SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.N. BHAGWATI, V.R. KRISHNA IYER AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.
Smt. Smriti Marthand, Appellant
Versus
Distt. Judge of Kumaum, Nainital and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 715 of 1976,
D/- 20-9-1976.
Constitution of India,1950 – Article 226 - U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 – Section 21(1)(a) and 21 - Suit for premises – Eviction - This appeal arises out of an application filed by respondents for eviction of appellant under S. 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 - Prescribed Authority, who heard application, took the view that bona fide requirement of Respondents was not established and on this view, rejected application of Respondents - District Judge, in appeal, disagreed with the view taken by Prescribed Authority and came to conclusion that the bona fide requirements of Respondents was established on evidence on record and in any event, by reason to S. 21, it must be conclusively presumed that they bona fide required premises for their own use and occupation - Since, according to learned District Judge, case fell within Expln. (iv) to S. 21, he held that R. 16 (1) of the Rules framed under Act which requires the comparative hardship of landlord and tenant to be taken into account was not applicable, and passed an order of eviction against appellant - Appellant thereupon preferred a writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad - High Court declined to interfere with the finding in regard to bona fide need of respondents, since that was a finding of fact and High Court was of the view that it would not be competent for it in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of Constitution to disturb a finding of fact reached by District Judge - Whether or not an order of eviction should be made against tenant and R. 16 has been retrospectively validated by S. 27 of Amending Act – Held, it is obvious, that learned District Judge as well as Prescribed Authority were liable to take into account comparative hardship of landlord and the tenant and High Court was in error in taking the view that judgment of the District Judge could not be quashed simply on the ground that hardship of the tenant was neither considered nor compared - On this view, court would have ordinarily remanded the case to High Court but it would be an idle formality to do so, since District Judge has also not taken into account the comparative hardship of landlord and the tenant, and even if the matter is remanded to High Court, High Court would have to set aside the judgment of the District Judge and remand the case to District Judge - This step can be by passed in the interest of expedition and we accordingly allow appeal, set aside the order of High Court as also the Judgment of District Judge and remand the case to District Judge with a direction to dispose it of in the light of the amended S. 21 read with R. 16. Since the case is an old one - District Judge will dispose of appeal before him as expeditiously as possible and in any event not later - Appeal allowed.
Judgment
P. N. BHAGWATI, J.- This appeal arises out of an application filed by respondents Nos. 2 to 5 for eviction of the appellant under S. 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulations of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The Prescribed Authority, who heard the application, took the view that the bona fide requirement of Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 was not established and on this view, rejected the application of Respondents Nos. 2 to 5. The District Judge, in appeal, however, disagreed with the view taken by the Prescribed Authority and came to the conclusion that the bona fide requirements of Respondents Nos 2 to 5 was established on the evidence on record and in any event, by reason of Expln. (iv) to S. 21, it must be conclusively presumed that they bona fide required the premises for their own use and occupation. Since, according to the learned District Judge, the case fell within Expln. (iv) to S. 21, he held that R. 16 (1) of the Rules framed under the Act which requires the comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant to be taken into account was not applicable, and passed an order of eviction against the appellant. The appellant thereupon preferred a writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad. The High Court declined to interfere with the finding in regard to the bona fide need of respondents Nos. 2 to 5, since that was a finding of fact and the High Court was of the view that it would not be competent for it in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution to disturb a finding of fact reached by the District Judge. So far as the question of comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant was concerned, the High Court held that it was not liable to be taken into account since R. 16 (1) was ultra vires of the Act. The High Court in this view rejected the writ petition. Hence the present appeal by special leave obtained from this Court.
2. The only question which arises in this appeal for consideration is whether High Court was right in taking the view that the comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant was not required to be taken into account since R. 16 (1) was ultra vires of the Act. This question need not detain us, since subsequent to the filing of the appeal, S. 21 of the Act has been amended with retrospective effect by introduction of a proviso, which requires that comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant should be taken into account in the light of the factors prescribed by the rules, in the determination of the question whether or not an order of eviction should be made against the tenant and R. 16 has been retrospectively validated by S. 27 of the Amending Act. It is, therefore, obvious, that the learned District Judge as well as the Prescribed Authority were liable to take into account the comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant and the High Court was in error in taking the view that the judgment of the District Judge could not be quashed simply on the ground that the hardship of the tenant was neither considered nor compared. On this view, we would have ordinarily remanded the case to the High Court but it would be an idle formality to do so, since the District Judge has also not taken into account the comparative hardship of the landlord and the tenant, and even if the matter is remanded to the High Court, the High Court would have to set aside the judgment of the District Judge and remand the case to the District Judge. This step can be by passed in the interest of expedition and we accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court as also the Judgment of the District Judge and remand the case to the District Judge with a direction to dispose it of in the light of the amended S. 21 read with R. 16. Since the case is an old one, the District Judge will dispose of the appeal before him as expeditiously as possible and in any event not later than 31st December, 1976. There will be no order as to costs.
Appeal allowed
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