JUDGMENT

SARKARIA, J.:—The petitioner challenges the validity of the order, dated December, 14, 1972, of his detention made by the District Magistrate 24, Parganas under Section 3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (hereinafter called the Act).

2. The only ground of detention served on the detenu runs thus:

"You are being detained ...on the ground that you have been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community as evidenced by the particulars given below:

"That on 10-9-72 in between 06.30 hrs. and 07.30 hrs. you and your associates broke open Wagon Nos. PC 12799 NR 35424 and ERC 97048 loaded with foodgrain (wheat) and committed theft in respect of the same from Canning Railway Yard. You were named in the F. I. R. and subsequently arrested.

3. In the counter-affidavit filed by the District Magistrate, it is averred that he was "satisfied from the materials on record as stated in the ground of detention , and the "acts committed by the detenu 755 (as disclosed in the grounds furnished to the detenu) about the necessity of making the detention order. It is nowhere said in the counter that anything more than the bald information given (vide Annexure A, to the counter) was communicated to the detenu. Therefore, neither the contents of the F.I.R. nor the vital particulars of the incident of theft on which the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate was based, were communicated to the detenu. The material served on the detenu in conspicuous by the non-mention of many facts of the incident, such as, the quantity of wheat stolen, the implements or weapons, if any, with the thieves, the show of force, if any, accompanying the theft, the magnitude and duration of the dislocation caused to the supplied and services etc. etc.

4. The material communicated to the detenu disclosed a case of theft simpliciter for which he would have been normally dealt with and punished under the Penal Code in a court of law. Indeed, as mentioned in Annexure A (quoted above), the petitioner was initially arrested for such prosecution. There is however nothing in the counter-affidavit to show that after his arrest, he was actually charge-sheeted before a Magistrate for trial and was discharged or released thereafter in pursuance of an order passed under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

5. Shri Raghunath Singh, Advocate, appearing as amicus curiae for the petitioner contends that under the law the detaining authority was bound to communicate to the detenu, all material facts integral to the grounds of detention which weighed with the detaining authority in ordering the detention, and his failure to do so, has left the ground communicated deficient and vague, and, in consequence, deprived the detenu of his right of making an effective representation. For this reason, it is urged, the detention is illegal.

6. Shri S. C. Majumdar, learned Counsel for the State, however, contends that this Court cannot test and review the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority by objective standards; nor can the Court go into the question whether the solitary ground of detention was sufficient to make the impugned order, the matter being one exclusively within the province of the authority. It is further maintained that the law requires only the "grounds of detention, as distinguished from the particulars of the evidence , to be communicated to the detenu, and that this requirement has been amply complied with in the instant case.

7. We think that the contention of the learned amicus curiae for the petitioner must prevail. No doubt, Clause (4) of Article 22 of the Constitution and Section 8 of the Act do not, in terms, speak of particulars ; or facts , but only of grounds to be communicated to the detenu. But this requirement is to be read in conjunction with and subservient to the primary mandate: "and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order , in