Judgement

KRISHNA IYER, J. - Having had the advantage of reading my learned brothers judgment I should have stopped mine with a single sentence, following the example of Diplock, L. J. who in Hughes v. Hughes *1 merely said : For the reasons given by my brother Harman I would dismiss the appeal. But I respect brother Sens request that my concurrence notwithstanding. I should, in a separate opinion, highlight the quintessential aspects and reinforce the legal conclusions which are interpretatively decisive and constitutionally validatory of Section 14-B of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (briefly, the Act). That is the apology for this separate judgment of mine. Why an apology? Because exordiums are opprobriums and socio-economic apercus are anathemas for some judicial psyches; and I should have, for that reason, abandoned my habitual deviance from the orthodox norm idealised by some that a judicial judgment shall be a dry statement of facts, drier presentation of law and logomachy and driest in least communicating to the law-abiding community, which is the Courts constituency, the glow of life-giving principles rooted in social sciences and translated into juristic rules which legitimate our institution functionally. The last consideration, in my humble view, is the elanvital of the justicing process and jettisoning it is judicial self-alienation from the nation. Of course, minds differ as rivers differ and habits die hard !

* 1. See Foot-note 49 in Law and Politics by Robert Stevens

2. The central issues in this civil appeal (sic) (writ petition?) are where S. 14-B of the E.P.F, and M. P. Act is unconstitutional and, if not, what is the semantic-juristic sweep of the expression damages used therein. Other vital but peripheral matters may be side-stepped for the nonce, especially because my learned brother has neatly and rightly dealt with them. The factual setting of the case, without which the legal contentions argued lose their luscent relevance, have been stated by my brother Sen, J. but I may project them in a single sentence to help focus on the vires of S. 14-B and the conceptual width of damages in the given context. Is the imposition by the "speaking order" of the Regional Provident fund Commissioner, Chandigarh, of a heavy penalty of Rupees 94.996.80 by way of damages under S. 14-B of the E.P.F and M.P. Act 1952 upon the writ petitioners-employers, for chronic and unjustified defaults in remittances of the provident fund contributions of themselves and their employees legally sustainable, if obviously in excess of the pecuniary loss of interest attributable to the non-payment? Briefly and broadly and lopping off aspects unnecessary for this case the scheme of the Act is that each employer and employee in every establishment falling within the Act do contribute into a statutory fund a title, viz. 6 1/4 of the wages to swell into a large fund wherewith the workers who toil to produce the nations wealth during their physically fit span of life may be provide some retiral benefit which will keep the pot boiling and some source wherefrom loans to face unforeseen needs may be obtained. This social security measure is a human homage the State pays to Articles 39 and 41 of the Constitution. The viability of the project depends on the employer duly deducting the workers contribution from their wages, adding his own little and promptly depositing the mickle into the chest constituted by the Act. The mechanics of the system will suffer paralysis if the employer fails to perform his function. The dynamics of this beneficial statute derives its locomotive power from the funds regularly flowing into the statutory till.

3. The pragmatics of the situation is that if the stream of contributions were frozen by employers defaults after due deduction from the wages and diversion for their own purposes, the scheme would be damnified by traumatic starvation of the fund, public frustration from the failure