SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
V.R. KRISHNA IYER AND A.C. GUPTA, JJ.
Jasraj Indersingh, Appellant
Versus
Hemraj Multanchand, Respondent.
Civil Appeals Nos. 2208-2209 of 1968,
D/- 14-2-1977.
Advocates appeared
Mr. S. T. Desai, Sr. Advocate. (Mr. D. N. Mishra and Mr. B. N. Mohta, Advocates with him), for Appellant; Mr. M. N. Phadke, Sr. Advocate, (Mr. A. G. Ratnaparkhi, Advocate with him), for Respondent.
Constitution of India - Article 133 – Claim of compensation - Challenging correctness - Trial Court - No jurisdiction - And some pre-trial conciliation activism by court at an early stage might well have sorted out dispute bettered their relations and pre-empted this cock-fight - Doing justice is a noble behest which blesses all deciding within a judicative pyramid provocative of appeals and revisions bleeds both and unwittingly incites bitter persistence in struggle to win – Court are courts of justice guided by law and signature tune of Judicature is Fiat – Court gently suggested in this spirit whether parties would be disposed to compose their quarrel - Counsel as often happens constructively helped, but the purchase of peace at this late stage was difficult and we gave up - Of course adjudication on law and facts cannot and shall not be influenced by this extra-curial excursion – Held, However it transpires that in this proposition has been affirmed. Viewed simplistically remand order by High Court is a finding in an intermediate stage of same litigation - When it came to trial Court and escalated to the High Court it remained the same litigation - Appeal before SC is from suit as a whole and therefore entire subject-matter is available for adjudication before us – If on any other principle of finality statutorily conferred or on account of res judicator attracted by a decision in an allied litigation the matter is concluded, we too are bound in SC – Otherwise whole for first time comes to this Court and High Courts finding at an intermediate stage does not prevent examination of the position of law by this Court. Intermediate stages of the litigation and orders passed at those stages have a provisional finality - After discussing various aspects of the matter speaking for Court in observed - Circumstance that remanding judgment of the High Court was not appealed against, assuming that an appeal lay therefore cannot preclude the appellant from challenging correctness of the view taken by High Court in that judgment. The contention barred before High Court is still available to be canvassed before this Court when it seeks to pronounce finally on the entirety of the suit - Cited before us decision of the Bombay High Court in as part of his argument - Therein it is laid down that a remand order will not operate as res judicative and preclude remanding court from reopening it at the subsequent stage of the same continuing proceeding when law underlying remand order is differently interpreted by a larger Bench or by SC. Such an order or finding recorded at the stage of remand happens to be interlocutory and cannot terminate cause finally so that when litigation comes up before remanding court previous remand order would ordinarily be conclusive and binding like any other interlocutory order - But exceptions there are where a re-consideration of such an order is necessitated either by discovery of fresh matter or of unforeseen development subsequent to order or change of law having retrospective effect - Order accordingly
Judgment
KRISHNA IYER, J.:- The two appeals, measured by their legal merits or factual dimensions may not justify their longevity from June 23, 1949 to February 1977 - the former being the date of birth of the suit and the latter the termination, at long last, of the cases in this Court. The subject-matter is a relatively small money claim which perhaps is less than the amount each side has spent on the forensic scrimmage. Before we narrate the facts and discuss the law, we may permit ourselves a pensive reflection about our processual justice. If we (law-makers and lawyers) tarry any longer to forge a speedy and radical jurisprudence of remedies-in-action, the long quest for the fruits of rights may tempt suitors into the traditional quagmire of processual legalistics where from extrication may prove an expensive futility. The story which hopefully comes to a close with this judgment, among many others like this, bears testimony to the crying need for serious reform - not oblique by-pass - of the court system by an aware legislature, lest the considerable social cost of pursuing judicial remedies stultify and disenchant seekers of legal justice. The facts, when unfolded, will validate this obiter intended to alert the law-maker.
2. The High Court, thanks to the then rule of valuation under Article 133 (1) (a) of the Constitution, granted a certificate of fitness. The appellant-plaintiff, as kartha of a joint Hindu family, was running a business in the name and style of Jasraj Inder Singh with two shops, one in Khamgaon and the other in Bombay. (The trade name for the Bombay Shop was slightly different.) The respondent-defendant had been having dealings with the plaintiff at both places between October 1947 and May 1948. The accounts between the parties fluctuated from time to time, since deposits, advances, withdrawals and entrustment of silver, castor, cotton and the like for sale as agents and crediting the prices in the accounts were a running feature of the mutual dealings. The plaintiff isolated the transactions which took place in Khamgaon and brought a suit claiming a sum of Rs. 11,401-7-9 which represented the net balance due on the Khamgaon khata to him from the defendant on May 12, 1948. Interest was also demanded on an alleged agreed rate. It is noteworthy that the plaintiffs initial folly, as Shri Desai, for the appellant. frankly admitted, was in excluding from the suit claim the amounts due one way or the other from the Bombay branch of the business. The contracting parties were identical, the dealings were similar and on any fair basis either could get from the other the net amount legally due from both the shops together. But legal sense and commonsense were abandoned by the plaintiff out of the oblique motive of claiming a larger sum than would be due in case a joint balance was struck. This dubious device, as will be seen presently, has backlashed on the plaintiff whose disaster in the High Court has been largely courted by this motivated cleverness. To revert to the litigative narrative, the defendant urged in defence that the demand was untenable since he had deposited six bars of silver with the Khamgaon shop of the plaintiff to be sold through his Bombay branch and if the sale proceeds thereof were taken into account in the Khamgaon khata a larger sum would be due to him. (We bypass, for the time being, the fight over this claim being a set-off under Order VIII, Rule 6, C. P. C., or a counter-claim in the nature of a substantive relief for the balance). This counter-claim was met by the plaintiff in additional pleading wherein he urged that the sale of silver bars was a matter for the Bombay shop and should not be mixed up with the Khamgaor dealings which were the basis of the action. What falls for regrettable comment is that even at this stage the plaintiff did not invoke the obvious argument that the Khamgaon and the Bombay shops both belonged to the same owner and since the transactions were between th
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