Judgement

KRISHNA IYER, J. - Having had the advantage of reading my learned brothers judgment I should have stopped mine with a single sentence, following the example of Diplock, L. J. who in Hughes v. Hughes *1 merely said : For the reasons given by my brother Harman I would dismiss the appeal. But I respect brother Sens request that my concurrence notwithstanding. I should, in a separate opinion, highlight the quintessential aspects and reinforce the legal conclusions which are interpretatively decisive and constitutionally validatory of Section 14-B of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (briefly, the Act). That is the apology for this separate judgment of mine. Why an apology? Because exordiums are opprobriums and socio-economic apercus are anathemas for some judicial psyches; and I should have, for that reason, abandoned my habitual deviance from the orthodox norm idealised by some that a judicial judgment shall be a dry statement of facts, drier presentation of law and logomachy and driest in least communicating to the law-abiding community, which is the Courts constituency, the glow of life-giving principles rooted in social sciences and trans