Judgment

GOSWAMI, J.:- The appellant, the Paradip Port Trust, is a major port governed by the provisions of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 and is managed by a Board of Trustees constituted under the provisions of the said Act. Under Section 5 of the said Act the Board of Trustees is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power, subject to the provisions of the Act, to acquire, hold or dispose of property and may sue or be sued in the name of the Board. An industrial dispute was raised by the Paradip Shramik Congress representing the workmen with regard to the termination of the services of one Nityananda Behera, a temporary teacher in the Paradip Port Trust High School. The dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal (Central) Bhubaneswar, Orissa, under Sec. 10 (1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1974 (briefly the Act).

2. The respondents (hereinafter to be referred to as the Union) appeared before the Tribunal through the Adviser and General Secretary of Paradip Shramik Congress. The appellant sought to be represented before the Tribunal through Shri T. Misra, Advocate, who was a "Legal Consultant" of the Trust. The appellant filed their authority in Form F under Rule 36 of the Orissa Industrial Dispute Rules in his favour. The appellant subsequently filed also a Power of Attorney executed by the Chairman of the Board of Trustees in favour of Shri T. Misra who was admittedly a practising Advocate of the Orissa High Court.

3. An objection was taken by the Union to the representation of the Paradip Port Trust (hereinafter to be described as the employer) by Shri T. Misra, Advocate, and the Union refused to give their consent to his representation as required under Section 36 (4) of the Act.

4. The Tribunal after hearing the parties upheld the objection of the Union. The Tribunal examined the terms and conditions of the appointment of Shri T. Misra as Legal Consultant of the employer and held as follows:-

"His duties and the restrictions on his practice which have, been extracted above and the terms as to his professional fees, etc. indicate that the relationship of the first party and Shri Misra is clearly that of a client and his lawyer and not that of employer and employee. Hence, Shri Misra cannot be said to be Officer of the first party."

The Tribunal further held:

"Merely by execution of a power-of -attorney, the restrictions attached to a legal practitioner contained in sub-section (4) of the Act cannot be circumvented. I would accordingly hold that Shri Misra who is a legal practitioner cannot represent the first party before this Tribunal even if he holds a power-of-attorney executed in his favour by the first party."

5. The appellant has obtained special leave of this Court against the above order of the Tribunal. We have heard the Solicitor-General on behalf of the appellant and Shri Goyal for the respondents.

6. Along with the above appeal two special Leave Petitions Nos. 1844A and 1845 of 1976 are also posted for hearing for admission and we have heard Mr. Gobind Das at great length. The two Special Leave Petitions are by the management of Keonjhar Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. One application is relating to rejection by the Tribunal of the Banks prayer for representation before the Tribunal through its Advocate, Shri B. B. Rath, on the ground of objection by the Union under section 36 (4) of the Act. The second application relates to the order of the Tribunal allowing Shri A. C. Mohanty, Advocate and Vice President of the Keonjhar Central Co-operative Bank Employees Union under Section 36 (1) of the Act notwithstanding the objection of the management.

7. Industrial law in India did not commence with a show of cold shoulder to lawyers as such. There was an unimpeded entrance of legal practitioners to adjudication halls before tribunals when the Act first came into force on April 1, 1947. Three years later when the Labour Appellate Tribunals were constituted under the Industrial Dispute