JUDGMENT

FAZAL ALI, J.:— These appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court by which the conviction and sentence of the appellants under Ss. 120B, 477A and 409 of the Indian Penal Code were upheld or modified to some extent. So far as appellant No. 1 is concerned, who was also accused No. 1 at the trial, his appeal is limited to the question of sentence as also the nature of the offence. The special leave granted to A. 24 is open. Since all these appeals were decided by the High Court by one judgment we also propose to dispose of the appeals by one common judgment. The facts of the case have been detailed in the judgment of the courts below and it is not necessary for us to repeat the same over and again.

2. We have heard learned counsel for both the parties at length and have also gone through the judgment of the High Court and that of the Sessions Judge and have also gone through the record of the case. On a perusal of the record and judgment of the High Court we are clearly of the opinion that these appeals are concluded by findings of facts. It is well settled that this Court in special leave will not interfere with concurrent findings of facts unless the findings are vitiated by a grave error of law or by an error which leads to serious and substantial miscarriage of justice. After a perusal of the judgment of the courts below we find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court and are unable to find any special circumstances which require our interference with the order passed by the High Court.

3. A number of contentions were raised by the counsel for the various accused and after considering those contentions we find that they have been fully met by the High Court in its very well reasoned judgment which has considered various shades, aspects and points in controversy.

4. So far as appellant No. 1 (accused No. 1) Mr. Chitale who has argued the case with his usual ingenuity and persuasiveness submitted three points before us. It was argued that the appellant No. 1 had resigned from the office of the managing director of bank and therefore he could not be held liable for misappropriation committed after he had relinquished his office. So far this is concerned, it has been clearly found by the High Court that even though he acted as Chairman of the bank and had relinquished the office as Managing Director, he was for all practical purpose functioning as Managing Director of the Laxmi Bank throughout the material period. This finding is based on a thorough analysis and consideration of the evidence adduced before the Court. In view of this finding it is manifest that even though the first appellant may have relinquished his office as managing director still he had full control over the affairs of the bank and virtually acted as de facto managing director. For these reasons, therefore, the first contention raised by Mr. Chitale must be overruled.

5. Secondly, it was contended that substitution of one chose in action for another will not amount to a breach of trust or conversion to his own use by the accused. In R. K. Dalmia v. Delhi Administration reported in (1963) 1 SCR 253 this Court while relying on authorities of the Lahore Court and other courts has clearly found that a director is not only an agent but is in the position of trustee. This has been held in People Bank v. Harikishan Lal, AIR 1936 Lah 408 at p. 409 which was approved by this Court. In this connection this Court observed as follows:-

"Both Dalmia and Chokhani therefore had dominion over the funds of the Insurance Company."

6. In People Bank v. Harikishan Lal (supra) it was stated:-

Lal Harikishan Lal as Chairman is a trustee of all the moneys of the Bank.

7. In Palmers Company Law, 20th Edn. It is stated at p. 517.

"Directors are not only agents but they are in some sense and to some extent trustees or in the position of trustees."

8. Similarly this Court pointed out that in case of G.E.R. 7 Co. v. Tu