Durgi Devi: State Of U. P. vs State Of U. P. : Harbans

Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation

1978 Supreme(SC) 131

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.S. SARKARIA, N.L. UNTWALIA AND P.S. KAILASAM, JJ.
Smt. Durgi Devi and others etc., Appellants
Versus
State of U.P. etc., Respondents.
Civil Appeals Nos. 2478-2479 of 1968
Decided on 5-4-1978.
Advocates appeared
Mr. V. S. Desai, Sr. Advocate (M/s. K. J. John and Mrs. A. K. Verma, Advocates with him), for Appellants in C. A. No. 2478/68 and Respondents in C. A. No. 2479/68: Mr. G. N. Dikshit, Sr. Advocate (M/s. M. V. Goswami and O. P. Rana, Advocates with him), for Respondent in C. A. No. 2478/68 and Appellants in C. A. No. 2479/68.

Advocates:
A.K.VERMA, G.N.DIKSHIT, K.J.JOHN, M.V.GOSWAMY, O.P.RANA, V.S.DESAI

Headnote:
U. P. Zamindari Ablition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 – Section 4 – Claim of compensation – Possession for land - A draft Compensation Roll purporting to be under S. 40 of the Act was prepared in respect of the intermediaries interests in the said villages and served upon the intermediary who thereupon, filed two objections against the Roll - Intermediary claimed more than the one shown as due to him in the draft Roll. Purporting to act under S. 39 (1) (e) (i) of the Act, the Compensation Officer held that the sale proceeds of the forests in the area of village Sorna during 35 years immediately preceding the date of vesting, aggregated - He divided this figure by 35 and took he resultant figure, i.e. Rs. 17,524 as the annual income from the forests in village had already been included in the gross assets, he deducted this amount and thus fixed the annual income from the forests in this village – Held, Had Mr. Dikshits argument, that clause (c) of S. 44 contemplates an omnibus deduction which encompasses all the sources of income assessed under clauses (a) to (g) of S. 39 (1) been correct, there was no necessity to specify the quantum and nature of deductions separately in cls. (e) and (f) of S. 44 and then relate them by specific reference to sources of income under clauses (f) and (g) of S. 39 (1). If clause (c) of S. 44 were applicable proprio vigore to income from Khudkasht land, there was no necessity to incorporate it by specific reference in cl. (d) (iii) of the same section. In other words, the deduction mentioned in clause (c) of S. 44 could have no application to the income assessed from the source under clause(b) of S. 39, but for the special provision made in sub-clause (iii) of clause (d) of S. 44. Construed consistently with the context and scheme of S. 44, it appears that the deduction mentioned in clause (c) of S. 44 was not intended to apply to the income from forest assessed under clause (e) of S. 39 (1). The deduction under clause (c) of S. 44 appears to be confined to the rental income assessed under clause (a) of Section 39 (1), or the income from Khudkasht lands assessed under clause (b) of S. 39 (1) to which it has been notionally applied by specific incorporation in subclause (iii) of clause (d) of S. 44 - High Court was, therefore, right in holding that 15% towards the cost of management could not be deducted by the Compensation Officer in respect of the income from forest calculated under clause (e) of S. 39 (1) - Nor could the words gross assets occurring at the close of cl. (c) in S. 44, be divorced from the context of rents and construed in the spacious sense in which they have been used in S. 39. Their meaning and scope in the context is confined to the income from rents. If these words are torn out of the context and interpreted in the comprehensive sense in which they are used in S. 39, this will lead to wholly unreasonable oppressive and absurd results. This was demonstrated by the learned Judges of the High Court, with reference to the income from mines worked directly by an intermediary, calculated under cl. (g) of S. 39 (1). Clause (f) of S. 44 provides that 95 per centum of the gross income determined under clause (g) of S. 39 would be deductible for the purpose of computing the net assets of the intermediary from this source. If the contention of Mr. Dikshit, that 15% deduction under clause (c) of S. 44 is applicable to all sources of income, including from the mines under clause (g) of Section 39 (1) is correct, then the income from mines directly worked by the intermediary will suffer a double deduction 95% plus 15% under cls. (f) and (c) of S. 44 - Appeals dismissed

JUDGMENT

SARKARIA, J.:— These two cross-appeals on certificate arise out of a judgment, dated December 9, 1963, of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

2. The appellants in Civil Appeal 2478 of 1968 are the heirs and legal representatives of Shir R. B. Jodha Mal Kuthiala, who was an intermediary (landlord) in the State of Uttar Pradesh and possessed two villages, Dhalani and Sorna. There are huge tracts of forests in the area of these villages. On the issue of a notification under S. 4 of the U. P. Zamindari Ablition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (for short the Act), all rights and interests of the intermediary, including the forests in villages Dhalani and Sorna, vested in the State of U. P. with effect from the date of vesting, i.e. July I, 1952.

3. A draft Compensation Roll purporting to be under S. 40 of the Act was prepared in respect of the intermediarys interests in the said villages and served upon the intermediary who thereupon, filed two objections against the Roll. The intermediary claimed Rs. 64,971/9/7 more than the one shown as due to him in the draft Roll. Purporting to act under S. 39 (1) (e) (i) of the Act, the Compensation Officer held that the sale proceeds of the forests in the area of village Sorna during 35 years immediately preceding the date of vesting, aggregated to Rs. 6,13,334/8/3 (after deducting Rs. 22,000 relating to the income from the forests in village Dhalani). He divided this figure by 35 and took he resultant figure, i.e. Rs. 17,524 as the annual income from the forests in village Sorna. But as Rs. 1,775/14/6 had already been included in the gross assets, he deducted this amount and thus fixed the annual income from the forests in this village, at Rs. 15,748/1/6. From this figure, he further deducted 15% for management cost and held that the intermediary was entitled to a further sum of Rs. 13,471/11/6 over and above the one shown as due to him in the draft Compensation Roll. With these findings, the Compensation Officer disposed of the objections of the intermediary by his order, dated October 28, 1955.

4. Against this order of the Compensation Officer, which under the Act amounts to a decree, the aggrieved intermediary preferred an appeal to the High Court. The State also filed cross objections. The High Court held that the Compensation Officer in preparing the Compensation Roll had committed two errors. Firstly, he completely excluded from consideration the provisions of sub-clause (ii) of clause (e) of S. 39 (1) and did not either appraise the annual yield of the forests or take the same into consideration. Secondly, he did not give any reason for taking the period of 35 years under sub-clause (i) of Section 39 (1) (e) as the measure for calculating the annual average income from the forests. After appraising the evidence on record, the High Court held that it was just and proper that the number of years to be adopted in calculating the average annual income under sub-clause (i) of S. 39 (1) (e) should be 20 years. On this basis, the High Court divided the sum of Rupees 6,13,334/8/3 that had been worked out by the Compensation Officer in respect of the income from sales of forests in village Sorna, by 20, and arrived at the figure Rs. 30,666/11/3. The High Court further held on an interpretation of clause (e) of S. 39 (1), that the Compensation Officer was bound to appraise the annual yield of the forests on the date of vesting under sub-clause (ii) of S. 39 (1) (e), and take such yield also into consideration. Relying mainly on the evidence of Shri D. D. Chopra (a retired Divisional Forest Officer examined by the intermediary), the High Court found that the yield of the forests, appraised under Clause (ii) of S. 39 (1) (e) of the Act, would be Rs. 47,128. The High Court further appears to have added the figures worked out by it under sub-clauses (i) & (ii) of S. 39 (1) (e) and then divided the same by two. By this process, considering all the circumstances of the case, the High Court he

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