Judgment

V. R. KRISHNA IYER, J. - Shree Pal Singh has vigorously advocated the case of the respondent and we have listened to him patiently so that his studious preparation may not go unheeded. Even so, we are inclined to allow the appeal in the circumstances of the case, we may make it clear, right at the beginning that the law that is applicable is not in dispute but the facts and circumstances of cases may differ when the application of law is called for.

2. In the present case, we may set out briefly the necessary facts. The Haryana Roadways is a State transport undertaking and he respondent before us is a member of the running staff, a conductor, whose job is to collect fares from passengers and issue tickets to them. Probably because conductors were collecting fares but not issuing tickets a system of flying squads was in operation in the Haryana State for the purpose of checking the proper collection of fares by conductors. The respondent before us, while on duty on by (HRA-1262) on its trip from Palwal to Khodulpat, was the conductor whose vehicle was overtaken by the flying squad. The squad stopped the bus and its inspector discovered that four passengers had alighted at Kamini Khade without tickets and that 11 passengers traveling in the bus also did not have tickets although they claimed to have paid the fares. A report followed, a charge-sheet ensued, a domestic inquiry was held, guilt established and simple termination of services effected. The respondent hastened to the civil court for a declaration that the order of termination in the disciplinary enquiry was a nullity and he must therefore be given a declaration of continuance in service. The trial Court, on the evidence, was taken in by this plea and the appellate court also affirmed it. The High Court dismissed the second appeal in limine. The State has come by special leave with this appeal.

3. The principal ground on which the courts below have declared the termination bad is that none of the 11 passengers have been examined at the domestic enquiry. Secondly, it has been mentioned that there is a departmental instruction that checking inspector should record the statements of passengers, which was not done in this case. The explanation of the State, as borne out by the record, is that the inspector of the flying squad who had said that they had paid the fares but they declined to give such written statements. The third ground which weighted with the court was, perhaps, that the co-conductor in the bus had supported with this evidence, the guiltlessness of the respondent.

4. It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender or independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunals cannot be held good. However, the courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The residuum rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent no