JUDGMENT

BHAGWATI, J.:—This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment of the Gujarat High Court enhancing the sentence imposed on the appellant by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jhagadia, for an offence under S. 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

2. The appellant was charged before the learned Judicial Magistrate for an offence under S. 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Act for selling adulterated turmeric powder to respondent No.2 who was, at the material time, a Food Inspector in the employ of the State. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the offence charged against him and a trial was thereupon held by the learned Judicial Magistrate. The prosecution led the evidence of respondent No.2 and one Thakurbhai who was one of the panch witnesses in whose presence the turmeric powder was purchased by respondent No.2 and the certificate of the Public Analyst showing that the turmeric powder was adulterated was also tendered in evidence. The prosecution closed its case and thereafter the appellant was examined by the learned Judicial Magistrate under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the same day, presumably as a result of plea-bargaining to which the learned Judicial Magistrate was also perhaps a party, the appellant submitted an application admitting his guilt and praying that since he was a poor man and this was his first offence, leniency should be shown to him. The learned Judicial Magistrate thereupon proceeded to make an order convicting the appellant of the offence under S. 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Act and sentencing him to suffer simple imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 300 or in default to suffer further rigorous imprisonment for one month.

3. It appears that through an anonymous application the High Court came to know that though the appellant was convicted of an offence under S. 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Act and there was a minimum sentence prescribed for such offence, the learned Judicial Magistrate had let off the appellant lightly with only one days simple imprisonment in breach of the mandatory requirement in the Act. The High Court thereupon in suo motu exercise of its revisional jurisdiction issued a notice to the appellant to show cause why the sentence imposed on him should not be enhanced and the proceeding thus initiated was treated as a criminal revision application. The learned single Judge before whom the criminal revision application came up for hearing took the view that though the appellant had admitted his guilt by filing an application after the closing of the prosecution evidence, the learned Judicial Magistrate had not founded his order convicting the appellant on the admission of guilt but he had considered the evidence led by the prosecution and come to the conclusion on the basis of such evidence that the appellant was guilty of the offence charged against him and the conviction was, therefore, not vitiated, but so far as the sentence was concerned, it was patently in breach of the requirement of S. 16 (1) (a) (i) of the Act which provided for a minimum sentence of imprisonment for three months and the learned single Judge, therefore, enhanced the sentence to three months simple imprisonment and also increased the amount of the fine from Rs.300 to Rs.500. This decision of the High Court is assailed in the present appeal preferred by the appellant after obtaining special leave from this Court.

4. The principal contention advanced on behalf of the appellant was that though the learned Judicial Magistrate considered the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution and did not act solely on the admission of guilt made by the appellant, his approach to the evidence was coloured by the admission of guilt and since the admission of guilt was not made by the appellant at the stage of making his plea before the commencement of the prosecution evidence, but only after the prosecution evidence was closed and he had already been examined