Judgment

FAZAL ALI, J.:- This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 10th November, 1978 by which the High Court accepted the revision filed before it and set aside the order of the Sessions Judge and directed him to conclude the trial according to law.

2. The points in controversy arise in the following circumstances:-

3. The appellant Rohtas was being prosecuted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for having caused the death of one Subhash on 23rd December, 1974. The trial proceeded before the Sessions Judge and after the evidence was concluded the case was adjourned to the 5th May, 1978 for recording the statement of the appellant. At this stage it appears to have been pointed out to the Sessions Judge that he had no jurisdiction to try the appellant as the appellant happened to fall within the provisions of the Haryana Children Act, 1974, for short, to be referred to as the Haryana Act. Thereafter the Sessions Judge remitted the matter to the Committing Magistrate directing him to hold an enquiry as to whether or not the appellant Rohtas was a child within the meaning of the provisions of the Haryana Act and after arriving at a finding that the appellant was child, the Magistrate proceeded to try the case in accordance with the provisions of the Haryana Act. The brother of the deceased filed a revision before the High Court for quashing the proceedings against the appellant on the ground that the Sessions Judge and the Committing Magistrate were wrong in holding that the case of the appellant fell within the purview of Section 4 of the Haryana Act. The contention raised by the appellant (sic) was based on the fact that although the Criminal Procedure code of 1973, hereinafter to be referred to as the Code of 1973, contained provisions some of which were directly in conflict with the Haryana Act and other Central Acts, therefore, the Code of 1973 would prevail and the State Acts would stand overruled by virtue of the provisions of Article 254 of the Constitution of India. This argument appears to have been accepted by the High Court on the ground that as the Haryana Act was passed with the previous consent of the President of India, so far as the State of Haryana is concerned, the Act was constitutionally valid and would operate by force of Article, 254, Clause (2) of the Constitution.

4. Before scrutinising the contentions of the parties it may be necessary to examine and analyse some of the important and relevant provisions of the statute concerned. To begin with, even the previous Criminal Procedure Code of 1898 contained a special procedure for the trial of persons who had committed offences and who were below the age of 15. Such accused could be tried by a Magistrate on whom powers are conferred by Section 8 sub-section (1) of the Reformatory Schools Act of 1897 which also provided for the custody, trial or punishment of such youthful offenders. This Section was expressly repealed by Section 65 of the Haryana Act which reads as below:-

"Certain Central Acts not to apply:-

(1) The Reformatory Schools Act, 1897 (Central Act 8 of 1897), and Sections 29-B and 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Central Act 5 of 1898), shall cease to apply to any area in which this Act has been brought into force.

(2) The Womens and Childrens Institutions (Licencing) Act, 1956 (Central Act 105 of 1956), shall not apply to any childrens home, special school or observation home established and maintained under this Act."

5. This being the position, so long as the Haryana Act was to be in force in the State of Haryana, it is manifest that Section 29-B was put completely out of action and any trial of an accused who was a child within the meaning of the Haryana Act had to be conducted in the manner prescribed by the Haryana Act. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary for us to detail the procedure which was to be adopted by the Court under the Haryana Act. The fact