JUDGMENT

KRISHNA IYER, J.:—Brevity is a necessity in a judgment which proceeds substantially on a consensus among counsel as regards the manner of disposal. Therefore we will be brief in narrating a few facts stating a little law and proceeding straight to the directions to be issued in the light of the controversy arising herein. However, we may indicate even here that there is one question of law which is contentious on which we propose to indicate our view in a general way. This we do because counsel on both sides have pressed that it will be helpful since the High Court has laid down its interpretation with which we do not agree.

2. The Maharashtra (Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices) Act, 1971 (for short, the Act) although passed by the legislature in 1971, was, for inscrutable reasons, brought into force on 8th September, 1975. Whether this can be called laws delay or implementation gap is a matter of phraseology but the fact is that when the legislature makes a law (especially, welfare law for the weaker section of the community) it is implicit that the benefits of the legislation to the consumers thereof shall not be delayed by the Executive by bringing it into force long years later. This is another dimension of laws delays not fully known to the public.

3. The respondent union applied for recognition under the Act, on 15th December, 1975, to the appropriate authority, viz., the Industrial Court, Admittedly the union then commanded the requisite qualification of 30 per cent membership. But then there are other condition also necessary before an application for recognition can be accorded. At this stage, we may express our pensive reflection on the fact that notwithstanding the direction in S.11 (2) that an application for recognition shall be disposed of, as far as possible, within three months from the date of receipt of the application this particular proceeding has been pending well beyond one year for reasons which we need not investigate here. It is a bad omen for industrial processual justice.

4. When the application for recognition was pending, the employer moved the High Court for issuance of an appropriate writ questioning the competence of the union to get recognition. Two grounds were urged without success. The first was that the requirements of Form A read with R. 4 promulgated in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 61 had not been complied with and for that reason alone the application was bound to be dismissed.

5. By way of aside we may mention that S. 12 provides that when an application from a union for recognition is made, notice thereof shall be given in the specified manner and it is open to any other union or unions to raise objections and claim recognition provided the union or unions could claim membership of employees in the concerned undertaking. In the present case another such union appear to have raised such an objection and is represented before us by Mr. K. P. V. Menon.

6. The core of the dispute is as to whether form A should be so read as to insist upon the rejection of the application for recognition if the conditions contained in Columns 7 and 11 (2) therein are not complied with. We may read those conditions in form A.

"Condition 7. The constitution of the applicant union provides for the matters mentioned in S. 19 of the Act. A copy of the constitution is attached.

Condition 11(2): The Executive Committee of the applicant union met on the following dates during the twelve months preceding the date of the application".

Section 19 makes it obligatory upon a union seeking recognition under the Act to provide for a few matters one of which is that

"an auditor appointed by the State Government may audit its account at least once in each financial year".

All the points mentioned above have to be provided in the constitution of the applicant union.

7. So far as we are concerned, the applicant union i.e. the respondent before us has amended its constitution in