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SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
N.L. UNTWALIA AND R.S. PATHAK, JJ.**
State of Maharashtra, Appellant
Versus
Veerappa R. Saboji and another, Respondents.
Civil Appeal No. 628 of 1976
Decided on 6-9-1979.
Advocates appeared
Mr. M. N. Phadke, Sr. Advocate (M/s. S. K. Mehta and M. N. Shroff, Advocates with him), for Appellant; M/s. G. L. Sanghi and F. S. Nariman, Sr. Advocates (Mr. K. R. Nagaraja, Advocate with them), for Respondent No.1
* Spl. Civil Appln. No. 138 of 1972, D/-4-3-1976 (Bom).
** The Judgments are printed in the order in which they are given in the certified copy. The first judgment is not therefore, necessarily the leading judgment - Ed.
-held, though the principle is undisputed difficulty may arise in its application from case to case.
Certainly. Based on the provided legal document, here are the key points:
The case involves the termination of a temporary government servant, specifically a judicial officer appointed on probation, whose services were terminated before confirmation, and whether such termination constitutes a punishment requiring compliance with Article 311(2) of the Constitution [judgement_subject].
The appointment letter explicitly indicated that the initial appointment was on probation for two years and was purely temporary, with the understanding that services could be terminated without notice during probation (!) .
The rules governing recruitment specify that a government servant appointed on probation must be confirmed after the probation period if certain conditions are met, but there is no automatic confirmation; confirmation depends on the fulfillment of specific criteria and an express order of confirmation (!) (!) (!) .
The expiration of the probationary period does not automatically confirm a government servant; confirmation requires a clear, explicit order, and continued service beyond the probation period without such an order does not imply confirmation (!) (!) .
The termination of a government servant’s services in an officiating or temporary capacity, especially when the order does not explicitly cast a stigma or penal consequence, is generally not considered a punishment and thus does not violate Article 311(2), provided the order is not made with malicious intent or mala fide motives (!) (!) .
The court emphasizes the importance of examining the nature of the order on its face and the circumstances surrounding it to determine whether it is punitive or a simple termination, and whether procedural safeguards under Article 311(2) have been followed (!) (!) .
The official records and departmental reports may be scrutinized if there is a prima facie case that the order was made as a punishment, but such scrutiny is not warranted where the order on its face is a straightforward termination and there is no evidence suggesting mala fide intentions (!) (!) .
The burden of proof lies on the government to demonstrate that the order was not punitive if the government servant claims it was made as a punishment, and the court should avoid delving into departmental records unless such a case is established (!) (!) .
The court recognizes that delays in confirmation can occur for administrative reasons and that continued service beyond the probationary period without an explicit confirmation order does not imply automatic confirmation (!) (!) .
The case highlights that actions taken against government servants must be justified by valid reasons and should not be motivated by mala fide or malicious intent, especially when such actions impact the rights and reputation of the employee (!) (!) .
The decision underscores the principle that the form of the order alone does not determine its nature; the surrounding circumstances and the intent behind the order are crucial for classification as punitive or simple termination (!) (!) .
Overall, the ruling clarifies that temporary or officiating government servants can be lawfully terminated through a simple notice unless the termination is accompanied by or intended as a punitive measure, which would require adherence to procedural safeguards under constitutional provisions (!) (!) .
Let me know if you need further analysis or specific legal advice related to this case.
JUDGMENT
UNTWALIA, J.:—This appeal by special leave has been preferred by the State of Maharashtra from the judgment of the Bombay High Court given in a Writ Petition filed by respondent No.1 for quashing the order of termination of his service. The High Court has allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the order.
2. Respondent No.1 was appointed a Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, on probation in accordance with the Bombay Judicial Service Recruitment Rules, 1956 - hereinafter referred to as the Rules. In paragraph 3 of the appointment letter dated 31st October, 1960 it was clearly stated :-
"You will be on probation for a period of two years from the date on which you take charge of your appointment, and during this period your appointment is liable to be terminated without notice. After the period of probation your services are liable to be terminated on one months notice as long as your appointment is temporary. It should be clearly understood that your appointment at present is purely temporary".
Respondent No.1 pursuant to the said letter of appointment joined the Judicial Service, Class II, in the State of Maharashtra on the 7th December, 1960. The two years probationary period originally fixed expired on 6th December, 1962; even so he was allowed to continue in the post only in an officiating capacity and was not confirmed. His services were terminated by a simple order of termination dated the 15th December, 1971 which ran as follows :-
"The Government is pleased to terminate the services of Shri V. R. Saboji, Officiating Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Kalamnuri, District Parbhani with effect from 1st February, 1972".
A copy of the above order was forwarded to and served upon the first respondent along with a covering letter of that date expressly stating therein:-
"Your appointment is still temporary and your services are liable to be terminated on one months notice. I am to state that Government has decided to terminate your services with effect from 1st February, 1972 and that you will, therefore cease to be in service with effect (from) that date. A formal order is enclosed herewith".
3. The first respondent challenged the order of his termination in the High Court by filing a Writ Petition impleading the then Law Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra as respondent No.1, State of Maharashtra, respondent No.2 and S/Shri K. N. Wahi and P. G. Karnik as respondents 3 and 4 respectively. To put it briefly, the case made out by the first respondent in his Writ Petition was that he had become a confirmed Government servant and the order terminating his services simpliciter was by way of punishment. Respondents 3 and 4 were respectively District and Inspecting District Judges in the District where respondent No.1 happened to work under them. They bore some ill-feeling and ill-will against him and had made certain enquiries and reported the matter to the High Court as a result of which, according to the belief of the said respondent, some adverse remarks were given to him and his services were terminated at the insinuation of the said two officers. Affidavits were filed on behalf of the State of Maharashtra and respondents 3 and 4 as well. The latter two in their counters denied the allegations of mala fides against them.
4. In the High Court the following five points were urged on behalf of respondent No.1:-
"(1) That the order of termination has been passed as by way of punishment which amounts, in fact, to dismissal and since the provisions of Article 311 (2) have not been complied with, the order is void :
(2) That the petitioner has been purposefully picked for discharge when many of his juniors were allowed to be retained. Therefore, the order is violative of Article 16 of the Constitution.
(3) The order has been passed mala fide with a view to circumvent the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution;
(4) The petitioner had, in fact, at the time of ter
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