1976 Supreme(SC) 520

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Y.V. CHANDRACHUD AND P.K. GOSWAMI, JJ.
Lal Chand (dead) by L. Rs. and others, Appellants
Versus
Radha Kishan, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 636 of 1975,
D/- 17-12-1976.
Advocates appeared
M/s. N. C. Sikri and A. D. Sikri, Advocates, for Appellants; M/s. S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja and P. N. Puri, Advocates, for Respondent.

Headnote:

Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, - Section 20 - Slum Clearance Act, 1956 - Civil Procedure Code - Order XLI - Rule 4 - Possession of two rooms – Eviction of tenants - Jurisdiction of Civil Court - whether the ratio in Anand Nivass case would apply to the present proceedings which arise out of the Delhi Rent Control Act of 1958, the appeals could not have been dismissed by the first appellate Court and the High Court on the ground that Lal Chand had died without leaving a heritable interest and therefore his legal representatives had no right to continue the appeal - whether the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act operated as a bar to the maintainability of the suit brought by the respondent - whether the present suit is barred for the reason that before instituting it, respondent had not obtained permission of the competent authority - respondent filed an application under Section 19 (2) of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 96 of 1956, for permission of the competent authority to execute the decree for possession obtained by him against Lal Chand and others. The competent authority after taking into account the factors mentioned in Section 19 (4) of that Act, passed an order permitting the respondent to execute the decree in respect of the two rooms situated on the second floor only. Respondent was expressly refused permission to execute the decree in regard to the premises situated on the ground floor - Aggrieved by that order, the respondent filed an appeal to the Administrator under Section 20 of the Slum Clearance Act, 1956. The appeal was heard by the Chief Commissioner of Delhi who confirmed the order of the competent authority. Pursuant to his order, the defendants handed over possession of the two rooms on the second floor to the respondent - This, however, was not the end of the matter. Having obtained possession of a part of the premises, the respondent embarked upon a fresh round of litigation giving rise to this appeal. He filed a regular Civil Suit No. 435 of 1966 against Lal Chand, Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram for possession of the remaining rooms on the ground floor. That suit was decreed by the Trial Court on May 4, 1967. Nand Lal and Kakibai were not impleaded to the suit presumably because they had surrendered possession of the two rooms on the second floor in pursuance of the order passed in appeal under the Slum Clearance Act – Held, We are unable to understand how after working out his remedy under the Delhi Rent Control Act as modified by the Slum Clearance Act, it is competent to the respondent to bring a fresh suit for evicting the appellants from the premises on the ground floor. The authorities under the Slum Clearance Act who are exclusively invested with the power to determine whether a decree for eviction should be permitted to be executed and, if so, to what extent, had finally decided that question, refusing to allow the respondent to execute the decree in respect of the ground floor premises. By the present suit, the respondent is once again asking for the relief which was included in the larger relief sought by him in the application filed under the Slum Clearance Act and which was expressly denied to him. In the circumstances, the present suit is also barred by the principle of resjudicata. The fact that Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot apply on its terms, the earlier proceeding before the competent authority not being a suit, is no answer to the extension of the principle underlying that section to the instant case. Section 11, it is long since settled, is not exhaustive and the principle which motivates that section can be extended to cases which do not fall strictly within the letter of the law. The issues involved in the two proceedings are identical, those issues arise as between the same parties and thirdly, the issue not sought to be raised was decided finally by a competent quasi-judicial tribunal. The principle of res judicata is conceived in the larger public interest which requires that all litigation must, sooner than later, come to an end. The principle is also founded on equity, justice and good conscience which required that a party which has once succeeded on an issue should not be permitted to be harassed by a multiplicity of proceedings involving determination of the same issue. Were it permissible to bring suits of the present nature, the beneficial jurisdiction conferred on the competent authority by the Slum Clearance Act would become illusory and meaningless for, whether the competent authority grants or refuses permission to execute a decree for eviction, it would always be open to the landlord to enforce the ejectment decree by filing a substantive suit for possession. Verily, the respondent is executing the eviction decree by instalments, now under the garb of a suit. Apart from the fact that the suit is barred on account of principles analogous to res judicata, it is plainly in violation of the injunction contained in Section 19 (1) (b) of the Slum Clearance Act, if regard is to be had to the substance and not for the form of the proceedings - We cannot accept this argument either. The suit filed by the respondent being incompetent and the Civil Court not having jurisdiction to entertain it, the decree passed by it is non-ext. The nullity of that decree can be set up at least by Kesho Ram and Jhangi Ram who are entitled to defend and protect their possession by invoking the provisions of the Slum Clearance Act - Appeal allowed