SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.N. BHAGWATI AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.
Sunder Dass, Appellant
Versus
Ram Parkash, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 2006 of 1968,
D/- 24-2-1977.
Advocates appeared
Mr. Bishan Narain, Sr. Advocate, (Mr. D. N. Mishra, Advocate with him), for Appellant; Mr. V. S. Desai, Sr. Advocate. (M/s. B. P. Singh and A. K. Srivastava. Advocates with him), for Respondent. 1202
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 - Section 3 - Sale certificate was not issued in favour - Building as tenant and pursuant to this letter - Appeal by certificate raises short but interesting question of law relating to interpretation and effect of proviso to Section 3 of Delhi Rent Control Act - Dispute in this appeal relates to shop situate ground floor of building bearing Municipal situate in Delhi - Building was an evacuee property and it was acquired by Central Government Section Displaced Persons Act - Formed part of compensation pool - It was sold by public auction and appellant being highest bidder was accepted as auction purchaser by managing officer - It does not appear from record as to when appellant paid full purchase price to managing officer but presumably he did so before when sale was confirmed in his favour by managing officer – Held, Prima facie it may appear somewhat strange that decree for eviction which was good and valid when it was made should be treated as null and void by virtue of retrospective introduction of proviso in Section - But such a result is necessarily involved in legal fiction created by retrospective operation of proviso - If as result of said fiction court must read proviso as forming part of Section as from date of enactment Delhi Rent Control Act conclusion is inescapable that civil court had no inherent jurisdiction to entertain suit and trial Court as well as Additional District Judge and High Court were in error in exercising jurisdiction in relation to suit when their jurisdiction was clearly excluded by Section - Appellant however urged that introduction proviso in Section should not be given greater retrospective operation than necessary and it should not be so construed as to affect decrees for eviction which had already become final between parties - Now it is true and that is settled principle of construction that court ought not to give larger retrospective operation statutory provision than what can plainly be seen to have been meant by legislature - This rule of interpretation is hallowed by time and sanctified by decisions though court are not at all sure whether it should have validity in context of changed social norms and values - But even so court do not see how retrospective introduction of proviso in can be construed so as to leave unimpaired a decree for eviction already passed when question arises in execution whether it is a nullity - Logical and inevitable consequence of introduction of proviso in Section with retrospective effect would be to read proviso as if it were part of section at date when Delhi Rent Control Act was enacted and legal fiction created by retrospective operation must be carried to its logical extent and all consequences and incidents must be worked out as if proviso formed part of section right from beginning - Appeal dismissed
Judgment
P. N. BHAGWATI, J.:- This appeal by certificate raises a short but interesting question of law relating to the interpretation and effect of the proviso to Section 3 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The dispute in this appeal relates to a shop situate on the ground floor of a building bearing Municipal No. 624-36 (Old) 530-35 (New) situate in Sadar Bazar, Delhi. The building was an evacuee property and it was acquired by the Central Government under Section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. 1954 and formed part of the compensation pool. It was sold by public auction and the appellant being the highest bidder was accepted as the auction purchaser by the managing officer on 5th September, 1955. It does not appear from the record as to when the appellant paid the full purchase price to the managing officer but presumably he did so before 23rd September, 1955 when the sale was confirmed in his favour by the managing officer. The sale certificate was not issued in favour of the appellant for a considerable time and we are told that even until now it has not been issued out possession of the building was handed over to the appellant on 30th August, 1956 and a letter dated 3rd September, 1956 was addressed by the managing officer to the respondent intimating to him that since possession of the building had been handed over to the appellant, the respondent should pay rent to the appellant and otherwise deal directly with him effect from 30th August, 1956. This letter was addressed to the respondent, because at that time the respondent was in possession of one other shop in the same building as a tenant and pursuant to this letter, he attorned tenancy in respect of the shop to the appellant. On 1st September, 1956, the appellant let out the shop in dispute (hereinafter referred to as the premises) to the respondent and the latter continued in possession of the premises as a monthly tenant. However, on 10th August, 1959 the appellant gave a notice to quit terminating the tenancy of the respondent and calling upon him to hand over vacant possession of the premises by the mid-night of 31st August, 1959. The respondent declined to comply with the requisition contained in the notice and hence the appellant filed a suit in the Court of the Senior Subordinate Judge, Delhi on 15th September, 1959 for recovery of possession of the premises from the respondent. There was also a claim made in suit for recovery of arrears of rent but this claim is no longer material and we need not dwell on it. The respondent resisted the claim for eviction inter alia on the ground that the certificate of sale not having been issued in favour of the appellant he was not the owner of the premises and hence he was not legally competent to let out the premises to the respondent nor was he entitled to recover possession of the premises from the respondent. The respondent also disputed the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 which had come into force on 9th February 1959 was applicable to the tenancy of the premises and by reason of Section 50 of that Act, the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The trial Court took the view, on a reading of the decision of this Court in M/s. Bombay Salt and Chemical Industries v. L. J. Johnson, AIR 1958 SC 289 that since the certificate of sale was not issued in favour of the appellant, he had not become the owner of the premises and the premises continued to belong to the Government and by reason of Section 3 which provided that "Nothing in this Act shall apply to any premises belonging to the Government", the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was not applicable to the tenancy in respect of the premises and the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The trial Court also held that since the full purchase price had been paid by the appellant and possession of the premises had been handed over by the managing officer to the a
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