JUDGMENT

KRISHNA IYER, J.:— Counsel for the appellant - a jolted transport operator - has assertively argued for an untenable position, heedless of the true nature of transport permit jurisprudence. The sole issue on which limited leave has been granted to him by this Court under Art. 136 lends itself to straight forward resolution, once we grasp the public character of the litigation and public purpose of the jurisdiction where permits regulating the plying of stage carriages are awarded or refused. The conscience of this branch of public law is justice to the public, although, in the process of adjudication private claims to carry on transport business through permits are comparatively evaluated. Public interest is the paramount consideration, while private rights, fundamental though, apparently constitute the quasi-lis for decision. The touchstone of better merit is solely the ability to serve the public, and the hierarchy of transport tribunals, bearing true faith and allegiance to Section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1948 (for short, the Act) have the duty and, therefore, the power to consider all factors pertinent to the larger scheme of efficient public transport. To equate - and thereby hamstring - this jurisdiction and processual law with what governs a civil proceeding under the Civil Procedure Code, is to miss the policing policy of the law and maim he amplitude of the power-duty complex. In other words, the duplex scheme of the statute is the holding of a public enquiry to determine who will serve public interest best but ordinarily activated into that inquiry by private applicants for permits. The pro bono publico character of the hearing cannot be scuttled in the name of competitive individual rights and narrow procedural trappings.

2. The minimal facts. The appellant and the 1st respondent, among others, applied for permits to ply a stage carriage on a specified route in the Krishna District, Andhra Pradesh. Although there were two permits for issuance, one was given to R2 and that has become final. We are now concerned only with the other permit which had been granted by the Regional Transport Authority (acronymically, RTA) to the appellant but was switched over to the 1st respondent by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (STAT) on taking into consideration a fresh ground and supporting evidence to the effect that the appellant was guilty of a transport tax violation and had compounded that offence under Section 60 (3) of the Act. The power in this behalf was stated to be based on Rule 15 of the Andhra Pradesh State Transport Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Appellate rules), which reads:

"15. Additional Evidence- (1) The parties to the appeal or application shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence whether oral or documentary before the Tribunal but,-

(a) if the authority from whose order the appeal or application is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or

(b) if the party seeking to adduce additional evidence satisfies the Tribunal that such evidence, notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at or before the time when the under appeal was passed; or

(c) if the Tribunal requires any documents to be produced or any witnesses to be examined to enable it to pass just orders; or

(d) for any other sufficient reason, the Tribunal may allow such evidence or documents to be produced or witnesses examined:

Provided that were such evidence is received the other party shall be entitled to produce rebutting evidence, if any.

(ii) If the Tribunal is or opinion that any witness should be examined in connection with any case before it. it may instead of examining him before itself, issue a commission to the concerned Regional Transport Authorities or the State Transport Authority as the case may be, or to an Advocate or such other suitable person as it may deem fit, in the circumstances