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1979 Supreme(SC) 320

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
R.S. SARKARIA AND R.S. PATHAK, JJ.
Syad Akbar, Appellant
Versus
State of Karnataka, Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 456 of 1978,
D/- 25-7-1979.
Advocates appeared
M/s. S. S. Javali, B. P. Singh and A. K. Srivastava, Advocates, for Appellant; M/s. M. Veerappa and J. R. Dass, Advocates, for Respondent.

Advocates:
A.K.SRIVASTAVA, B.P.SINGH, J.R.DAS, M.VIRAPPA, S.S.JAVALI

Headnote:

Indian Evidence Act – Sections 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 89, 105, 114Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 313Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 304A – Wilful Misconduct – Appellant was driving a passenger bus – When the bus reached a place from where a kacha path bifurcates for village Hariyabbe, a girl, aged about 4 years, ran across road – Appellant swerved vehicle towards extreme right side of road – In spite of it, child was hit and died at spot – A complaint was lodged by Patel of village, Gunde Gowda, at Hariyabbe Police Station – Station House Officer (P.W. 7) after registering a case, reached spot and sent dead body of child for post-mortem examination, and recorded statements of witnesses, including some of passengers in Bus – Appellant was sent up for trial before Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, who convicted him under Section 304A of Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to six months simple imprisonment with a fine and in default, to one months imprisonment – Held, Though Horabin was a case arising out of an aircraft accident and the observations extracted above were made in the context of an allegation of wilful misconduct, yet the reasoning employed and the principle enunciated, particularly in the last sentence which has now been underlined, are applicable to the facts of the case before court – The wilful misconduct or wilful default in issue in Harabins case was not very different from a charge of negligence, because negligence has "two meanings in the law of tort : it may mean either a mental element which is to be inferred from one of the modes in which some torts are committed, or it may mean an independent tort which consists of breach of a legal duty to take care which results in damage, undesired by the defendant – As in Horabin, here also, the accused had swerved the vehicle to the extreme right side of the road, not only to avoid collision with the ill-fated child but also to avoid the risk of the vehicle falling into deep ditches on either side of the road, and the resultant possibility of far greater harm to the passengers in the bus. – After going through English translation of evidence of witnesses, furnished by counsel, and closely analysing happening and its circumstances in light of arguments advanced on both sides Court is of opinion that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had caused death of child by negligent or rash driving – All happened in fraction of a moment and even if the worst was assumed against the appellant, highest that could be said was that a misjudgment on his part too slight to be branded as culpable negligence, could well account for accident resulting in death of child – Appeal Allowed

Judgment

SARKARIA, J.:- By a short order we had allowed this appeal by special leave directed against a judgment, dated March 22, 1978 of the High Court of Karnataka, and acquitted the appellant. We now give our reasons in support of that order.

2. On March 18, 1974 at about 8-30 p.m., the appellant was driving a passenger bus No. MYM-5859 on Dharampura-Hiriyur Road towards Hiriyur. When the bus reached a place from where a kacha path bifurcates for village Hariyabbe, a girl named Gundamma, aged about 4 years, ran across the road. The appellant swerved the vehicle towards the extreme right side of the road. In spite of it, the child was hit and died at the spot. A complaint was lodged by the Patel of the village, Gunde Gowda, at Hariyabbe Police Station. The Station House Officer (P.W. 7) after registering a case, reached the spot and sent the dead body of the child for post-mortem examination, and recorded the statements of witnesses, including some of the passengers in the Bus.

3. On these facts, the appellant was sent up for trial before the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Chitradurga, who convicted him under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to six months simple imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 500 and in default, to one months imprisonment.

4. At the trial, the prosecution examined 11 witness. The parents of the deceased child were also examined, but they were admittedly not eye-witnesses of the occurrence. P. W. 2, a passer-by and P. W. 5, P. W. 6 and P. W. 9, who were passengers in the bus at the material time, were examined as eye-witnesses by the prosecution.

5. The substance of the story that emerges from the testimony of these eye-witnesses, taken as a whole, was that at the material time, the accused was driving the bus slowly as there was a narrow bridge 30 feet ahead. The mother (P.W. 4) came from the habitation of the village to go to the field across the road at some distance, where her husband was working. The ill-fated child was following the mother. Before crossing the road, the mother asked the child not to come after her but to return home, but, when the mother had crossed the road and descended into the deep ditch on the other side, the child crying Amman suddenly dashed across the road to join her mother. The accused in order to save the child, swerved the vehicle to the extreme right side of the road. According to the eye-witnesses, excepting one, the accused blew the horn, also. But the child was caught under the left front wheel of the vehicle and was crushed to death. It was further evident from the statement of G. Ramakrishnappa (P. W. 5) that if the appellant had taken the bus beyond the point where the child was hit, the bus would have fallen into the deep ditch, along with the passengers.

6. The Public Prosecutor, however, treated all the four eye-witnesses as hostile, and cross-examined them to impeach their credit, with the permission of the Court. The Public Prosecutor did not contradict them with their Police statements with regard to the facts that the vehicle was coming slowly; that the child came suddenly on the road and that the driver had swerved the vehicle towards the extreme right to save her, but was unable to do so. The only portion of the Police statements of the eye-witnesses, with which they were specifically confronted, was that before the Police they had stated that the accident took place due to the negligence of the accused, while at the trial, they were saying something to the contrary.

7. During his examination under Section 313 Cr. P. C., the appellant stated that he was driving the vehicle slowly, and the child came on the road from the left, all of a sudden, to cross it; that in order to avoid a collision with the child, he immediately swerved the vehicle towards the right side of the road, but he failed to save the child. Thus, the defence plea was that the accident could not be avoided in the circumstances, in spite of the care taken. The trial Court held












































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