SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.N. RAY, C.J.I., M.H. BEG AND JASWANT SINGH, JJ.
Harbanslal Jagmohandas and another, Appellants
Versus
Prabhudas Shivlal, Respondent.
Civil Appeals Nos. 282 and 2068 of 1971
Decided on 12-3-1976.
AND
Civil Appeal No. 282 of 1971.
Civil Appeal No.2068 of 1971
Rev. Everett M. Fasanachat and another, Appellants
Versus
West End Works, Respondent.
Advocates appeared
Mr. D. V. Patel, Sr. Advocate, (M/s. S. K. Dholakia and R. C. Bhatia, Advocates with him), for Appellants in Civil Appeal No. 282 of 1971.
Mr. V. S. Desai, Sr. Advt., (M/s. Mekohn F. A. Pereiza and H. S. Parihar, Advocate for Mr. I. N. Shroff. Advocate with him), for Appellants in Civil Appeal No. 2068 of 1971.
Mr. V. S. Desai, Sr. Advocate, (Mr. H. S. Parihar, Advocate for Mr. I. N. Shroff, Advocate with him), for Respondent in Civil Appeal No. 282 of 1971.
Constitution of India,1950 - Article 227 - Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 - Sections 12 (3) (b), 11 (4) , 11 , 12 and 11 (3) - Decree passed - Notice - Ground of arrears - Service of the notice - Appeals raise a common question as to whether provision contained in Section 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 referred to as the Act applies - High Court took the view that the provisions of Section 12 (3) (a) of Act apply to the suit - Bombay High Court took the view that the Provisions contained in Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act do not apply to the suit - principal question is whether on receipt of a notice from the landlord terminating the tenancy on ground of arrears of rent dispute as to standard rent has to be raised before the expiry of the period of one month after the service of the notice - Held, Bombay High Court overlooks the limitation of time within which a dispute is to be raised as to standard rent. The view of the Bombay High Court is that disputing within one month of the service of notice terminating the tenancy is one mode of raising a dispute and there is another mode of raising the dispute at any stage of the suit - View of the Bombay High Court nullifies the provisions contained in Section 12 and Explanation thereto and confers a right on the tenant where the legislation does not contemplate such a right - Section 11 (3) of the Act deal with orders which may be passed by the Court during the pendency of application disputing the rent - C. A. No. 282 of 1971 dismissed C. A. No. 2068 of 1971 allowed
JUDGMENT
RAY C. J.:— Civil Appeal No. 282 of 1971 referred to as the Gujarat Appeal is by special leave from the order dated 22 December, 1970 of the High Court of Gujarat rejecting a revision application against the judgment and decree passed by the Extra Assistant Judge on 17 September, 1970.
2. Civil Appeal No, 2068 of 1971 hereinafter referred to as the Bombay Appeal is by special leave from the judgment and order dated 31 March, 1971 of the High Court of Bombay.
3. Both the appeals raise a common question as to whether the provision contained in Section 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act applies. The Gujarat High Court took the view that the provisions of Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act apply to the suit. The Bombay High Court took the view that the Provisions contained in Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act do not apply to the suit, but that the suit is governed by the provisions contained in Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act.
4. The principal question is whether on receipt of a notice from the landlord terminating the tenancy on the ground of arrears of rent dispute as to standard rent has to be raised before the expiry of the period of one month after the service of the notice.
5. The Gujarat High Court has taken the view that the dispute as to standard rent is to be raised within one month from the service of the notice on the tenant. The Bombay High Court has taken a contrary view and held that the tenant can raise a dispute as to standard rent in his written statement in answer to the suit and in such a case the provisions of Sec. 12 (3) (b) of the Act will apply.
6. In the Gujarat appeal the respondent filed a suit for recovery of possession of a portion of the ground floor of a building on the ground that the appellant was in arrears of rent from 1 September, 1964 and also on the ground that the respondent bona fide required possession of the premises in suit. The Third Joint Civil Judge in the trial Court gave a decree in favour of the respondent for possession of the premises. The trial Court held that the appellants were in arrears of rent from 1 September, 1964 and that they were not ready and willing to pay the rent. The trial court further held that the contractual rent in respect of the premises was not unreasonable and excessive.
7. The appellants in the Gujarat appeal filed an appeal in the Court of District Judge of Surat. The Appellate Court by judgment dated 17th September, 1970 confirmed the judgment and decreed the suit.
8. The appellants thereafter filed a revision application before the Gujarat High Court on the ground that the court should have held that the case fell under Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act. The High Court rejected the revision application at sight.
9. The facts found in the Gujarat appeal are as follows: The appellants paid rent to the respondent up to 31 August, 1964. The respondent landlord by notice dated 14 November 1966 terminated the tenancy of the appellants, inter alia, on the ground that the appellants were in arrears of rent for more than six months. The appellants received the notice on 6th December, 1966. The respondent filed the suit on 2 February, 1967.
10. In the Gujarat appeal the appellants contended that they raised the dispute about the standard rent by theirletters dated 17 November, 1966; 19 December, 1966 and 11 February, 1967 and, therefore, there was a dispute as to standard rent and the provisions contained in Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act do not apply. The Appellate Court found that the letters dated 17 November, 1966 and 19 December, 1966 alleged to have been written by the appellants to the respondents were manufactured by the appellants and the certificates of posting were obtained by unscrupulous means. As to the alleged letter of the appellants dated 11 February, 1967 the Appellate Court found that in that letter the appellants referred to the letters dated 17th November, 1966 and 19 December, 1
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