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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.S. SARKARIA AND P.S. KAILASAM, JJ.
G. Appaswami Chettiar and another, Appellants
Versus
R. Sarangapani Chettiar and others, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 2028 of 1968
Decided on 22-3-1978.
Advocates appeared
M/s. R. Thiagarajan, K. Jayaram and K. Ram Kumar, Advocates, for Appellants; Mr. S. Rajagopalan, Mrs. Sunanda Bhandare and Miss Malini Poduval, Advocates, for Respondents.
Hindu Succession Act – Section 14 – Removed from service - Trial court – Condo nation of delay - Suit was filed by the appellants for (1) a declaration that the adoption of the second respondent by the first respondent is not true and valid; (2) declaring that in any event the second respondent as an adopted son could not take the estate of either under the will of or by succession; (3) a declaration that alienations made by of respondents 3 and 4 are not binding on the and will not beyond the lifetime of the first respondent - Trial court found that the adoption was true but not valid since the agnates of her husband namely another were not consulted and their consent obtained. In view of this finding the trial court left open the construction of will of and the question as to whether second respondent is entitled to claim under the will of or by way of succession on intestacy - Held, The learned counsel for the appellants referred to Students Sanskrit English Dictionary where the meaning of the word is given at page 582 as "offspring, progeny". The learned counsel also referred to of and submitted that the term would include only children born of the body. We are unable to accept this contention and to read the passages cited as excluding an adopted son. Further, neither the dictionary meaning nor the passage in can be accepted as laying down principles of Hindu Law. We are satisfied that the term cannot be construed as confined to sons, grandsons and their descendants born out of the body excluding the adopted son or his descendants. The High Court, in our view, was in error in coming to the conclusion that the second respondent is not entitled to take the properties under the will as the adopted son of first respondent - View of the High Court that the second respondent would succeed to as his adopted son is right but as we have held that the second respondent would succeed under the earlier clause of the will which provides that after her resort need not be had to the subsequent clause in the will which provides for the husband of and his descendants taking the property. In our view, as the second respondent being the adopted son not only of but also of her husband his rights as the adopted son of as well as cannot be denied. On the failure of not having putra or female descendants the property would be taken by and his. The fact that died during the lifetime of would not affect the vesting in - Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in any event the appellants cannot succeed as after the Hindu Succession Act came into force in 1956 the life estate which had, would ripen into an absolute estate under Act 30 of 1956. This contention was rightly rejected by the High Court as the life estate to which was entitled was under the will of her father and therefore S. 14 (2) of the Act would be applicable and the life estate would not be enlarged into an absolute estate - Appeal dismissed
JUDGMENT
KAILASAM, J.:— This appeal is preferred by the plaintiffs against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras on certificate. Appellants are the sisters grandsons of one Gopalasami Chettiar. The first defendant Ramathilakam Ammal is the daughter of Gopalasami Chettiar and the second defendant the adopted son of the first defendant is the sisters grandson of her husband Sethu Chettiar. The two defendants are respondents 1 and 2 in this appeal. Defendants 3 and 4 are the alienees of certain properties of Gopalasami Chettiar from respondents 1 and 2.
2. The suit was filed by the appellants for (1) a declaration that the adoption of the second respondent by the first respondent is not true and valid; (2) declaring that in any event the second respondent as an adopted son could not take the estate of Gopalasami Chettiar either under the will of Gopalasami or by succession; (3) a declaration that alienations made by respondents 1 and 2 on 16th December, 1956 in favour of respondents 3 and 4 are not binding on the reversioners of Gopalasami Chettiar and will not enure beyond the lifetime of the first respondent.
3. The trial court found that the adoption was true but not valid since the agnates of her husband namely Pattalam Ramasami Chettiar, another Ramasami Chettiar and Kuppusamy Chettiar were not consulted and their consent obtained. In view of this finding the trial court left open the construction of will of Gopalsami Chettiar and the question as to whether second respondent is entitled to claim under the will of Gopalasami Chettiar or by way of succession on intestacy. The court found that the alienation made by respondents 1 and 2 in favour of respondents 3 and 4 is not valid.
4. On appeal by respondents 1 and 2 to the High Court the court held that the adoption of the second respondent by the first respondent was true and valid but agreed with the contention of the appellants that the second respondent as the adopted son of the first respondent could not take any bequest under the will. But as Sethu Chettiar, the adoptive father of the second respondent, took a vested interest under the will, the respondent will be entitled to that interest as the adopted son. The High Court also dismissed the claim of the appellants for any declaration in respect of alienations made by respondents 1 and 2 in favour of respondents 3 and 4. In the result the High Court dismissed the suit and hence this appeal before us.
5. The validity of the adoption was questioned by the appellants on various grounds. First of all it was contended that Sethu Chettiar, the husband of Ramathilakam Ammal had prohibited her from making any adoption to him. The trial court found against this plea of the appellants and the finding was confirmed by the High Court. The plea was not put forward before us and therefore need not be considered. The second ground that was taken was that the adoption was not valid for want of consent of the sapindas of the husband of Ramathilakam Ammal, the first respondent. The third ground of attack was that the motive for adoption by the widow was improper as the adoption was made for the purpose of depriving the sapindas of their right to property and not on any consideration of spiritual benefit to her husband.
6. The power of a Hindu widow to adopt a son to her husband is well recognised in Hindu Law. The widow is the surviving half of the husband and the widow adopts according to the texts in her own right though the later view appears to be that she acts as a delegate or representative of her husband. When the adoption is authorised by the husband the widows power is co-extensive with that of her husband. Equally, when the consent of the husbands kinsmen is obtained the widows power is co-extensive with that of her husband (vide Sri Balusu Gurulingaswami v. Sri Balusu Ramalkshmamma). (1899) ILR 22 Mad 398 (PC). The power of adoption can be exercised by the widow alone and nobody can compel her to adopt. Whe
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