore be said that the prosecution was able to prove that the demand notice was issued by a competent officer.

5. It has next been argued by Mr. Netar that as the respondent did not make a grievance that the quantity of paddy to be sold by him in pursuance of clause 3 (2) of the Levy Order was excessive and he did not avail of the provisions of clause 4 of the Levy Order, it was not permissible for him to dispute his liability to sell the quantity of paddy which had been determined by