Judgment

SHINGHAL, J.:- This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated March 26, 1976. It related to the validity of the imposition of octroi with effect from July 15, 1950, on certain goods brought within the Maunath Bhanjan Municipality, hereinafter referred to as the Board.

2. The challenge to the imposition was made by the Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd., hereinafter referred to as the Company. The Company started constituting a textile factory, a part of which at any rate, fell within the area of the Board. It applied for an obtained exemption from the levy of octroi on its building material on the ground that it was a new concern. It however started bringing more articles within its premises, and the Octroi Superintendent made a demand for the payment of octroi on June 25, 1969. The Company tried to avoid the levy on the basis of the order of exemption, but the Executive Officer of the Board repeated the demand on May 30, 1970, and June 16, 1970. The Board also wrote to the State Government for permission to realise octroi from the Company. The Government gave the permission to realise the tax. The Company thereupon challenged the levy of the octroi in the High Court by a writ petition. The High Court took the view that the initial imposition of the octroi was illegal, allowed the writ petition, and issued a mandamus directing the Board not to realise the tax. The Board feels aggrieved and has come up in appeal to this Court.

3. It appears that the Company took four grounds for challenging the levy of octroi, but the High Court examined only the following ground, as it took the view that it was enough for the Companys success in the petition, and did not examine the other grounds,-

"that the procedure prescribed for the imposition of taxes by municipal boards under Sections 131 to 135 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, was not followed by the Municipal Board."

Counsel for the parties have accordingly confined their arguments to the finding of the High Court in favour of the Company on this ground.

4. As the ground on which the Company has succeeded is quite general and vague, we asked counsel for the parties to refer to the precise plea in that respect, in the writ petition. They could however only invite out attention to ground No. 6 of the writ petition where the Company has merely stated that the imposition of octroi was void and illegal "because mandatory provisions for imposition of octroi tax as provided in the U. P. Municipalities Act has not been followed." It is therefore obvious, and has not been disputed before us, that the Company took a very vague ground to challenge the validity of the imposition of octroi, and left it to the High Court to embark on a roving and fishing inquiry, on the off chance of finding some violation of the so-called "mandatory provisions for the imposition of octroi." It has not been disputed before us that the High Court undertook such an inquiry and struck down the imposition on the following grounds,-

(1) The draft rules for the levy of the tax were not published, and only the rates of octroi were published, so that there was violation of the provisions of Section 23 of the General Clauses Act and Sections 134 (1) and 300 of the Act.

(2) The order of the District Magistrate, which was equivalent to the special resolution of the Board under sub-section (2) of Section 134 was invalid as it was passed on June 20, 1950, while the rules were finalised and published on July 15, 1950.

(3) There was no "foundation or basis" of the notification under Section 135 (2) and no such notification was published.

5. Counsel for the Company however strenuously argued that there was no compliance with the provisions of Sections 131 to 133 also, and made a reference to the decisions in Municipal Board, Hapur v. Raghuvendra Kripal. (1966) 1 SCR 950 and Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Rampur, (1965) 1 SCR 970, for the purpose of showing that parts