JUDGMENT

FAZAL ALI, J. :— This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Delhi dated 21st October, 1975 by which the High Court set aside the order of the Magistrate discharging the appellant and directed his commitment to the Court of Session.

2. The facts of the case have been detailed in the judgment of the High Court and that of the trial Court and it is not necessary for us to repeat the same all over again. It will be enough to say that the complainant Pratap Bhanu Prakash Singh purchased 27,000 shares of Rohtas Industries which were entrusted to the appellant against a loan of Rs. 1.82 lacs advanced by the appellant. Accordingly, the allegation was made in the complaint that the appellant committed a breach of trust of the amount covered by the share by selling them against the express directions of the complaint. The allegations were denied by the appellant who put forward a plea tha there was no entrustment but the shares were placed in the hands of the appellant as security and therefore the question of breach of trust did not arise. In view of the allegations and counter allegations made by the parties, we are not inclined to go into the merits of the case particularly when we propose to uphold the order of the High Court directing commitment of the appellant to the Court of Session. Any observation which may be made by us on merits are likely to prejudice either party at the trial and therefore we refrain from going into merits at this stage. We are, however satisfied that having regard to the reasons given by the High Court it cannot be said that the High Court was in error in exercising its discretion by setting aside the order of discharge and directing commitment to the Court of Session.

3. It appears that the complainant was tried by the trial Magistrate, who after entering into pros and cons of the case found that no prima facie case was established and he accordingly discharged the appellant by his order dated 28-10-1971. The complainant unsuccessfully filed a Revision against this order before the Sessions Judge, Delhi who affirmed the order of the Magistrate. Ultimately the matter came up in revision before the High Court which after going through facts and circumstances of the case found that a prima facie case for commitment was made out and set aside the order or discharge passed by the Magistrate and upheld by the Sessions Judge and directed that the appellant be committed to the Court of Session. Hence this appeal by special leave before us.

4. Two points were argued by Mr. Ashoke Sen, the learned counsel for the appellant. In the first place, it was urged that having regard to the admitted facts and circumstances of the case no prima facie case against the accused was made out and the trial Magistrate was therefore justified in discharging the appellant and the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in reversing the order of discharge and directing commitment. For the reasons that we have already given it is not possible for us to hold that the order of the High Court suffers from the infirmity pointed out. The High Court has arrived at a finding of fact that a prima facie case was made out for directing commitment to the court of Session and this Court would not normally interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court. We would like to point out that under Sec. 213 sub-cl. (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the 1898 Code) a Magistrate can discharge the accused if he finds that there are no sufficient ground for committing the accused. It is obvious that the High Court has applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and it is not for this Court in appeal by special leave to go into the sufficiency or insufficiency of the material before the Magistrate which may afford a justification for passing an order of discharge. In these circumstances the first argument put forward by the learned counsel for the appell