Judgment

CHANDRACHUD, J.- The appellant, Palaniappa Gounder, was convicted by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Salem, under S.302 of the Penal Code and was sentenced to death on the charge that on August 23, 1974 he had committed the murder of one Sengoda Gounder. The appellants son and daughter-in-law were convicted by the learned Judge for abetting the murder and were sentenced to life imprisonment. The three accused filed an appeal in the High Court of Madras which upheld the appellants conviction under S.302 but reduced the sentence from death to imprisonmment of life. However, while reducing the substantive sentence the High Court imposed a fine of Rs.20,000/- on the appellant and directed that out of the fine, if realised, a sum of Rs.15,000/- should be paid to the son and daughters of the deceased under S.357 (1)(c) of the Cr. P.C. 2 of 1974. The other two accused were acquitted by the High Court. We are not concerned in this appeal with the legality of the appellants conviction or with the acquittal of his daughter and son-in-law. The special leave granted by this Court is limited to the question of the propriety of the fine imposed by the High Court.

2. The reason and occasion for imposing the sentence of fine was that an application was filed before the High Court under S.482 of the Criminal Procedure Code by a son and two daughters of the deceased praying that the appellant, his son and daughter-in-law be asked to pay to them, as heirs of the deceased, compensation in the sum of Rupees 40,000/- for the death of their father.

3. S.482 of the Code under which the heirs of the deceased filed the application for compensation coresponds to S.561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code of 1898. It saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A provision which serves the inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express provision contained in the statute which saves that power. This is put in another form by saying that if there is an express provision in a statute governing a particular subject-matter there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent powers of the Court because the Court ought to apply the provisions of the statute which are made advisedly to govern the particular subject-matter. From this it will be clear that the application made by the heirs of the deceased for compensation could not have been made under S.482 since S.357 expressly confers power on the court to pass an order for payment of compensation in the circumstances mentioned therein. That did not, however, affect the power of the High Court to deal with the application because though the application was wrongly described as having been made under S.482 the High Court could deal with it as if it were made under S.357 of the Code. That in fact is what the High Court proceeded to do, for it passed the order of compensation not under S.482 but under S.357 (1)(c) of the Code.

4. S.357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 2 of 1974, reads thus:

"357. Order to pay compensation.

(1) When a Court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence (including a sentence of death) of which fine forms a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be applied.

(a) in defraying the expenses properly incurred in the prosecution;

(b) in the payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensation is, in the opinion of the Court, recoverable by such person in a Civil Court;

(c) when any person is convicted of any offence for having caused the death of another person or of having abetted the commission of such an offence, in paying compensation to the persons who are, under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 (13 of 1855), entitled to recover damages from the person sentenced for the loss resulting to them from s