JUDGMENT

A. ALAGIRISWAMI, J. :— The appellants were the defendants in a suit filed by the respondent for specific performance of an agreement entered into by them to sell a house belonging to them in Bhopal. The agreement, Ex. P. - 1, is dated 17th September 1959 and reads as follows :

"Today i.e. on 17-9-1959, one house in which I am living situate at Gojarpura, I agree to sell the entire house apart from the side-portion of the door which has been given to the maternal uncle according to the religious law of MOHAMMADANISM, for a consideration of Rupees 31,375/- (i.e. thirty one thousand three hundred and seventy five rupees) to Seth Sanwaldas son of Motilal Sarraf Chouk with the consent of my sister. The entire door is included in the said house. I have realised a sum of Rs. 2000/- (i.e. two thousand) as an earnest money. No other (person) has a right (in that house) and there is no necessity of any advice. Tomorrow morning you consult your pleader and get PACCI receipt executed and shall have no objection.

Finis.

Sd/- Shaharyar Bano Begum daughters of late Sardar Akbar Khan

Sd/- Sarwar Bano

Witness :- Sd/- Ramnarayan Singh Chouk (in Hindi)

Sd/- Ramprakash (in English)."

The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that though the appellants executed an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff by which they agreed to sell only the house in which they were residing and the gate adjoining the said house, it was not proved that the property to be sold included the open plot of the land between the gate and theother house occupied by the tenants and also did not include such other house and hence a decree for specific performance cannot be passed to the extent of all the four properties for which specific performance was prayed for. It however ordered the defendants to return the sumof Rs. 2,000/- received by them a the time of agreement.

2. Before the High Court it was argued that the agreement, Ex. P-1 was too vague and therefore unenforceable. The High Court took the view that the terms of the agreement were quite clear and the trial Court was wrong in refusing to pass a decree for specific performance. Another argument advanced before the High Court was that although the defendants at the time of entering into the agreement considered themselves to be the sole owners of the whole house, they later on discovered that there were other co-shares also and that they were therefore incapable of carrying out the terms of the contract. The respondent stated before the High Court that he relinquished all claims for such further performance or for any damages or compensation either for deficiency or for loss or damage which may be sustained by him through the default of the defendants on that ground. In the result the High Court gave a decree for specific performance of the contract and for a sale-deed of the whole house, except the portion which has been shown in the sketch map attached to the plaint as having been expressly exempt from sale, regarding the right, title and inters of the defendants and that the defendants would not be liable tocompensate the plaintiff for any portion of the property that may go out of his hands on account of the claim of other co-sharers which may be proved in the house.

3. Before us three points were urged (1) that there was no concluded contract, (2) reservation of rights of other co-sharers, and (3) a decision on what exactly was the property agreed to be conveyed. Points 1 and 2do not really call for much comments nor are they susceptible to much argument in their support. The contract, Ex. P-1 is quite clear and definite. The fact that the vendee was asked to consult his pleader and get pacci receipt executed did not make the contract dependent upon the vendee consulting his pleader and getting the pacci receipt. The fact that he did not return thereafter to get pacci receipt does not make the contract any-the-less binding on the appellants. As regards the rights of the co-sharers, it appears that some