JUDGMENT

PATHAK, J.:— This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment of the High Court at Calcutta dated May 8 and 12, 1978 in so far as it directs the Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment in respect of the appellant.

2. The appellant is a banking company incorporated in the United Kingdom with its registered office at London. It carries on banking business in India, and is assessed under the Income-tax Act, 1961.

3. The appellant filed a return of its income for the assessment year 1972-73. During the assessment proceeding, the Income-tax Officer issued a notice under Section 142 (1) of the Income-tax Act requiring the appellant to produce certain account books and documents. The appellant applied against the notice to the High Court at Calcutta under Article 226 of the Constitution. A learned single Judge of the High Court did not accept the wide construction which the appellant sought to put upon the impugned notice, and construing it in specific limited terms he directed the appellant to comply with it. The appellant preferred an appeal in the High Court. Meanwhile, pursuant to the direction by the learned single Judge, the Income-tax Officer made an assessment order on March 31, 1977. Thereafter, the appeal was allowed by a Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated May 8 and 12, 1978, and the impugned notice under Section 142 (1) and the consequent assessment order were quashed. But while doing so, the Division Bench also directed this Income-tax Officer to make a fresh assessment. Aggrieved by that direction, the appellant applied for, and obtained, special leave to appeal, to this Court.

4. The sole question before us is whether the High Court erred in directing a fresh assessment. The appellant contends that the High Court was in error in making the direction because the assessment had already become barred by limitation and thereby a valuable right not to be assessed had accrued to the appellant, and the High Court was not competent to deprive the appellant of that accused right.

5. It is necessary first to examine whether the bar of limitation had come into play at any time before the High Court passed the impugned order.

6. The assessment year under consideration is the year 1972-73. By virtue of Section 153 (1) (a) (iii) of the Income-tax Act, no assessment order in respect of that assessment year could be made after two years from the end of that assessment year. The end of the assessment year is March 31, 1975. However, the appellant filed the writ petition on March 17, 1975, fourteen days before the end of the period for making the assessment order. On the same date, March 17, 1975, the learned single Judge granted an interim injunction restraining the Income-tax Officer from proceeding with the assessment, and on March 25, 1975, the injunction was made operative for the pendency of the writ petition. The writ petition was disposed of by the learned single Judge by his judgment dated August 31, 1976. It is apparent that the assessment proceedings remained stayed throughout the period from March 17, 1975 to August 31, 1976 by virtue of the orders of the court. As has been mentioned the learned single Judge disposed of the writ petition on August 31, 1976. In his Judgment, besides directing the appellant to comply with the notice under Section 142 (1) as construed by him, he also included a direction to the Income-tax Officer to complete the assessment by March 31, 1977. On September 22, 1976, he amended his judgment inasmuch as it now required that "the assessment for the relevant year must be completed on the 31st of March, 1977 but must not be completed before 31st March, 1977". In other words, while the Income-tax Officer could continue with the assessment proceedings he was restrained by the Court from making the assessment order before, and in fact could make it only on, March 31, 1977. Now it is important to note that when the amendment was made by the learned single Judge