SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
P.N. SHINGHAL AND O. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.
Smt. S. R. Venkataraman, Appellant
Versus
Union of India and another, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 2764 of 1977, D/-2-11-1978.
Advocates appeared
Mr. M. K. Ramamurthi, Sr. Advocate (Mr. Faqir Chand Advocate with him), for Appellant; Mr. P. N. Lakhi, Sr. Advocate (Mr. Grish Chandra Advocate with him), for Respondents.
-held, it is also immaterial whether action is in good faith or bad faith.
-discretionary powers exercised for unauthorised person.
-held, it is a trite law that it is generally immaterial in such case whether the repository was acting in good or bad faith.
-held, the order must be set-aside as unfair if the Govt. cannot support it as such unfair order of compulsory retirement only amounts to abuse of power by the authority.
Judgment
SHINGHAL, J.:- This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of the Delhi High Court dated November 24, 1976, dismissing the appellants writ petition in limine.
2. The appellant was promoted to the post of Director in the All India Radio after some thirty years of service under the Government of India. She was working as Joint Director, Family Planning, in the Directorate General of the All India Radio, when she was served with an order dated March 26, 1976, retiring her prematurely from service, with immediate effect, on the ground that she had already attained the age of 50 years on April 11, 1972, and the President was of the opinion that her retirement was in the public interest. The appellant made a representation on April 6, 1976, but it was rejected on July 1, 1976. She therefore filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution in which she, inter alia, made a mention of the hostile attitude of one V. D. Vyas who took over as Chairman of the Central Board of Film Censors from her on February 11, 1972. She also made a mention of the adverse remarks made by Vyas in her service record after she had ceased to work under him which, according to her, were "totally unfounded, biased, malicious and without any justification". She stated that "her integrity had never been considered doubtful 28 years before or 4 years after the period of 21/2 months she spent under him". It was also contended that some baseless allegations were made against her because of malicious vendetta" carried on by Vyas, and that the order of premature retirement was not in public interest but was "arbitrary and capricious", and that the retiring authority had not "applied its mind to the record" of her case. It was particularly pointed out that as she was confirmed in the post of Director on 28-4-1973, with retrospective effect from 10-7-1970, any adverse remark in her confidential report before that date could not legitimately form the basis of the order of her premature retirement. The appellant also pointed out that the order cast a stigma on her conduct, character and integrity and amounted to the imposition of one of the major penalties under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965.
3. It is not in controversy, and has in fact been specifically stated in the order of premature retirement dated March 26, 1976, that the appellant was retired in the public interest under cl. (j) (j) of Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules. That rule provides an follows :-
"(j) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule the appropriate authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so have the absolute right to retire any Government servant by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice.
(i) If he is in Class I or Class II service or post and had entered Government service before attaining the age of thirtyfive years, after he has attained the age of fifty years."
It is also not in dispute that the power under the aforesaid rule had to be exercised in accordance with the criteria and the procedure laid down in office memorandum No. F-33/13/61- Ests (A) dated 23rd June , 1969, of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. It is however the grievance of the appellant that her premature retirement was not made in accordance with the requirements of the rule and the memorandum, but was ordered because of malice, and was arbitrary and capricious as the Government did not apply its mind to her service record and the facts and circumstances of her case. It has been specifically pleaded that the power under F. R. 56 (j) (i) has not been exercised for the furtherance of public interest and has been based on collateral grounds. The appellant has pointed out in this connection that her service record was examined in March, 1976, by the Departmental Promotion Committee, with which the
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