JUDGMENT

SARKARIA, J.:— Whether a lease of a premises for carrying on the business of retreading of tyres is a lease for "manufacturing purposes" within the contemplation of Section 106, Transfer of Property Act, is the only question that falls for consideration in this appeal by special leave directed against a judgment, dated December 11, 1968, of the High Court of Allahabad. The question arises in these circumstances :

The plaintiff-respondent let out the accommodation in dispute at a rent of Rs.650/- per annum to the defendant who was doing the business of retreading of tyres in the said premises. The defendant defaulted in payment of rent. The plaintiff, therefore sent one months notice to the defendant terminating his tenancy. Thereafter, the plaintiff instituted a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment against the defendant.

2. The suit was resisted, inter alia, on the ground that the premises in dispute had been let out to him for manufacturing purposes and in view of Section 106, Transfer of Property Act, therefore, the lease could be terminated by the landlady only by six months notice expiring with the end of the year of tenancy and since the plaintiff had served only 30 days notice, the same was invalid and ineffective to terminate the tenancy.

3. The trial Court and the First Appellate Court concurrently decreed the suit for arrears of rent as well as for ejectment.

4. The only ground urged before the First Appellate Court and the High Court was that the tenancy being for manufacturing purposes, could not be terminated by one months notice. All the courts below negatived this contention and have concurrently held that the retreading of tyres is not a manufacturing purpose and, therefore, 30 days notice given by the plaintiff to the defendant for terminating his tenancy, was valid.

5. Mr. Khadar, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, contends that the process of retreading old tyres, involves the use of sophisticated machinery and results in bringing into being a distinct commercial commodity. It is argued that the essential test of a manufacturing process is that it must bring about a change in the character, quality or user of the old material processed so as to produce a distinct marketable article, but it is not necessary that the old material should completely lose its identity. It is urged that the High Court was in error in taking the view that from the process of retreading old tyres a commercially different article does not emerge. In support of the proposition that a process by which a useless article becomes useful and its character or use is changed is a manufacturing process, counsel has cited Commr. of Sales Tax U. P. v. Dr. Sukh Deo (1969) 1 SCR 710, Allenburry Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Ramkrishna Dalamia (1973) 2 SCR 257, State of Maharashtra v. Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. (1977) 1 SCR 1002 North Bengal Stores Ltd. v. Member, Board of Revenue, Bengal, (1938-50) 1 STC 157; and an Australian case Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Jack Zinadar Proprietary Ltd. (1948-49) 78 CLR 336 (Aus).

6. The expression "manufacturing purposes" has not been defined in the Transfer of Property Act. It has therefore, to be construed in its popular sense. According to the Permanent Edition of Words and Phrases, Vol. 26, manufacture implies a change but every change is not manufacture and yet every change in an article is the result of treatment, labour and manipulation. But something more is necessary and there must be transformation, a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or use. This construction of the expression "manufacture" received the imprimatur of this Court in South Bihar Sugar Mills v. Union of India (1968) 3 SCR 21. But the case directly in point is Allenbury Engineers Ltd. v. Ramkrishna Dalamia, ibid, wherein the question for consideration before this Court was whether the lease in favour of Allenbury Engineers was for "manufacturing purposes" w