JUDGMENT

SARKARIA, J.:— Controversy in these appeals centres round the interpretation of the words "specially empowered" appearing in Sec. 2(c) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956 (to be hereinafter referred to as the Act).

2. The facts giving rise to these appeals are as follows:

3. Chaturbhuj Maganlal and Bai Sabita, respondents herein, are husband and wife residing together at Parvati Bhuvan, Rajkot. Both of them together with Bai Hamida Basir Mohammed, respondent 3 herein, are accused 1, 2 and 3 respectively, in a trial for offences punishable under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class Rajkot in Cr. Cases Nos. 1372 and 1404 of 1968. When the trial was about to commence in these cases, 1699 the accused moved applications raising an objection that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the offences as he had not been "specially empowered" as required by Section 2 (c) of the Act. The Magistrate rejected those applications whereupon the accused went in revision before the Sessions Judge, Rajkot who dismissed the same.

4. Aggrieved the accused filed two revisions (Cr. R. 321 and 322 of 1969) in the High Court of Gujarat. A learned Judge of the High Court allowed the revisions on the ground that Mr. Modha, Magistrate 1st Class Rajkot, before whom these cases were pending, had no jurisdiction to try the same because the State Government notification, dated February 19, 1959 did not have the effect of making him a "Magistrate of the first class specially empowered" within the meaning of S. 2(c) of the Act. Accordingly, the Magistrate was directed to drop the proceedings pending against the revision-petitioners.

5. Against that decision of the High Court, the State has now filed these appeals on a certificate granted by the High Court under Article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution.

6. Section 2 (c) of the Act defines a "Magistrate" to mean "a District Magistrate, a Sub-Divisional Magistrate of the First Class specially empowered by the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette to exercise jurisdiction under the Act"

7. Section 22 further says:

"No court inferior to that of a Magistrate as defined in Clause (c) of Section 2 shall try any offence under Section 3, Section 4, Section 5, Section 6, Section 7 or Section 8".

8. The State Government Notification No. PPA/1257/84187/X of July 22, 1958, published in the Bombay Government Gazette of July 31, 1958, purporting to have been issued under Section 2 (c) runs as follows:

"In the exercise of the powers conferred by Section 2 (c) of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956, the Government of Bombay hereby empowers all the Judicial Magistrates of the First Class to exercise jurisdiction under the said Act, except under Sections 12 (1), 18 (1), 19, 20 (1) and (3) of the Act."

9. The question is, whether this notification has the effect of making every Judicial Magistrate of the First Class in the State within the area of his respective jurisdiction, a Magistrate competent to try any offence under Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8 of the Act?

10. Answer to this question depends on a correct interpretation of the expression "specially empowered" in S. 2 (c). There has been a sharp conflict of judicial opinion in regard to the meaning of this expression.

11. One line of decisions has taken the view (hereafter referred to as the narrow view) that the word "specially" in this expression has reference only to the mode of empowerment as indicated in Sec. 39 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. According to this view the word "specially" stands in contrast to the word "generally." Therefore, if powers to try certain offences are conferred on a class of officials by their official title, they are "generally empowered"; but if the powers are conferred on particular individuals by name or by virtue of their office, they are "specially empowered." On this reasoning it is deduced that the words "specially